高炮瞄准具性能综合测试系统的实现

前置角的准确度是表征高炮瞄准具综合性能的重要指标,而在现有条件下无法对其进行精确测试。为此设计一性能综合测试系统,根据在最佳零位和空回条件下高炮前置角测试结果与理论值间的偏差值,实现对瞄准具性能的准确评估。     

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ON THE ROAD TO NUCLEAR ZERO

The disappointingly slow pace of progress on efforts to prevent proliferation, reduce nuclear weapons, and eliminate nuclear risks has many causes. The factor that might be easiest for individuals in the arms control and nonproliferation community to change stems from their own ambivalence about major questions that must be addressed on the road to reducing the number of nuclear weapons in the world to zero. This essay explores how ambivalence about four key issues—strategic stability, alliance relations, institution-building, and nuclear energy—often leads community members to take positions that play well at home and within their like-minded group but raise unintended impediments to achieving their own long-term goals. The author suggests alternative ways to handle these questions to improve the prospects for domestic and international agreement on practical measures that would eliminate, not perpetuate, nuclear risks.     

ZERO NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The current nuclear nonproliferation order is no longer sustainable. The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) has weakened considerably over the years, with nuclear have-nots displaying increased dissatisfaction with the status quo. Meanwhile, demands for civilian nuclear technology have led to increased proliferation risks in the form of dual-use technologies. Arms control as we currently understand it—piecemeal treaties and agreements—is no longer sufficient to address the growing threat of proliferation and the frailty of the NPT. This article calls for a bolder nonproliferation agenda pursuing multilateral nuclear disarmament. Disarmament is, in fact, technologically achievable; a lack of political will stands as the only remaining roadblock to a world free of nuclear weapons. A better understanding of the technological feasibility of disarmament, as well as recognition of the diminishing strategic value of nuclear weapons, will help to erode this political reluctance.     

舰炮弹丸对零航路捷径超声速导弹的侵彻分析

以零航路捷径下小口径舰炮弹丸对超声速反舰导弹的侵彻毁伤效果为研究方向,仿真计算了零航路捷径下小口径舰炮弹丸与超声速反舰导弹的交汇姿态,建立了反舰导弹模型,在此基础上就不同侵彻部位及交汇角度条件下小口径舰炮弹丸对超声速反舰导弹的侵彻毁伤效果进行了有限元仿真,得出了具有统计意义的仿真结果,总结了弹丸无法毁伤导弹战斗部的几点因素。研究对有效评价小口径舰炮弹丸对超声速反舰导弹的毁伤效果以及对导弹整体的易损性分析提供了理论参考。     

环肋轴对称组合壳塑性极限分析的弹性模量调整有限元方法

基于轴对称截锥壳单元,以单元横截面峰值应力为等效应力,建立了弹性模量调整有限元方法,应用Fortran语言编制了有限元软件用于计算环肋轴对称组合壳的塑性极限载荷.该方法根据组合壳的应力分布情况调整轴对称壳单元和肋骨单元的弹性模量,并进行一系列的弹性迭代计算,计算收敛后即可以得到环肋轴对称组合壳的塑性极限载荷.通过对算例的计算证明:该方法具有良好的收敛性和较高的效率,计算结果与试验结果吻合较好.     

New results on a stochastic duel game with each force consisting of heterogeneous units

Two forces engage in a duel, with each force initially consisting of several heterogeneous units. Each unit can be assigned to fire at any opposing unit, but the kill rate depends on the assignment. As the duel proceeds, each force—knowing which units are still alive in real time—decides dynamically how to assign its fire, in order to maximize the probability of wiping out the opposing force before getting wiped out. It has been shown in the literature that an optimal pure strategy exists for this two‐person zero‐sum game, but computing the optimal strategy remained cumbersome because of the game's huge payoff matrix. This article gives an iterative algorithm to compute the optimal strategy without having to enumerate the entire payoff matrix, and offers some insights into the special case, where one force has only one unit. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 56–65, 2014     

维和警察的心理压力及其调控

中国维和警察在联合国维和任务区的特定环境下产生心理压力是必然的,维和警察必须了解产生心理压力的环境因素,学会分析产生心理压力的原因,掌握心理压力的调控方法。     

业主延期条件下FIDIC施工合同条件调价公式研究

调价公式作为FIDIC合同中最重要的风险分配方式之一,通过对可调价要素价格指数或价格的调整,把合同中的隐性风险在业主和承包商之间的分配比例作了明确规定.从承包商的角度,并基于业主的原因造成工期延长的条件下,对调价公式中各个组成因子及其权重对调价结果的影响进行了研究,探索把调价公式同成本管理有机结合起来,以期达到降低成本...     

An inspection game: Taking account of fulfillment probabilities of players' aims

This paper deals with an inspection game of customs and a smuggler. The customs can take two options of assigning a patrol or not. The smuggler has two strategies of shipping its cargo of contraband or not. Two players have several opportunities to take actions during a limited number of days. When both players do, there are some possibilities that the customs captures the smuggler and, simultaneously, the smuggler possibly makes a success of the smuggling. If the smuggler is captured or there remain no days for playing the game, the game ends. In this paper, we formulate the problem into a multi‐stage two‐person zero‐sum stochastic game and investigate some characteristics of the equilibrium solution, some of which are given in a closed form in a special case. There have been some studies so far on the inspection game. However, some consider the case that the smuggler has only one opportunity of smuggling or the perfect‐capture case that the customs can certainly arrest the smuggler on patrol, and others think of a recursive game without the probabilities of fulfilling the players' purposes. In this paper, we consider the inspection game taking account of the fulfillment probabilities of the players' aims. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

某地地导弹控制回路参数测试系统设计

针对导弹的定型试验,介绍了一种通用的地地导弹系统数据采集方案,并对其中所遇到的关键问题加以阐述,对各种火控系统的定型设备研制具有一定的参考价值