一个多层的 context 逻辑

本文介绍了ｃｏｎｔｅｘｔ研究的现状,定义了一个新的ｃｏｎｔｅｘｔ逻辑ＣＬ,定义并证明了与之相关的一些概念和定理。     

Intelligence and military doctrine: paradox or oxymoron?

This article examines the evolution of the current British military joint intelligence doctrine. We argue that military intelligence doctrine is dogged by an intrinsic tension between the ethos and expectations of military doctrine and those of the professional practice of intelligence. We further argue not only that prior iterations of UK joint intelligence doctrine failed to effectively deal with this intelligence doctrine dilemma, but also that measures in the current doctrine to address this problem directly created their own problems. Moreover, as a result, otherwise sound innovations in the current UK intelligence doctrine have proven unsuitable to wider diffusion in more recent intelligence doctrine such as the new NATO intelligence doctrine which, otherwise, draws extensively on its British precursor.     

The fertile ground of Hell’s carnival: Charles T. R. Bohannan and the US Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps’ investigations of war criminals,collaborators, and the Huk,in the Philippines 1945–1947

Insurgencies thrive in regions where government legitimacy is absent. In the post-war Philippines, Captain Charles T. R. Bohannan of the Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps became actively aware of this dynamic. Bohannan is best known for his later work with Edward Lansdale and Ramon Magsaysay in defeating the Huk Rebellion (1950–1954). Here the author examines Bohannan’s early investigative work against Japanese war criminals, wartime Filipino collaborators, and the rising threat of communist subversion most associated with the Huk. All of these experiences fed into what would be the successful campaign against the Huk, chronicled in his seminal work, Counter Guerrilla Operations: The Philippines Experience, and offers lessons on the investigative (as opposed to tactical or psychological) nature of effective counter-insurgency work, as it relates to both legitimacy in governance and the rise of insurgencies.     

Budget allocation,national security,military intelligence,and human capital: a dynamic model

This study develops a dynamic model that integrates military intelligence into the defense capability of the country and the optimal allocation of its government budget. We assert that the effectiveness of the country’s military intelligence is contingent on the quality of its human capital, which, in turn, implies a long-term positive relationship between the government’s various civilian expenditures and its capacity to achieve a cost-effective intelligence and, hence, military capability. This relationship is developed within a multiple-period arms race model between two rivals. Using this model and stylized data for the Israeli–Syrian arms race, we show that an appropriate budget shift from defense to civilian expenditures during the initial periods of the planning horizon will gradually (over a decade, say) increase the quality of human capital in the country and, thus, the effectiveness of its intelligence, which, in turn, will increase the country’s future security and welfare.     

Attributing Cyber Attacks

Who did it? Attribution is fundamental. Human lives and the security of the state may depend on ascribing agency to an agent. In the context of computer network intrusions, attribution is commonly seen as one of the most intractable technical problems, as either solvable or not solvable, and as dependent mainly on the available forensic evidence. But is it? Is this a productive understanding of attribution? — This article argues that attribution is what states make of it. To show how, we introduce the Q Model: designed to explain, guide, and improve the making of attribution. Matching an offender to an offence is an exercise in minimising uncertainty on three levels: tactically, attribution is an art as well as a science; operationally, attribution is a nuanced process not a black-and-white problem; and strategically, attribution is a function of what is at stake politically. Successful attribution requires a range of skills on all levels, careful management, time, leadership, stress-testing, prudent communication, and recognising limitations and challenges.     

JTIDS系统扩频码的优选及扩频图案的设计

首先介绍了联合战术信息分发系统(JTIDS)的一般概念,进而针对它的抗干扰措施———直接序列扩频的扩频码的优选及扩频图案的设计,提出了合适的算法,并用C语言在微机上仿真实现。实验结果证明优选的码字质量高,生成速度快,此方面的仿真实现逼近JTIDS,有利于对JTIDS进行深入研究,从而对它实施有效干扰。     

从"误伤事件"原因分析,看战术数据链战略地位

以伊拉克战争为背景,介绍了美军及北约的战术数据链发展情况、技术概要,重点论述了不同时期的战术数据链在技术体制上的差异,以及由此可能导致互联、互通和互操作的分析.最后,结合我军的一些现状,在汲取外军教训的基础上,提出我军在战术数据链建设方面的一些建议.     

现有军用光电装备快速智能化手段

近年来,人工智能技术在图像处理领域取得了突破性进展,使得目标识别和目标检测算法的性能得到大幅提高,也为军用光电装备智能化创造了有利条件。本文从算法、数据和计算能力等人工智能三要素入手,分析了快速实现军用光电装备智能化的有效途径及过程中可能面临的问题,指出:现有的技术理论基本满足装备升级需求,智能化过程中还应重点加强实时性算法的研究,提早对专用数据集的收集整理进行布局完善,采用低功耗高性能边缘计算设备为装备计算能力水平提升提供支撑等。同时,在工程化过程中仍存在部分实际问题,需根据装备进行个性化设计,以解决理论与应用之间的差距。最后,建议重点加强国产化水平与能力的提高,以实现关键技术自主可控。     

THE F‐35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER AS A SOURCE OF INNOVATIon AND EMPLOYMENT: SOME INTERIM RESULTS

The F‐35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) programme is important for innovation in the Dutch economy and also contributes to other programmes in the aerospace industry (spin‐off) and other industries (spillover). On top of the expected value of US$9.2 billion in development and production, based on interviews with 10 companies and research institutes, an expected spin‐off of US$1.1 billion and an expected spillover of US$120 million will result. In addition, over 23,000 man‐years are associated with the activities in the development and production of the JSF. This study excludes the large and labour‐intensive Maintenance, Repair and Overhaul (MRO) activities. Further validation of data and an update of current results is planned for 2006.     

CIVIL SOCIETY AND VIOLENCE—HOW TO MANAGE IN THE TOWNSHIPS WITHOUT THE ARMY

This article discusses the validity of national security threats in Botswana and whether they justified the creation of the Directorate of Intelligence and Security Services (DISS), which has been controversial since its formation. Since its inception in 2008, the DISS has been accused of many human rights violations and politicisation. Without fully deliberating on the basis for its creation, some discourses have focused on the politicised operations without relation to what the DISS is supposed to be doing. The author works under the assumption that debates should be shaped by whether it was necessary to create the DISS, and, if so, how we can shape and steer debates on its oversight, management, reform and operations. This article argues that despite the politicisation of the DISS, Botswana's national security threats are both real and imagined; and that domestic threats to national security have moved from the conceptual ‘imagined’ category to the ‘real’. However, that in itself did not warrant the design and mandate of the DISS, and the article argues that it was external threats that really warranted the creation of a civilian intelligence agency. The article concludes that Botswana faces a plethora of external security threats – traditional and non-traditional – that warranted the creation and continuance of the DISS.