恩德炉煤气化工艺的防火设计

恩德炉煤气化工艺是煤炭资源转变为石油化工产品的有效技术途径之一。在介绍实际工程工艺概况的基础上,分析了恩德炉煤气化工艺的火灾危险性,并对恩德炉煤气化工艺的防火设计进行了研究。     

舰载电子设备布线设计方法及其工程应用

针对舰载电子设备布线所导致的电磁兼容问题,以及传统电子设备布线设计效率和布线施工效率低等问题,在介绍布线设计技术的基础上,提出了一种舰载电子设备布线设计的方法。在此基础上,给出了在没有进行三维布线设计的情况下,布线设计的替代方案——一种简化的布线设计方法。通过舰载电子设备布线设计,给出了解决电子设备电磁兼容问题的方法,提高了电子设备布线设计效率和布线施工效率。     

基于RMS特性的武器装备的系统效能评估模型

为了保证武器装备的战斗力,建立了基于可靠性、维修性和保障性(RMS)的系统效能评估模型。定义系统效能的度量,分析其影响因素。针对执行任务期间装备发生故障时难修复和可修复两种情况,通过模型可用性、可信度及能力矩阵,分别求出基于RMS特性的武器装备系统效能表达式(ERMS),从而得出相应评估模型。     

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons: how safe is safe enough? Transparency versus opacity

Due to expanding and increasing religious extremism and terrorism coupled with political instability in Pakistan, most western observers believe that Pakistan's nuclear weapons are not secure and could be taken over by terrorists. This would have adverse implications for the region and for global peace, especially for the security of USA and Europe. This article argues that this perception is based on a flawed understanding and knowledge of how Pakistan's command and control setup has evolved and operates. Pakistan's nuclear weapons are as safe as any other state's nuclear weapons. Pakistan has also been active in supporting and participating in global efforts to improve nuclear safety and security. Over the years, Pakistan has been quite open in sharing information regarding how it is improving its command and control system with western governments as well as scholars. This article argues that the steps Pakistan has taken to secure its nuclear weapons are adequate and that Pakistan would continue to further strengthen these measures; however, it is the expanding religious extremism, terrorism and anti-Americanism in the country which make the international perception of Pakistan extremely negative and then seep into the perception of Pakistan's nuclear weapons safety and security.     

Strategic “defensivism” and post-reset blues: US–Russian nuclear arms reductions,missile defenses and minimum deterrence

US nuclear deterrence and arms control policy may be moving, by design and by inadvertence, toward a posture of strategic “defensivism”. Strategic “defensivism” emphasizes the overlapping and reinforcing impact of: (1) reductions in US, Russian and possibly other strategic nuclear forces, possibly down to the level of “minimum deterrence,” (2) deployment of improved strategic and/or theater antimissile defenses for the US, NATO allies and other partners; and (3) additional reliance on conventional military forces for some missions hitherto preferentially assigned to nuclear weapons. This article deals with the first two of these aspects only: the interaction between missile defenses and offensive force reductions in US–Russian strategy and policy. The findings are that stable deterrence as between the USA and Russia is possible at lower than New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty levels, but reductions below 1000 deployed long-range weapons for each state, toward a true minimum deterrent posture, will require multilateral as opposed to bilateral coordination of arms limitations. Missile defenses might provide some denial capability against light attacks by states with small arsenals, but they still fall short of meaningful damage limitation as between powers capable of massive nuclear strikes.