面向航天装备大数据的知识图谱体系

近年来,航天装备大数据平台建设已经取得了长足进步。然而,航天装备数据深层次价值仍然未被有效发掘,关键原因在于现有大数据业务数据存在无法跨专业贯通、缺乏全局数据资源智能分析及管理。知识图谱技术作为大数据时代的推理和分析利器,与航天装备大数据完成无缝对接具有天然的优势和内在动机。本文从研究面向航天装备数据知识图谱的/组织管理、关联分析、数据挖掘、知识可视化等开放式共享服务出发,通过大数据、人工智能方法挖掘航天数据的应用潜力,并引入数据化决策模型和监控体系,建立航天装备数据全息画像,实现业务数据的跨业务贯通,并提供网格化的高速检索,以求通过提升数据管理的规范化、标准化、精益化水平指导航天装备的优化和升级。     

Background dominant colors extraction method based on color image quick fuzzy c-means clustering algorithm

A quick and accurate extraction of dominant colors of background images is the basis of adaptive camouflage design. This paper proposes a Color Image Quick Fuzzy C-Means (CIQFCM) clustering algorithm based on clustering spatial mapping. First, the clustering sample space was mapped from the image pixels to the quantized color space, and several methods were adopted to compress the amount of clustering samples. Then, an improved pedigree clustering algorithm was applied to obtain the initial class centers. Finally, CIQFCM clustering algorithm was used for quick extraction of dominant colors of background image. After theoretical analysis of the effect and efficiency of the CIQFCM algorithm, several experiments were carried out to discuss the selection of proper quantization intervals and to verify the effect and efficiency of the CIQFCM algorithm. The results indicated that the value of quantization intervals should be set to 4, and the proposed algorithm could improve the clustering efficiency while maintaining the clustering effect. In addition, as the image size increased from 128 × 128 to 1024 × 1024, the efficiency improvement of CIQFCM algorithm was increased from 6.44 times to 36.42 times, which demonstrated the significant advantage of CIQFCM algorithm in dominant colors extraction of large-size images.     

卫星导航系统功率增强子星座优化设计与性能分析

卫星功率增强技术是提高区域导航信号抗干扰性能的一种有效措施,在卫星导航全星座中优选出卫星数量少、服务性能优的功率增强子星座,是新一代卫星导航系统建设迫切需要解决的问题。因此提出基于卫星数最少准则的功率增强子星座优化设计方法,详细介绍设计流程、数学模型及最优解搜索策略;定义了可用性水平、精度水平和覆盖范围等指标评估功率增强子星座性能;以GPS为例,分别针对覆盖点目标和区域目标两种应用背景进行功率增强子星座优化设计及性能评估。分析结果表明:全球范围内任意目标点进行功率增强需要12～17颗卫星;实现对我国沿海地区的连续覆盖需要18颗功率增强卫星;覆盖整个亚太地区则需要全星座24颗卫星都具备功率增强能力,这样才能满足其连续性和精度要求,此时最优功率增强子星座的服务范围可扩充至全球区域。     

演化排列优化拉丁超立方设计方法

拉丁超立方设计是最常用的计算机试验设计方法之一,针对现有拉丁超立方设计方法采样一次性且难以兼顾设计的空间均匀性和计算效率的问题,提出了一种演化排列拉丁超立方试验设计方法。通过对小样本设计的演化、排列信息继承和扩充等操作,以较小的计算量实现了样本的扩充与优化。此外,所提方法可以兼顾现有样本和新增采样点之间的关系,实现样本的序列扩充,这在实际近似建模过程中十分方便。通过多组数值试验,验证了本文方法在空间均匀性和计算效率等方面的优越性。     

Controlling Novichoks after Salisbury: revising the Chemical Weapons Convention schedules

ABSTRACT

Novichok agents are a class of nerve agents developed by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. In light of the use of a Novichok agent in Salisbury in March 2018, two sets of proposals to amend Schedule 1 of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) have been put forth, one jointly by the United States, Canada, and the Netherlands, and the other by Russia. Both sets of proposals will be discussed and voted upon at the next Conference of States Parties of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in November 2019. If either set of proposals is approved, it will be the first time that the list of chemicals subject to verification under the CWC will have been modified. This viewpoint will discuss these proposals, and argue that, if adopted, the joint proposal and the portions of the Russian proposal upon which consensus can be reached would significantly strengthen the CWC by considerably expanding the coverage of its Schedule 1 and bringing Novichok agents firmly within the CWC’s verification system. We also argue that, since the OPCW Technical Secretariat did not deem the fifth group of chemicals proposed by Russia to meet the criteria for inclusion in Schedule 1, Russia should withdraw this part of its proposal from consideration. The proposals have also served an important purpose in clarifying the identity of the chemical agent used in the Salisbury incident, squarely placing it within one of the two families of Novichok agents described by the Russian chemical-weapons scientist and whistleblower Vil Mirzayanov. If either proposal is approved in November, it will be important to conduct a thorough assessment of key precursors for the synthesis of Novichok agents and assess the need to amend CWC schedules and national and multinational export-control lists accordingly.     

Pakistan’s nuclear future: continued dependence on asymmetric escalation

ABSTRACT

In 2019, the geostrategic landscape of South Asia significantly changed. A crisis between India and Pakistan involved air strikes across international boundaries for the first time since the 1971 war. Pakistan came close to economic collapse, while India re-elected hawkish Narendra Modi as prime minister in a landslide. These developments, alongside the United States’ efforts to strike a deal to leave Afghanistan and rapidly improving US-India relations, portend new challenges for Pakistan’s security managers—challenges that nuclear weapons are ill-suited to address. Despite the shifting security and political situation in the region, however, Pakistan’s nuclear posture and doctrine seem unlikely to change. This article explores the roots of Pakistan’s reliance on the traditional predictions of the nuclear revolution, most notably the notion that nuclear-armed states will not go to war with one another, and argues that this reliance on nuclear deterrence is a response both to Pakistan’s security environment and to serious constraints on moving away from nuclear weapons toward an improved conventional force posture. Pakistan’s central problems remain the same as when it first contemplated nuclear weapons: the threat from India, the absence of true allies, a weak state and a weaker economy, and few friends in the international system. While 2019 may have been a turning point for other states in the region, Pakistan is likely to stay the course.     

India’s emerging space assets and nuclear-weapons capabilities

ABSTRACT

Over the last five decades, India’s nuclear and space programs have gone through several phases, from collaboration to divorce to supportive. An interplay of two factors determined the nature of the relationship. One was the state of India’s nuclear-weapon program. The second was international conditions, especially India’s relationship with the nuclear-nonproliferation regime. In the early decades, because of the rudimentary nature of India’s nuclear and space programs, the relationship was collaborative, since the rocket technology being developed was a necessary adjunct to the nuclear-weapon program. Subsequently, as India’s rocketry capabilities and nuclear-weapon program began to mature and concerns about international sanctions under the non-proliferation regime began to grow, the two programs were separated. The Indian rocketry program was also divided, with the civilian-space and ballistic-missile programs clearly demarcated. After India declared itself a nuclear-weapon state in 1998 and the programs matured, the relationship has become more supportive. As the two programs mature further, this relationship is likely to deepen, as the nuclear-weapon program requires space assets to build a robust and survivable nuclear deterrent force.     

Cyber-weapons in nuclear counter-proliferation

ABSTRACT

Under what conditions are cyber-weapons effective in nuclear counter-proliferation? With continued interest in nuclear proliferation professed by Iran, North Korea, and Saudi Arabia, a discussion of the effectiveness of counter-proliferation measures remains relevant. Cyber-attacks as military option in a state-on-state conflict still requires additional corroborating evidence to make conclusions about its long-term effectiveness. This work analyses the general applicability of cyber-weapons and their usefulness in nuclear counter-proliferation. Through a comparative case study of Operation Orchard, Stuxnet, and recent “Left-of-Launch” operations against North Korea, the essay finds that cyber-operations are not particularly effective against nuclear programmes that are in the later stages of their development. They can disrupt and delay a nuclear programme temporarily, if the attack remains clandestine, but cannot halt nuclear proliferation all together. However, effectiveness increases if they are used in combination with conventional weapons. The article addresses a topic of interest to national-level decision-makers: whether cyber-operations can and should play a role in nuclear counter-proliferation.     

Amphetamines,Cognitive Enhancement and their Implications for Medical Military Ethics

ABSTRACT

The growing area of military bio-technologies, especially the use of cogniceuticals, raises several ethical concerns for military physicians. These include the role of military physicians in prescribing amphetamines whose long-term effects are largely unknown, and the possible undermining of the ethic of “do no harm,” since amphetamines may diminish a soldier’s moral responsibility. Below, we outline some important questions relating to the ethics of amphetamines and medical military physicians.     

Chemical-weapon use in Syria: atrocities,attribution, and accountability

ABSTRACT

International efforts to hold the government of President Bashar al-Assad accountable for the use of chemical weapons in the Syrian Civil War have entered a new phase. For the first time, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the international organization responsible for implementing the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention, has been empowered to identify the perpetrators of chemical attacks in Syria. The Investigation and Identification Team (IIT), which was formed to conduct the OPCW’s new attribution mission, has announced its intention to investigate and identify the perpetrators of nine chemical attacks in Syria, including the April 7, 2018, attack in Douma. This article reviews recent efforts to attribute chemical attacks in Syria, describes what we know about the nine incidents to be investigated, summarizes what is known about the Syrian government officials, military commanders, and chemical-warfare scientists suspected of being responsible for these attacks, discusses what to expect during the next phase of the attribution process, and offers insights into how the international community can move beyond attribution to accountability. Accountability is necessary to provide justice for victims and to prevent future incidents by demonstrating that perpetrators of chemical attacks will be identified and punished.