French war plans, 1914: The ‘Balance of Power Paradox’

Historians have noted that both German and French war preparation in 1914 fell victim to the inadequacies of traditional threat-based planning: vulnerability to ‘threat deception’ which caused each to underestimate or mischaracterize the threat; a tendency to ‘mirror-image’ by fitting intelligence into preconceived notions of how the enemy was expected to behave; and ‘group think’ that discouraged a serious consideration of alternative scenarios. This article applies the ‘Balance of Power Paradox’ to explain why, at the dawn of the twentieth century, war planning in both Germany and France was driven by an acute sense of weakness which encouraged each side to fashion highly ‘risk acceptant’ strategies. In particular, he examines why and how French commander-in-chief General Joseph Joffre evolved and rationalized his audacious, and disastrous, Plan XVII to leverage French weaknesses and prevent the stronger German Army from bringing the full weight of its military strength to bear against France. The potential implication of this historical vignette is that leaders, and by extension military planners, of both strong and weak states focus on the constraints faced by their opponents, and assume that they can avoid the limitations of their position, while their opponent cannot.     

Fortifications and the European Military Balance before 1914

This article analyses the evolution of permanent fortifications in Europe between 1870 and 1914. Despite the introduction in the 1880s of high explosive shells, intensive construction continued until the eve of war. Fortifications figured prominently in armaments budgets and in offensive as well as defensive strategic planning, while their design changed radically. Nonetheless, the pattern of development worked against the Central Powers. Austria-Hungary concentrated against Italy at the expense of the Balkans and Galicia; Germany concentrated on Alsace-Lorraine, neglecting the east until 1912. Whereas France modernised its eastern fortresses, Belgium did little, enticing Germany into the envelopment strategy that would draw Britain into the First World War.