Book reviews

Exporting Democracy: Fulfilling America's Destiny. By Joshua Muravchik, American Enterprise Institute (1991) ISSN 0–8447–3734–8. $12.95.

Generals in the Palacio. By Roderick Ai Camp. Oxford University Press, (1992), ISBN 0–19–507300–2, £45.

L'Armement en France. Genèse, Ampleur et Coût d'une Industrie By François Chesnais and Claude Serfati, Editions Nathan, Collection Economie/Sciences Sociales, Paris (1992), ISBN 2–09–190086–9.

The Têt Offensive. Intelligence Failure in War. By James Wirtz, Cornell University Press, New York (1991), ISBN 0–8014–2486–0. $38.50.

Restructuring of arms producton in Western Europe. Edited by Michael Brzoska and Peter Lock. Oxford University Press, Oxford (1992), ISBN 0–1982–9147–7. £25.00.

What is Proper Soldiering? A study of new perspectives for the future uses of the Armed Forces of the 1990s. By Michael Harbottle. The Centre for International Peacebuilding, Chipping Norton (1992), £3.50.

The Strategic Defence Initiative By Edward Reiss, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge (1992), ISBN 0–521–41097–5. £30.00.     

Artisanal small-scale opal mining (ASOM) insecurity in the Delanta wereda,Ethiopia: The shifting landscape of multidimensional insecurity in the face of emergent ASOM wealth

The commencement of opal mining in Ethiopia a decade ago has attracted the involvement of poor peasants, wealthy traders and traffickers. Although the academic and official literature on artisanal small-scale opal mining (ASOM) has primarily focused on the loss of wealth owing to a lack of skill and its traditional nature, this study explores the multidimensional insecurity that the discovery and mining of opal stones in the Delanta wereda of Wollo has brought about. This study contends that the ASOM industry has brought a new and previously unknown body of wealth to a society that is not used to the circulation of huge amounts of money in its narrow geography of commerce, engendering multidimensional insecurity. To make things worse, the network of patrimony and rentierism connecting locals with powerful people at the regional and federal level has given licence to illegal wealth extraction at the cost of exacerbating local insecurity. The qualitative data for the study was collected using interviews, focus group discussions, non-participant observations and document analyses at Delanta mining sites, the Wegel Tena town administration and Dessie city.     

Prospects for Closer GCC Military and Political Cooperation

Abstract

‘[Sovereignty] is possible only within the framework of multinational communities, of common institutions designed to provide common responses to common challenges. Security is no longer attainable in the traditional way. Neither the walled city nor the nation-state can provide protection against attack or threats of physical destruction… Increasingly the politics of nations revolve around the careful management of interdependence.’     

The responsibility to protect,as enshrined in article 4 of the Constitutive Act of the African Union

This paper assesses the emergence of the responsibility to protect (R2P) as an international relations norm. Following a brief discussion of the genesis of this norm, it assesses the key aspects of R2P. It then examines the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000) to analyse the extent to which R2P is enshrined and implicated in this document. The paper also discusses the extent to which the AU has sought to implement R2P through its commitment to promote peace around the continent where there is a crisis. It concludes with a discussion of whether the AU is in fact committed to R2P.     

The United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur: Implications and prospects for success

With the security situation in Darfur remaining grim, the international community passed United Nations Security Resolution 1769 that authorised a more robust peacekeeping force. This article addresses the security concerns motivating the United Nations-African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID), highlights the mandate and implications of the force, and compares the potential command and control issues to the experiences of the Somalia intervention in the 1990s. It closes by analysing the prospects for success of the intervention and offering some limited recommendations on ways to mitigate the risks associated with the peacekeeping effort.     

Auxiliary Force or National Army? Afghanistan's ‘ANA’ and the Counter-Insurgency Effort, 2002–2006

Afghanistan's fifth effort to form a central army started in 2002, following the fall of the Taleban regime. Mainly run by the US armed forces, the formation of the so-called ‘Afghan National Army’ run into several difficulties, ranging from initially slow recruitment, low educational level of troops and officers, high attrition rates. As the new army began to take shape, it lacked many of the characteristics which had been associated by the promoters with a ‘national’ army. It also showed a low level of commitment and a lax discipline. As of 2006, it looked more like an auxiliary force at the service of the US army and its allies than like a ‘national’ army.