Book reviews

Red Banner: the Soviet Military System in Peace and War. By Christopher Donnelly. Jane's Information Group, Coulsdon, UK (1988), 288 pp., £35.00

Images of T. E. Lawrence. By S. E. Tabachnick and C. Matheson. Jonathan Cape, London (1988); The Letters of T. E. Lawrence. Edited by Malcolm Brown. Dent, London (1988); T. E. Lawrence. By J. Wilson. National Portrait Gallery Publications, London (1988); Lawrence and the Arab Revolts. By D. Nicolle. Osprey, London (1989)

Liddell Hart and the Weight of History. By John Mearsheimer. Brassey's, London (1989), £15.95

Science and Mythology in the Making of Defence Policy. Edited by Margaret Blunden and Owen Greene. Brassey's, London (1989), £27.50/$44.00

Warfare in the Twentieth Century. Edited by Colin McInnes and G. D. Sheffield. Unwin Hyman, London (1988), 239 pp., £25.00     

Production-location problems with demand considerations

The production-location problem of a profit maximizing firm is considered. A model is developed for a single firm, facing the joint problems of determining the optimal plant location, the optimal input mix, and the optimal plant size. A homothetic production function is used as the model of the production technologies, and the existence of a sequential “separability” between the production, or input mix, problem and the location problem is demonstrated.     

Landmarks in defense literature

Tom Wintringham: New Ways of War (1940), People's War (1942) and Weapons and Tactics (1943)     

An inventory model with finite-range stochastic lead times

This article considers an inventory model with constant demand and stochastic lead times distributed over a finite range. A generalization of the EOQ formula with backorders is derived and ranges for the decision variables are obtained. The results are illustrated with the case of uniformly distributed lead time.     

A price leadership method for solving the inspector's non-constant-sum game

An inspector's game is a non-constant-sum two-person game in which one player has promised to perform a certain duty and the other player is allowed to inspect and verify occasionally that the duty has indeed been performed. A solution to a variant of such a game is given in this paper, based on the assumption that the inspector can announce his mixed strategy in advance, if he so wishes, whereas the other player, who has already given his promise, cannot threaten by explicitly saying that he will not keep his word.