Why did Sudan Lose a small war in Southern Sudan?

ABSTRACT

When on the wrong end of an asymmetry in the projection of hard power, weaker sides countenance the grim arithmetic of avoiding direct and massed confrontations. Invariably, insurgents have over the ages tended to employ indirect tactical methods to render their stronger opponents ineffective. Ultimately – interest asymmetry, regime type, asymmetries of strategy, and external intervention – combine in a complex interplay and pattern, to militate against a strong side. In Sudan, these factors interacted throughout the civil wars to produce regional autonomy and finally an independent South Sudan in 2011. Similar strategic logic had confronted many large African states battling insurgencies in Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Zaire, and apartheid-era South Africa. Oftentimes, weakening public resolve has caused these governments to accommodate, capitulate or withdraw even if they try not to blink. Notwithstanding the regime type, it can be concluded that the majority of strong actors are prone to fail in a protracted, asymmetric conflict. Hence, the notion of linking victory in counterinsurgency to the degree of openness (democratic polyarchies); or closeness (totalitarianism) – is still valid but highly contestable in the case of Africa’s large dysfunctional states.     

Models for production planning under power interruptions

We present a robust optimization model for production planning under the assumption that electricity supply is subject to uncertain interruptions caused by participation in interruptible load contracts (ILCs). The objective is to minimize the cost of electricity used for production while providing a robust production plan which ensures demand satisfaction under all possible interruption scenarios. The combinatorial size of the set of interruption scenarios makes this a challenging problem. Furthermore, we assume that no probabilistic information is known about the supply uncertainty: we only use the information given in the ILC to identify an uncertainty set that captures the possible scenarios. We construct a general robust framework to handle this uncertainty and present a heuristic to compute a good feasible solution of the robust model. We provide computational experiments on a real‐world example and compare the performance of an exact solver applied to the robust model with that of the heuristic procedure. Finally, we include the operational impact of interruptions such as “recovery modes” in the definition of the uncertainty set. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013     

Turkey’s strategic choice: buy or make weapons?

Turkey has been investing in its national defence industrial base since the 1980s. As with other developing countries, Turkey’s motivations for investing in national defence industries can be boiled down to the pursuit of defence autarky, economic benefits and international prestige. However, after 40 years of investment, Turkey is unable to reach the primary goals of defence industrialisation. We argue that three factors are important to understanding Turkey’s persistence in these primary goals. First, Turkey believes that there is an overall improvement in its defence industrial capabilities and the goal of autarky is still reachable. Second, increased defence exports support the belief that Turkish defence industries have become sustainable and the trend will continue in the future. The third reason, perhaps most important of all, has to do with the domestic political gains of defence industrialisation: the AKP uses defence industry and indigenous weapon systems for prestige and, therefore, garners broader support.