Counterinsurgency as armed reform: The political history of the Malayan Emergency

Despite the emphasis in doctrine and academia that counterinsurgency is in its essence political, these operations are all too commonly discussed and approached as primarily military endeavors. Informed by the need to refocus counterinsurgency studies, this article revisits a foundational case of the canon – the Malayan Emergency – to discuss its political (i.e., not military) unfolding. The analysis distinguishes itself by emphasizing the diplomatic processes, negotiations, and deals that gave strategic meaning to the military operations underway. In so doing, the article also generates insight on the use of leverage and elite bargains in creating new political settlements and bringing insurgent conflicts to an end.     

Soldiers as victims: behind military barracks in the post-colonial African army

This paper examines the ways in which the military infringes on the social and political rights of soldiers who joined the Zimbabwe National Army in post-independence Zimbabwe. Contrary to the scholarly and policy debates that present Zimbabwean soldiers as the silent prop behind President Robert Mugabe and the perpetrators of political violence, this paper argues that these soldiers have also been victimised in army barracks. The victimhood of soldiers has been explicit in the ways in which they are forced to execute their duties beyond their professional expectations. In substantiating this argument, the paper explores the unethical military training and the ways in which soldiers are disciplined and punished through Chapter 11:02 of the draconian Defence Act. The paper’s contribution stems from a ‘rights’ perspective that emphasises the right to freedom, justice and protection, which is usually quite silent in the military. But the question is how can soldiers’ concerns be translated into new practices without compromising so-called ‘state security’?     

The view from above: how the Royal Air Force provided a strategic vision for operational intelligence during the Malayan Emergency

It has long been held that the Federation of Malaya’s counter-insurgency campaign during the First Malayan Emergency (1948–60) was determined by the use of intelligence. Special Branch — the Federation’s primary intelligence agency — dominates the prevailing paradigm of how the insurgent threat was tackled. Conversely, the role of the Royal Air Force (RAF) within this paradigm is very limited. Most observers simply dismiss the role of photoreconnaissance or airstrikes as being largely inconsequential to the counter-insurgency effort. This is perhaps understandable: the Emergency was after all a ‘policing action’ and the insurgents were largely hidden under Malaya’s jungle canopy and amongst the Chinese community. However, further scrutiny reveals that the RAF made a much more significant contribution to the intelligence element of the counter-insurgency campaign than previously realised. First, the RAF decided to locate their Advanced Headquarters with the Army’s General Headquarters. This led to the creation of the Land/Air Operations Room, through which intelligence, tasking and resources were coordinated. Moreover, the RAF put its intelligence teams into the field to provide a practical link between local units and theatre-level assets. Second, with the support of the Army, the RAF established at the beginning of the Emergency the Joint Air Photographic Intelligence Board (Far East). This coordinated all photographic intelligence requirements throughout the Emergency, which was then delivered via the Joint Air Photographic Centre (Far East). Hence, via Joint Operations Centre and JAPIB (FE), the RAF provided both the practical means for effective joint intelligence operations at theatre level throughout the Emergency.     

Minimum force in British counterinsurgency

With strategic success in Iraq and Afghanistan far from certain, comforting beliefs about Britain's superiority at counterinsurgency have come under increasingly sceptical scrutiny. This article contributes to the debate with particular reference to the supposedly pivotal principle of minimum force. After discussing the recent literature on the subject, the article critiques the methodology employed by advocates of the traditionalist view on British COIN, arguing for a more rigorous historical approach based on primary sources. Following these historical matters, it is argued that conceptually, minimum force should be analysed dialectically in relation to practices of exemplary force, and above all, on the evidence of what happens in a conflict. Arguably the value ascribed to doctrine in strategic analysis has become unduly inflated, and we must look beyond it to understand war and political violence.     

Countering Insurgents through Distributed Operations: Insights from Malaya 1948–1960

This article examines the emerging US Marine Corps concept of ‘Distributed Operations’ (DO) and its applicability to counter-insurgency. DO involves dispersing the force and empowering decentralised units so as to create a network of mobile, agile and adaptable cells, each operating with a significant degree of autonomy yet in line with the commander's overall intent. This concept's applicability to irregular campaigns is assessed with reference to the Malayan Emergency, in which the British and Commonwealth forces employed dispersed and decentralised small-unit formations to great effect. The article teases out the conditions that allowed DO to succeed in Malaya, and comments on the requirements and implications for the use of DO today in the prosecution of the ‘Long War’.     

The national defense function and federalism: the importance of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act

Countries with a federalist system of government have different arrangements for providing national security. US national security is provided by national and State defense forces. The quintessential national function – national defense – experienced some changes that enhanced the role of the States. Policy changes in the National Defense Authorization Act of 2008 (2008 NDAA) introduced new roles for the Governors and the State defense forces, or the National Guard. This article explores how the interests of Congress and States aligned in the 2008 NDAA such that the national defense function changed. This article finds that the national government continues to have the central coordinating role, but that the politics and provisions of the 2008 NDAA changed the national–State relationship in mission, decision-making, and command and control so that US federalism in the national defense function is evolving in unexpected ways.     

Coping with the refugee and migrant crisis in Slovenia: the role of the military

Approximately 470,000 refugees and migrants passed through Slovenian territory between September 2015 and March 2016, creating a crisis that required a great deal of organisational and field work on the part of many governmental and non-governmental institutions. In the social sciences, a discourse on “security versus humanitarian approach” on the refugees and migrant issue appeared; however, the article goes over such a discourse and deals with roles and problems of different institutions – mostly the military – that responded to the crisis. Namely, coping with the crisis was characterised by significant institutional adjustments, difficult co-ordination, and intense public debate. The Slovenian Armed Forces were included in this process as support for Civil Protection and Police. The military’s role followed the military missions defined by the Defence Act; however, the government also proposed some changes to the act that were met with some doubts on the part of the public and different institutions.     

Winning hearts and minds to lose control: exploring various consequences of popular support in counterinsurgency missions

The strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds’ is considered key to successful counterinsurgency, but it often works at the expense of political control over the course of war. This happens when the strategy requires the counterinsurgent to work with a local nationalist group that takes advantage of its lack of access to civilians. This exposes the counterinsurgent to a dilemma inherent in the strategy; because working with the group is a crucial part of the strategy, victory would be impossible without it. Yet when the strategy is implemented through the group, it compromises the policy it serves. I show how this dilemma undermined British political control during the Malayan Emergency.     

Airpower in the Mau Mau conflict: the government's chief weapon

Strategists are currently debating the efficacy airpower provides in counterinsurgency operations. Through the lens of Colonel John Warden's theory of systemic paralysis, this essay reveals the truth about how airpower was employed in the Mau Mau conflict – a subject that has, until now, been both shrouded in mystery and inaccurately reported. It reveals that the use of airpower in a conflict occurring almost 60 years ago proffers a number of lessons for its use in counterinsurgencies today. Moreover, it discovers that although useful in many respects, Warden's model is somewhat limited for analysing the true use of airpower in counterinsurgencies today and consequently, a more appropriate model is offered for airpower strategists to use in such conflicts.     

建筑物内电梯自动扶梯的火灾安全

本文阐述了电梯和自动扶梯在火灾时对建筑物及人员产生的不利影响 ,并针对其危险性提出解决方法。