OPTING OUT OF THE IRON TRIANGLE

Between the 1960s and the 1990s, the US chemical industry went from lobbying against the Geneva Protocol and promoting increased funding for chemical warfare to refusing to produce binary chemical weapons and assisting with the negotiations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)—even though the treaty included provisions that could be costly to industry. What happened in those thirty years to make the US chemical industry reverse its position on chemical weapons? This article argues these changes were largely caused by the chemical industry's desire to reform the negative public image it had acquired due to its involvement in the Agent Orange scandal and other high-profile incidents during the 1970s and 1980s. The chemical industry's assistance with CWC negotiations may be explained after an examination of the US public policy literature, which argues that industry will support apparently costly regulations if doing so helps it repair a damaged public image and ensures greater profits in the long run.     

LIVING WITH THE BEAR

George F. Kennan: An American Life, by John Lewis Gaddis. The Penguin Press, 2011. 784 pages, $40.     

On a class of nash-solvable bimatrix games and some related nash subsets

This work is concerned with a particular class of bimatrix games, the set of equilibrium points of which games possess many of the properties of solutions to zero-sum games, including susceptibility to solution by linear programming. Results in a more general setting are also included. Some of the results are believed to constitute interesting potential additions to elementary courses in game theory.     

The rules of engagement in Somalia – a judge advocate's primer 1

Scholars disagree on the prevailing focus on insurgent ideology. Some claim that the dominant Marxist ideology of the Cold War era has been supplanted by a new focus on ethnic and national identity. Others claim that many insurgencies were always focused on identity, but the Cold War and superpower antipathies distorted perceptions of insurgencies as politically-economically focused. Yet the heart of the matter is that analysts are not faced with an ‘either/or’ proposition.