Choosing arrival process models for service systems: Tests of a nonhomogeneous Poisson process

Service systems such as call centers and hospital emergency rooms typically have strongly time‐varying arrival rates. Thus, a nonhomogeneous Poisson process (NHPP) is a natural model for the arrival process in a queueing model for performance analysis. Nevertheless, it is important to perform statistical tests with service system data to confirm that an NHPP is actually appropriate, as emphasized by Brown et al. [8]. They suggested a specific statistical test based on the Kolmogorov–Smirnov (KS) statistic after exploiting the conditional‐uniform (CU) property to transform the NHPP into a sequence of i.i.d. random variables uniformly distributed on [0,1] and then performing a logarithmic transformation of the data. We investigate why it is important to perform the final data transformation and consider what form it should take. We conduct extensive simulation experiments to study the power of these alternative statistical tests. We conclude that the general approach of Brown et al. [8] is excellent, but that an alternative data transformation proposed by Lewis [22], drawing upon Durbin [10], produces a test of an NHPP test with consistently greater power. We also conclude that the KS test after the CU transformation, without any additional data transformation, tends to be best to test against alternative hypotheses that primarily differ from an NHPP only through stochastic and time dependence. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 66–90, 2014     

THE MYTH OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Nuclear deterrence is sometimes treated as a known quantity—a definite thing that keeps us safe and ensures our security. It has also often been used as a justification for possessing nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence, however, is based on an unexamined notion: the belief that the threat to destroy cities provides decisive leverage. An examination of history (including recent reinterpretations of the bombing of Hiroshima) shows that destroying cities rarely affects the outcome of wars. How is it possible that an action that is unlikely to be decisive can make an effective threat? Recent work on terrorism suggests that attacks against civilians are often not only ineffective but also counterproductive. And a review of the practical record of nuclear deterrence shows more obvious failures than obvious successes. Given this, the record of nuclear deterrence is far more problematic than most people assume. If no stronger rationale for keeping these dangerous weapons can be contrived, perhaps they should be banned.     

Book reviews

Managing International Conflict, From Theory to Practice: a Teaching Tool Using CASCON by Lincoln P. Bloomfield and Allen Moulton, New York: St Martin's Press, 1997, ISBN 0-312-13675-7 (pbk), £18.99.

The American Century: the Rise and Decline of the United States as a World Power by Donald W. White, London: Yale University Press, 1997, ISBN 0-300-05721-0 (hbk), £25.

Humanitarian Intervention in Contemporary Conflict by Oliver Ramsbotham and Tom Woodhouse, Cambridge: Blackwell, 1996.

The US Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions by Chris Seiple, Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic Leadership, US Army War College, 1996.

Uncivil Wars: International Security and the New Internal Conflicts by Donald M. Snow, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996, ISBN 1-55587-655-2 (pbk), £15.50, ISBN 1-55587-648-X (hbk), £33.50.

Intelligence Power in Peace and War by Michael Herman, Royal Institute for International Affairs, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, ISBN 0-521-56231-7 (hbk), £50, ISBN 0-521-56636 (pbk), £16.95.

UK Eyes Alpha: Inside British Intelligence by Mark Urban, London: Faber and Faber, 1996, ISBN 0-571-17689-5 (hbk), £16.99.

New Cloak, Old Dagger by Michael Smith, London: Victor Gollancz, 1996, ISBN 0-575-06150-2 (hbk), £20.

Conversion Survey 1997: Global Disarmament and Disposal of Surplus Weapons by Bonn International Center for Conversion, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.

Plutonium and Highly Enriched Uranium 1996: World Inventories, Capabilities and Policies by David Albright, Frans Berkhout and William Walker, Oxford: SIPRI and Oxford University Press, 1997.

The Wars of Eduard Shevardnadze by Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl and Melvin A. Goodman, University Park, PA: Penn State University Press, 1997.     

Book reviews

Use of Force: The Practise of States by A. Mark Weisburd, Penn: Penn State Press, University Park, 1997, ISBN 0-271-01679-5 (hbk), $65.00/£58.00, ISBN 0-271-01680-9 (pbk), $25.00/£22.50

Late Breaking Foreign Policy: the News Media's Influence on Peace Operations by Warren P. Strobel, Washington DC: United States Insititute of Peace Press, 1997, ISBN 1-878379-68-2 (hbk), £23.25, ISBN 1-878379-67-4 (pbk)

The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States After the Cold War by Richard N. Haass, New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1997, 148pp, index, ISBN 0-87609-201-6 (hbk), $24.95

The UN, Peace and Force edited by Michael Pugh, London: Frank Cass, 1997, ISBN 0-7146-4795-4 (hbk), £29.50, ISBN 0-7146-4320-3 (pbk), £15.00

Confidence-Building in South East Asia by Malcolm Chalmers, Oxford: Westview Press, 1996, ISBN 1-85143-116-0 (pbk), £19.95

Britain's Strategic Nuclear Deterrent: From Before the V-Bomber to Beyond Trident by Robert H. Paterson, London: Frank Cass, 1997, ISBN 0-7146470-3 (hbk), £35.00, ISBN 0-7146-4297-5 (pbk) £18.00

OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War by Maochun Yu, London: Yale University Press, 1997, ISBN 0 300 06698-8 (hbk), £25.00

Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy by Michael S. Lund, Washington DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 1996, ISBN 1-878379-52-6 (pbk), £11.75     

Many‐server loss models with non‐poisson time‐varying arrivals

This article proposes an approximation for the blocking probability in a many‐server loss model with a non‐Poisson time‐varying arrival process and flexible staffing (number of servers) and shows that it can be used to set staffing levels to stabilize the time‐varying blocking probability at a target level. Because the blocking probabilities necessarily change dramatically after each staffing change, we randomize the time of each staffing change about the planned time. We apply simulation to show that (i) the blocking probabilities cannot be stabilized without some form of randomization, (ii) the new staffing algorithm with randomiation can stabilize blocking probabilities at target levels and (iii) the required staffing can be quite different when the Poisson assumption is dropped. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 177–202, 2017     

The BWC protocol mandate for failure

The stage may be set for what could be a historic turning point in America's reliance on nuclear weapons to meet its fundamental national security interests. Proponents of a refurbished nuclear stockpile and infrastructure are convinced that nuclear weapons will remain central to U.S. security interests, yet they admit that there is no national consensus on the need for and role of nuclear weapons. Nuclear opponents are gravely concerned that to the extent nuclear refurbishment creates a global perception that nuclear weapons remain essential instruments, it will eviscerate nuclear nonproliferation measures precisely at a time when nuclear ambitions are growing. Moreover, opponents see deterrence through advanced conventional weapons as decisively more credible than any nuclear alternative. With hopes of elevating discourse to the national level, this article examines the key current arguments pro and con within the specialist community and forecasts changes in the U.S. nuclear arsenal over the next decade. It concludes with a brief prognosis on prospects for complete nuclear disarmament.     

PART II: CONTINUING TO QUESTION THE RELIABILITY OF NUCLEAR DETERRENCE

Responding to Derrin Culp's critique, the author argues that distinguished nuclear theorists may be wrong because groups of experts have been wrong in the past, that city attacks are central to nuclear deterrence theory because killing civilians en masse is what nuclear weapons do best, and that understanding how effective city attacks would be in war is crucial to understanding how well they would work as threats. Moreover, while it is undeniable that nuclear deterrence works some of the time, this simply is not good enough. Because any failure of nuclear deterrence could end in catastrophic nuclear war, nuclear deterrence must be perfect or almost perfect. This is a very difficult standard to reach.     

A robust queueing network analyzer based on indices of dispersion

We develop a robust queueing network analyzer algorithm to approximate the steady-state performance of a single-class open queueing network of single-server queues with Markovian routing. The algorithm allows nonrenewal external arrival processes, general service-time distributions and customer feedback. The algorithm is based on a decomposition approximation, where each flow is partially characterized by its rate and a continuous function that measures the stochastic variability over time. This function is a scaled version of the variance-time curve, called the index of dispersion for counts (IDC). The required IDC functions for the external arrival processes can be calculated from the model primitives or estimated from data. Approximations for the IDC functions of the internal flows are calculated by solving a set of linear equations. The theoretical basis is provided by heavy-traffic limits for the flows established in our previous papers. A robust queueing technique is used to generate approximations of the mean steady-state performance at each queue from the IDC of the total arrival flow and the service specification at that queue. The algorithm's effectiveness is supported by extensive simulation studies.