Optimal investment,pricing and replacement of computer resources

The problem of multiple-resource capacity planning under an infinite time horizon is analyzed using a nonlinear programming model. The analysis generalizes to the long term the short-run pricing model for computer networks developed in Kriebel and Mikhail [5]. The environment assumes heterogeneous resource capacities by age (vingate), which service a heterogeneous and relatively captive market of users with known demand functions in each time period. Total variable operating costs are given by a continuous psuedoconcave function of system load, capacity, and resource age. Optimal investment, pricing, and replacement decision rules are derived in the presence of economies of scale and exogenous technological progress. Myopic properties of the decision rules which define natural (finite) planning subhorizons are discussed.     

Analysis of artillery shoot‐and‐scoot tactics

Firing multiple artillery rounds from the same location has two main benefits: a high rate of fire at the enemy and improved accuracy as the shooter's aim adjusts to previous rounds. However, firing repeatedly from the same location carries significant risk that the enemy will detect the artillery's location. Therefore, the shooter may periodically move locations to avoid counter‐battery fire. This maneuver is known as the shoot‐and‐scoot tactic. This article analyzes the shoot‐and‐scoot tactic for a time‐critical mission using Markov models. We compute optimal move policies and develop heuristics for more complex and realistic settings. Spending a reasonable amount of time firing multiple shots from the same location is often preferable to moving immediately after firing an initial salvo. Moving frequently reduces risk to the artillery, but also limits the artillery's ability to inflict damage on the enemy.     

Optimal patrol to uncover threats in time when detection is imperfect

Consider a patrol problem, where a patroller traverses a graph through edges to detect potential attacks at nodes. An attack takes a random amount of time to complete. The patroller takes one time unit to move to and inspect an adjacent node, and will detect an ongoing attack with some probability. If an attack completes before it is detected, a cost is incurred. The attack time distribution, the cost due to a successful attack, and the detection probability all depend on the attack node. The patroller seeks a patrol policy that minimizes the expected cost incurred when, and if, an attack eventually happens. We consider two cases. A random attacker chooses where to attack according to predetermined probabilities, while a strategic attacker chooses where to attack to incur the maximal expected cost. In each case, computing the optimal solution, although possible, quickly becomes intractable for problems of practical sizes. Our main contribution is to develop efficient index policies—based on Lagrangian relaxation methodology, and also on approximate dynamic programming—which typically achieve within 1% of optimality with computation time orders of magnitude less than what is required to compute the optimal policy for problems of practical sizes. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 61: 557–576, 2014     

US strategic preferences in the early twenty-first century

This article investigates how US national security planners have envisioned the emerging strategic environment during the early twenty-first century and evaluates how their perceptions of this strategic environment have changed during these years. This conceptual evolution can be seen in how defense planners define threats, identify defense priorities, and design security strategies. Five key strategic planning documents serve as the basis for this analysis and illustrate significant shifts in how the US government has envisioned its own security requirements as well as the context within which its strategic vision will need to be realized. These planning documents are: (1) Joint Vision 2020, (2) the Bush Administration's 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, (3) the Obama Administration's 2010 National Security Strategy, (4) US Strategic Defense Guidance entitled Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21^st Century Defense, and (5) the US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Capstone Concept for Joint Operations: Joint Force 2020.     

To catch an intruder: Part A—uncluttered scenario

We analyze an interdiction scenario where an interceptor attempts to catch an intruder as the intruder moves through the area of interest. A motivating example is the detection and interdiction of drug smuggling vessels in the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean. We study two models in this article. The first considers a nonstrategic target that moves through the area without taking evasive action to avoid the interdictor. We determine the optimal location the interceptor should position itself to best respond when a target arrives. The second model analyzes the strategic interaction between the interceptor and intruder using a Blotto approach. The intruder chooses a route to travel on and the interceptor chooses a route to patrol. We model the interaction as a two‐player game with a bilinear payoff function. We compute the optimal strategy for both players and examine several extensions. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 64: 29–40, 2017