THE NPT

This article assesses the successes and failures of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) since its creation in 1968 by developing and applying a set of “metrics” to each of the NPT's substantive articles as well as to its withdrawal provisions. In light of this analysis, the article also puts forward some specific proposals for strengthening the NPT and its implementation, with a view to the debate and decisions at the upcoming 2010 NPT Review Conference. A concluding section turns explicitly to the 2010 NPT Review Conference and proposes pursuit of agreement on three NPT Action Plans: one for nonproliferation, one for peaceful uses, and one for nuclear disarmament. Combining vision and practicable steps, these Action Plans would set out a roadmap for action between the 2010 and the 2015 NPT Review Conferences. They could provide a foundation for substantive exchanges—in this case, on progress toward their implementation—during the preparations for the 2015 conference.     

军用仿生技术发展趋势

仿生技术是武器装备发展的核心技术,已成为新概念武器装备发展及性能提升的常用方法,具有极其广阔的应用前景。文章针对仿生技术的发展历程、技术现状及其在军事装备发展中所发挥的作用进行阐述,分析了决定军事仿生技术发展的生物结构表征技术、仿生设计技术、生物制造技术与军事应用具体特点,以及军事仿生技术发展趋势。     

试论性能化防火设计在消防监督工作中的局限性——以某商业综合体为例

近年来,超大体量建设工程大多通过性能化防火设计方法解决超规范设计的问题,虽然性能化防火设计在理论、模拟计算和分析论证上满足设定安全目标,但设计评估过程忽视我国国情、社会环境影响、公民素质及安全管理水平等实际情况,过分依赖后期管理,如处理不当,极易产生新的消防安全隐患.以某商业综合体为例,分析性能化防火设计的建筑物在实际消防监督工作中的局限性,旨在提醒各级消防监管部门、性能化设计评估单位、评审专家充分认识外部环境对性能化设计方案的影响,使性能化设计更加符合实际.     

基于渐进性的线性方程组教学设计的研究

针对线性方程组传统教学中的一些问题,给出了引入线性方程组、解线性方程组、分析解结构的渐进性三步教学设计,同时给出了maple求解线性方程组的两种方法,将理论与实践初步结合了起来,丰富了教学手段,激发了学生的学习兴趣。     

Kazakhstan's Nuclear Decision Making, 1991–92

This article examines Kazakhstani nuclear decision making from December 1991 to May 1992. The study is based on unique archival data and reveals how Kazakhstan's policy makers solved a nuclear dilemma that the nation faced in its first years of independence. The article reconstructs the internal policy-making process behind the decision made by President Nursultan Nazarbayev and his circle of advisors to accept non-nuclear status. The author argues that Almaty elaborated a deliberately ambivalent strategy toward the republic's nuclear status with the aim of maximizing the state's strategic interests. The article reviews external pressures affecting Nazarbayev's course of action and discusses policy options articulated during this period.     

Special Section: Nuclear Stability In South Asia

The question of nuclear stability in South Asia is a subject of both academic and policy significance. It is the only region in the world that has three, contiguous nuclear-armed states: India, the People's Republic of China, and Pakistan. It is also freighted with unresolved border disputes. To compound matters, all three states are now modernizing their nuclear forces and have expressed scant interest in any form of regional arms control. These issues and developments constitute the basis of this special section, which explores the problems and prospects of nuclear crisis stability in the region.     

某自行火炮全弹道多学科优化设计

为提高某自行火炮弹丸的杀伤效能,寻求该火炮全弹道设计参数间更优的匹配关系,并缩短全弹道设计周期,根据其包含的内弹道、外弹道和终点效应3个分学科之间的耦合关系,建立自行火炮全弹道多学科优化设计模型。以射程最大、杀伤面积最大为优化目标,进行全弹道优化设计。与单目标优化方法对比,多目标优化有效提高了该火炮弹道的综合性能,避免了单个目标优化时其他目标劣化的现象。     

基于实数编码遗传算法的超宽带波形设计

采用实数编码的遗传算法对超宽带(UWB)波形进行了独特设计。以正弦高斯脉冲作为基函数,提出了一种新的适应度函数表示方法,应用此方法设计出了更符合美国联邦通信委员会(FCC)提出的辐射掩蔽特性要求的脉冲波形,并对设计脉冲进行了链路预算。仿真结果表明:采用实数编码的遗传算法优化设计得到的超宽带波形效果好且仿真时间复杂度低;与随机组合脉冲相比,设计出的脉冲在信号传输性能方面更具优势。     

Strategic “defensivism” and post-reset blues: US–Russian nuclear arms reductions,missile defenses and minimum deterrence

US nuclear deterrence and arms control policy may be moving, by design and by inadvertence, toward a posture of strategic “defensivism”. Strategic “defensivism” emphasizes the overlapping and reinforcing impact of: (1) reductions in US, Russian and possibly other strategic nuclear forces, possibly down to the level of “minimum deterrence,” (2) deployment of improved strategic and/or theater antimissile defenses for the US, NATO allies and other partners; and (3) additional reliance on conventional military forces for some missions hitherto preferentially assigned to nuclear weapons. This article deals with the first two of these aspects only: the interaction between missile defenses and offensive force reductions in US–Russian strategy and policy. The findings are that stable deterrence as between the USA and Russia is possible at lower than New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty levels, but reductions below 1000 deployed long-range weapons for each state, toward a true minimum deterrent posture, will require multilateral as opposed to bilateral coordination of arms limitations. Missile defenses might provide some denial capability against light attacks by states with small arsenals, but they still fall short of meaningful damage limitation as between powers capable of massive nuclear strikes.