HARD CURRENCIES FOR HARD TIMES. TERROR ATTACKS AND THE CHOICE OF MONETARY ANCHORS

As terror’s victims increase, hard currency commitments gain effectiveness in reducing inflation, and central bank independence loses its effectiveness, because terror reduces transparency and the number of veto players in domestic politics. PCSE (Panel‐Corrected Standard Error) estimations of inflation are run on pooled cross‐section time‐series sample of 87 countries from 1975–2005. When the trend level rises to 100 victims annually a currency board reduces inflation by up to 7.5%, and an independent bank raises inflation by up to 8%. When victims exceptionally exceed the trend by 100, a currency board reduces inflation by 2.5%, and an independent bank raises it by 2%.     

Counterterrorism And Its Impact On Terror Support And Recruitment: Accounting For Backlash

This article presents a dynamic model in which counterterrorism policies have the potential to generate positive public support for terrorism via a backlash that may fuel terror recruitment. For an optimizing government aiming at maximizing security, this phenomenon produces a natural bound on proactive counterterror policy that is related to the dynamic path of conflict. Moreover, terror is a persistent phenomenon that requires patience on the part of the target government for optimal counterterror policies to be realized. Finally, the potential for backlash yields insights into the need for target governments to fight an information war to change public opinion regarding its own policies and the ultimate effect of terror attacks.     

Insights from a Database of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen Militants

This article uses a novel database of 1,625 posthumously published biographies of members of two Islamist militant organizations (Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)), all of whom were killed in the course of carrying out militant attacks. In general, each biography provides data on the militant’s birthplace, education, recruitment, and training. The number of observations in this database is a full order of magnitude larger than those of previous databases assembled from militant biographies. While the sample of militants in this database is the product of multiple selection effects, analysis of the database undermines many common myths about Pakistani militants and casts doubt on current policy approaches to mitigating Islamist militancy in Pakistan.     

Escalation and the War on Terror

Abstract

This article makes a case for treating escalation in irregular warfare as different in kind from the regular variant that was originally theorized during the Cold War. The regular variant emphasizes the role of clearly defined and commonly recognized ‘thresholds’ as a means of organizing cooperation within conflict. In contrast, the irregular variant can reward efforts by weaker terroristic actors to erode the moral significance of the combatant/non-combatant threshold, just as it can reward efforts by their stronger adversaries to bolster it.     

PUBLIC SAFETY AND THE MORAL DILEMMA IN THE DEFENSE AGAINST TERROR

The economic theory of defense has traditionally described public safety as achieved through investments that deter adversaries. Deterrence is, however, ineffective and pre‐emptive defense is required when a population of intended victims confronts supreme‐value suicide terror. A moral dilemma then arises, since pre‐emption may impose collective punishment, while in the absence of pre‐emption the population of intended victims is exposed to acts of terror. We consider how a population of intended terror victims confronts the moral dilemma, and compare the threatened population's response with the public‐safety recommendations of external judges who are not personally affected by the threat of terror.     

‘Full spectrum dominance’: Donald Rumsfeld,the Department of Defense,and US irregular warfare strategy, 2001–2008

This article examines the evolution of US irregular warfare (IW) doctrine and practice from 2001 onwards. It argues that, after 9/11, top-tier civilian policymakers in the US Department of Defense (DoD) and across the US government developed a heightened awareness of asymmetric threats and non-conventional forms of warfare, especially those shaped by contemporary globalisation. The result was a gradual turn towards irregular warfare, led by Rumsfeld and the DoD, designed to ensure ‘full spectrum dominance’ across all modes of conflict. This pre-dated the insurgency in Iraq and the promotion of counterinsurgency in the US Army by General David Petraeus and others. Policymakers' reluctance to acknowledge the insurgency in Iraq was not down to a failure to understand the concept of IW, but because they had viewed Iraq in conventional terms for so many years and were reluctant to admit their mistake.