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在简要介绍通用网格概念和发展的基础上,着重对军事网格和Agent Grid进行了研究和分析.介绍了美军军事网格发展历程中4个具有代表性的网格研究项目,展现了当前军事网格研究的现状和未来的发展趋势.以CoABS Grid项目为研究背景,分析了Agent Grid的基本特点和相关的主要观点,着重探讨了Agent和Grid技术的融合,以及Agent Grid与MAS的关系,最后总结提出了Agent Grid研究的技术要点. 相似文献
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介绍了一种面向移动Agent的并行计算模型,给出了采用十标度策略解决任务排序,采用满射策略解决任务映射的算法。该模型允许多个计算任务在异构主机构成的分布式环境下同时进行计算,并且通过算法优化,降低移动Agent之间的通信成本,减少网络流量。 相似文献
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网络中基于Agent的信息搜索特点及策略规划 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:1
基于网络条件下信息搜索的特点,采用搜索策略表示信息收集Agent对主机进行信息查寻的规划和过程,将搜索过程看作是一个三维空间,这个空间由条件、方法、信息源构成;给出了一种基于Agent的信息查找策略,用AgentSpeak(L)描述并实现了规划过程. 相似文献
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We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs. 相似文献
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在联邦式作战仿真平台中,互相通信的主体在进行通信的同时还需要保护其私有的信息。讨论了基于线性方程组“无穷解”条件下的连续信息空间的信息泄漏和保护问题,包括该模型的基本特性和防止泄漏的方法,指出了存在信息的部分泄漏问题,并给出了检测部分泄漏的方法,为提高计算性能,可指定检测子空间,最后,讨论了信息动态改变对信息泄漏的影响。 相似文献
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When facing high levels of overstock inventories, firms often push their salesforce to work harder than usual to attract more demand, and one way to achieve that is to offer attractive incentives. However, most research on the optimal design of salesforce incentives ignores this dependency and assumes that operational decisions of production/inventory management are separable from design of salesforce incentives. We investigate this dependency in the problem of joint salesforce incentive design and inventory/production control. We develop a dynamic Principal‐Agent model with both Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection in which the principal is strategic and risk‐neutral but the agent is myopic and risk‐averse. We find the optimal joint incentive design and inventory control strategy, and demonstrate the impact of operational decisions on the design of a compensation package. The optimal strategy is characterized by a menu of inventory‐dependent salesforce compensation contracts. We show that the optimal compensation package depends highly on the operational decisions; when inventory levels are high, (a) the firm offers a more attractive contract and (b) the contract is effective in inducing the salesforce to work harder than usual. In contrast, when inventory levels are low, the firm can offer a less attractive compensation package, but still expect the salesforce to work hard enough. In addition, we show that although the inventory/production management and the design of salesforce compensation package are highly correlated, information acquisition through contract design allows the firm to implement traditional inventory control policies: a market‐based state‐dependent policy (with a constant base‐stock level when the inventory is low) that makes use of the extracted market condition from the agent is optimal. This work appears to be the first article on operations that addresses the important interplay between inventory/production control and salesforce compensation decisions in a dynamic setting. Our findings shed light on the effective integration of these two significant aspects for the successful operation of a firm. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 320–340, 2014 相似文献
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结合分布式人工智能中的Agent技术和军械勤务辅助支持系统的特点 ,研究了面向A gent的军械勤务辅助支持结构。结合该系统介绍了Agent和多Agent系统的概念 ,讨论了A gent的通信机制 相似文献
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