The Saudi air war in Yemen: A case for coercive success through battlefield denial

The present-day conflict in Yemen is a valuable case study in the coercive use of airpower. The Saudi-led bombing campaign demonstrates the challenges inherent in applying a punishment-based strategy in a civil war, where coercive mechanisms operate differently than in interstate conflict. The audit from Yemen vindicates the effectiveness of a denial-based strategy and offers insights on the relative utility of interdiction and close air support in advancing that strategy. This examination dissects the campaign, assesses its effectiveness, and extracts insights useful both to the analysis of similar conflicts and to the evaluation of U.S. foreign policy alternatives.     

Terrorists and Unconventional Weapons: Is the Threat Real?

For years the government has been concerned about terrorists and unconventional weapons - but is the threat real? The threat is definitely real, but may not be from the source you would expect. The threat is not from biological and chemical weapons as experts seems to think - yes the information is readily available, but production and dissemination are far more complicated than what the public has been lead to believe. Even the threat from radiological devices, otherwise known as 'dirty bombs', is not realistic. The weapon is extremely dangerous to make, very heavy and produces a low mass casualty rate. Instead the threat stems from terrorists acquiring, producing or stealing nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons today are small enough that we would never be able to find them, and they can be remotely detonated.     

On the production of victory: Empirical determinants of battlefield success in modern war

Using a data set of historical battles from 1600 to 1973, this paper analyzes the empirical determinants of tactical success in modern war. Based on a reduced form approach we consider key elements of military theory as production factors for combat success as an output of a military production function. The paper focuses on the relationship of material and non-material factors to battlefield success, and especially on the role of superior force strengths. Contrary to the emphasis on technology which can be found in the recent literature, our estimation results indicate that numerical superiority has retained its crucial role for battlefield performance throughout history. In general, human elements of warfare, like leadership, morale and surprise, have continued to be important determinants of battle outcome despite technological progress in weapons.     

The optimum design of multivariate acceptance sampling plans

A model is developed which may be used to determine the expected total cost of quality control per inspection lot under acceptance sampling by variables where several characteristics are to be simultaneously controlled. Optimization of the model is accomplished through the application of a conventional search procedure. The sensitivity of the model and the optimum solution to the shape of the underlying probability distributions is discussed and associated analyses are presented through an example.     

A note on sojourn times in M/G/1 queues with instantaneous,bernoulli feedback

Queueing systems which include the possibility for a customer to return to the same server for additional service are called queueing systems with feedback. Such systems occur in computer networks for example. In these systems a chosen customer will wait in the queue, be serviced and then, with probability p, return to wait again, be serviced again and continue this process until, with probability (1 – p) = q, it departs the system never to return. The time of waiting plus service time, the nth time the customer goes through, we will call his nth sojourn time. The (random) sum of these sojourn times we will call the total sojourn time (abbreviated, sojourn time when there is no confusion which sojourn time we are talking about). In this paper we study the total sojourn time in a queueing system with feedback. We give the details for M/G/1 queues in which the decision to feedback or not is a Bernoulli process. While the details of the computations can be more difficult, the structure of the sojourn time process is unchanged for the M/G/1 queue with a more general decision process as will be shown. We assume the reader is familiar with Disney, McNickle and Simon [1].     

Minimum force in British counterinsurgency

With strategic success in Iraq and Afghanistan far from certain, comforting beliefs about Britain's superiority at counterinsurgency have come under increasingly sceptical scrutiny. This article contributes to the debate with particular reference to the supposedly pivotal principle of minimum force. After discussing the recent literature on the subject, the article critiques the methodology employed by advocates of the traditionalist view on British COIN, arguing for a more rigorous historical approach based on primary sources. Following these historical matters, it is argued that conceptually, minimum force should be analysed dialectically in relation to practices of exemplary force, and above all, on the evidence of what happens in a conflict. Arguably the value ascribed to doctrine in strategic analysis has become unduly inflated, and we must look beyond it to understand war and political violence.     

The economic effects of inspector error on attribute sampling plans

In this paper the effects of inspector error on a cost-based quality control system are investigated. The system examined is of a single sampling plan design involving several cost components. Both type I and type II inspector errors are considered. The model employs a process distribution, thus assuming that a stochastic process of some kind governs the quality of incoming lots. Optimal plan design is investigated under both error-free and error-prone inspection procedures and some comparisons are made.