JTIDS系统扩频码的优选及扩频图案的设计

首先介绍了联合战术信息分发系统(JTIDS)的一般概念,进而针对它的抗干扰措施———直接序列扩频的扩频码的优选及扩频图案的设计,提出了合适的算法,并用C语言在微机上仿真实现。实验结果证明优选的码字质量高,生成速度快,此方面的仿真实现逼近JTIDS,有利于对JTIDS进行深入研究,从而对它实施有效干扰。     

从"误伤事件"原因分析,看战术数据链战略地位

以伊拉克战争为背景,介绍了美军及北约的战术数据链发展情况、技术概要,重点论述了不同时期的战术数据链在技术体制上的差异,以及由此可能导致互联、互通和互操作的分析.最后,结合我军的一些现状,在汲取外军教训的基础上,提出我军在战术数据链建设方面的一些建议.     

THE F‐35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER AS A SOURCE OF INNOVATIon AND EMPLOYMENT: SOME INTERIM RESULTS

The F‐35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme is important for innovation in the Dutch economy and also contributes to other programmes in the aerospace industry (spin‐off) and other industries (spillover). On top of the expected value of US$9.2 billion in development and production, based on interviews with 10 companies and research institutes, an expected spin‐off of US$1.1 billion and an expected spillover of US$120 million will result. In addition, over 23,000 man‐years are associated with the activities in the development and production of the JSF. This study excludes the large and labour‐intensive Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) activities. Further validation of data and an update of current results is planned for 2006.     

‘Stay-Behind’ in France: Much ado about nothing?

Stay-behind networks in France were set up starting in 1948 and were aimed at responding to the possibility of a Soviet armed attack into Western Europe. Participants were identified, and arms and explosives cached, to be activated in case of hostilities. This activity became folded into a multilateral effort under the Allied Coordination Committee (ACC) of NATO. In France, the network was run as a highly compartmented activity under the French external intelligence service (DGSE). As the Soviet threat receded, the stay-behind activity became more and more dormant, and in 1990 it was quietly disbanded, immediately after the P-2 scandal broke in Italy.     

Investigating the Desirability of Navy Aircraft Service Life Extension Programs

Building on prior work on optimal replacement of aging aircraft, this paper presents three methodologies to evaluate prospective aviation Service Life Extension Programs (SLEPs) and applies these methodologies to US Navy F/A-18E/F data. While considerable uncertainty remains as to the values of key parameters (e.g. the cost of F/A-18E/F SLEPs), the preponderance of the evidence available at this juncture favors undertaking SLEPs on F/A-18E/Fs rather than replacing them with new Joint Strike Fighters.     

The Joint Chiefs of Staff,the atom bomb,the American Military Mind and the end of the Second World War

ABSTRACT

The decision by the US government to drop the atomic bombs on Japan is one of the most heavily debated questions in history. This article examines one element of that debate, in many ways the most surprising. That was the different views of the top of the military hierarchy in the USA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The JCS was on the whole more sceptical about using atomic weaponry than the USA’s civilian leadership, for ethical and strategic reasons. As such they were willing to consider very different ways of ending the war.     

Insurgency and Violent Extremism in Pakistan

Pakistan has an uneven history of dealing with insurgencies and extremism. This article identifies the various campaigns and policies employed to defeat militants and deal with violent extremism. It describes the major anti-state groups and how Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders, relying on the related strategies of selectivity, gradualism and containment, have allowed militancy and terrorism to thrive. This article finds that while the elites and the public may have belatedly come to appreciate the existential internal threats these groups pose to the country, there are strong reasons to doubt the state’s full commitment to its promises to take meaningful action.     

The NATO Response Force: A qualified failure no more?

With much fanfare, NATO declared its rapid reaction force—the NATO Response Force (NRF)—an Initial Operational Capability in 2004. This article addresses four questions: Where did the NRF come from? What does it look like in 2017? What have been the major obstacles for the NRF fulfilling its promises? And where is the NRF likely to go? The article holds two main arguments. First, due to inadequate fill-rates and disagreements as to the force’s operational role, the NRF was for many years a “qualified failure.” The force failed to become the operational tool envisioned by the allies in 2002. While not without effect, it fell hostage to the harsh reality of the expeditionary wars of Iraq and Afghanistan. Second, the NRF is off to a fresh beginning and will likely be considered at least a partial success by the allies in the years to come.     

The prospects of combined action: Lessons from Vietnam

Military commanders, policymakers, and analysts have recently embraced the concept of combined action as a powerful tool to improve the effectiveness of Afghan security forces in the fight against the Taliban. In doing so, they explicitly draw inspiration from the Combined Action Program employed by US Marines during the Vietnam War. This program is widely considered to have greatly improved the effectiveness of South Vietnamese government forces and contributed to increased population security in its area of operations and is considered a model worthy of emulation. This study finds that the success of the Vietnam-era Combined Action Program was more qualified than contemporary proponents argue. It argues that successes were tempered, and conditioned, by the choice of junior commanders, the level of operational control enjoyed by the US Marines, and the way the local forces were recruited and deployed. These conditions offer valuable lessons for those seeking to employ combined action not only in present-day Afghanistan, but also in future counterinsurgency campaigns.     

联合作战目标武器弹药匹配模型

本文分析了联合作战目标—弹药匹配问题,从作战目的复杂性、武器弹药多样性、毁伤要求易变性、作战过程协同性四个方面提出了对联合作战目标—弹药匹配模型的军事需求,基于规划理论对问题进行描述并给出基本的数学模型,结合需求,对规划的目标和约束进一步细致的分析,对模型进行扩展,使其能体现联合作战的特点,方便了在不同军事上下文中有针对性地进行使用。