灰色预测模型在非致命武器经济寿命预测中的应用

针对目前非致命武器经济寿命方面的研究相当缺乏的现状,结合非致命武器的自身特点,在全面分析装备全寿命周期费用的基础上,引入灰色理论,运用GM（1,1）模型对非致命武器的经济寿命周期费用进行估算和预测。通过分析,灰色预测模型具有较高的建模精度,预测方法和结果对非致命武器的经济寿命预测具有很强的实用性。     

基于RMS特性的武器装备的系统效能评估模型

为了保证武器装备的战斗力,建立了基于可靠性、维修性和保障性(RMS)的系统效能评估模型。定义系统效能的度量,分析其影响因素。针对执行任务期间装备发生故障时难修复和可修复两种情况,通过模型可用性、可信度及能力矩阵,分别求出基于RMS特性的武器装备系统效能表达式(ERMS),从而得出相应评估模型。     

Let’s make a (nuclear) deal: Bargaining,credibility, and the third offset strategy

An institutional perspective on nuclear deterrence cooperation within alliances has the potential to fundamentally reorient how we think about analyzing nuclear and deterrence decision-making between nuclear patrons and non-nuclear clients. It comes at a time when the presidency of Donald Trump is sure to test many of the core claims and assumptions in security studies, especially relating to bargaining and credibility within alliances. This article surveys questions that will be core to the research agenda involving alliance institutions and nuclear weapons during the Trump presidency and beyond.     

Enhancing Political Cohesion in NATO during the 1950s or: How it Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the (Tactical) Bomb

This article argues that the perceived need by NATO to nurture political cohesion within the Alliance during the 1950s resulted in the adoption of strategic concepts that were out-of-step with the military environment in which it was operating. It maintains that the Alliance acquiesced to American leadership on nuclear issues which led to the development of tactical nuclear capabilities at the expense of conventional war-fighting capabilities for the defence of the European Central Front. This resulted in a strategic concept that enhanced political cohesion but was militarily unviable.     

非致命武器系统安全性分析

非致命武器在各类防暴和处突任务中发挥着重要作用,为提高非致命武器的系统安全性,给出了系统安全性的定义,明确了非致命武器系统安全性的组成,分析了非致命武器本质(固有)安全性和使用安全性的关系。在建立非致命武器系统安全性评价指标的基础上,建立了适用于非致命武器的安全管理系统模型,为非致命武器的安全管理模式提供了一种新的思路。     

Nuclear opportunism: A theory of how states use nuclear weapons in international politics

How do states use nuclear weapons to achieve their goals in international politics? Nuclear weapons can influence state decisions about a range of strategic choices relating to military aggression, the scope of foreign policy objectives, and relations with allies. The article offers a theory to explain why emerging nuclear powers use nuclear weapons to facilitate different foreign policies: becoming more or less aggressive; providing additional support to allies or proxies, seeking independence from allies; or expanding the state’s goals in international politics. I argue that a state’s choices depend on the presence of severe territorial threats or an ongoing war, the presence of allies that provide for the state’s security, and whether the state is increasing in relative power. The conclusion discusses implications of the argument for our understanding of nuclear weapons and the history of proliferation, and nonproliferation policy today.     

How durable is the nuclear weapons taboo?

The nuclear weapons taboo is considered one of the strongest norms in international politics. A prohibition against using nuclear weapons has seemingly shaped state behavior for nearly seven decades and, according to some observers, made nuclear use ‘unthinkable’ today or in the future. Although scholars have shown that nuclear aversion has affected decision-making behavior, important questions about the nuclear taboo remain unanswered. This article seeks to answer a basic question: How durable is the taboo? We develop different predictions about norm durability depending on whether the taboo is based primarily on moral logic or strategic logic. We use the comparable case of the norm against strategic bombing in the 20th century to evaluate these hypotheses. The logic and evidence presented in this paper suggest that the norm of nuclear non-use is much more fragile than most analysts understand.     

Precision cyber weapon systems: An important component of a responsible national security strategy?

Given the advances made in conventional weapon capabilities, precision should by now be the accepted and expected norm in cyberspace as well. In this article I argue that developing precision cyber weapon systems, to be used during a lawful conflict, can be an important part of a responsible national security strategy to reduce the amount of violence and physical destruction in conflicts. I first describe a precision cyber weapon system in a military context. I then present three compelling rationales for the development of precision cyber weapon systems based on ethical, operational, and financial considerations. To support the position, I address several arguments that have been levied against their development. Thereafter I present several recommendations for a way ahead.     

轻武器寿命可靠性模型研究

为轻武器寿命可靠性评定提供理论依据,运用经典的可靠性理论,将轻武器装备寿命试验归结为可修复系统的有替换定时截尾试验,通过分析某型机枪的寿命试验数据,对母体寿命可能的分布类型作出假设,选择χ2检验法对假设进行拟合优度检验,利用最小二乘法得出对应分布的线性相关系数,通过比较确定母体分布类型,建立了该型机枪寿命的可靠性数学模型,对同类轻武器装备的可靠性指标评定提供了一定的参考。     

武器系统训练质量综合评估研究

探讨了武器系统训练质量综合评估的方法。综合考虑平时训练成绩和演习考核成绩,从静态和动态2个方面入手分析了武器系统训练质量的影响因素;以某炮兵武器系统为例,建立了综合评估指标体系;运用多级模糊综合评判法实现了对某炮兵武器系统营训练质量的综合评估。