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1.
周治林 《武警工程学院学报》2012,(5):79-83
思想教育是加强军队全面建设、完成各项任务的中心环节,各国军队都十分重视。美军是当今世界各国军队建设中总体水平最高的一支军队。其社会制度性质的不同,决定了美军与我军在思想教育内容上有着本质的区别,但美军对军人进行思想教育的方式方法有值得我们借鉴的地方。考察美军思想教育的历史,总结其特点,得出几点启示,目的是为了不断创新发展我军思想政治教育的形式方法,增强实际效果。 相似文献
2.
李佑标 《中国人民武装警察部队学院学报》2010,26(7):37-41
在新时期新阶段,武警部队的职能在不断拓展,武警部队的职责、体制等是否与此相适应,这是军事法学研究人员应当予以充分关注的理论问题。 相似文献
3.
Yoad Shefi 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(6):427-448
This paper models the interactions between the defense industry market structure and the defense needs of Israel, the USA and Western Europe, which produce several heterogeneous defense goods. The model specifies that the defense industries of the US and Europe are ‘large’ while that of Israel is ‘small’. The US military aid to Israel is also an integral part of the model. The results show that net defense costs of Israel are minimal when the number of its defense firms is one. The model predicts that an increase in US military aid reduces Israel’s government expenditure, its defense industry’s profits and its net defense costs. 相似文献
4.
We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to assess the impact of exports and imports of armaments (based on 1980 data) on sectoral trade and employment and other economic variables in the major Western trading countries. If the United States were to place a unilateral embargo on its arms exports and imports, we calculate that it would experience a comparatively small amount of employment displacement in the aggregate and that most of this displacement would occur in the transport equipment and electric machinery sectors. If all the major Western countries were to place a multilateral embargo on their arms trade, the sectoral effects on the United States would be similarly small. But the sectoral effects in several other industrialized and developing countries measured as a percentage of sectoral employment, would be larger, indicating potential short‐run adjustment problems in labor markets in some cases. 相似文献
5.
Marc Aufrant 《Defence and Peace Economics》2013,24(1):79-102
Within the EU France devotes to defence the largest financial and human resources although it is not the richest country, nor has it the largest population or labour force. The cost of nuclear weapons accounts for only a small fraction of this abnormally high French defence effort. If France had restructured its military capabilities at the same rate as its principal Allies during the 1985–1994 period, then French defence outlays would be about 20% less than at present. The fundamental reasons for France's excess defence outlay comprise virtual total dependence on French sources for equipment, produced in very small numbers; a military presence outside of Europe; and too many personnel. These deficiencies, and the consequent absence hitherto of a “peace dividend”, indicate a failure to identify the country's real strategic requirements, and a lack of will to reorganise efficiently French defence. The recently announced reform towards an all‐professional force is unlikely to achieve the potential and desirable improvement in cost‐effectiveness. 相似文献
6.
ABSTRACTThe new nuclear history can make a critical contribution by forcing us to reconsider or reframe the theoretical premises of the concepts we apply to our understanding of the present – and with which we try to navigate the future. It bears on fundamental questions, such as: How should the US manage its alliances? Should it establish a multilateral nuclear policy dialogue in Asia? In what depth should it discuss issues of doctrine and targeting with its Asian allies? What capabilities might reassure European allies in light of current Russian revisionism? Could nuclear war be limited and controlled in an East Asian maritime arena? Do nuclear weapons strengthen an alliance, or do they introduce a divisive bone of contention? Is extended nuclear deterrence (END) stabilizing or is it on the contrary pushing the allies to ask for more? What is the relationship between nuclear and conventional forces in END credibility? How do nuclear alliances contribute to international security and international order? The lessons and insights from these papers, which look at five historical cases of US extended deterrence during the Cold War, should help us think about crucial current issues, and be of use both to historians who want to have a better understanding of the Cold War past and to policymakers who are currently grappling with these issues. 相似文献
7.
Raphael D. Marcus 《战略研究杂志》2015,38(4):500-528
This article highlights a pattern of military adaptation and tactical problem-solving utilized by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) while engaged in protracted conflict with the Lebanese militant group Hizballah. It discusses the IDF’s recent attempts to institutionalize their historically intuitive process of ad-hoc learning by developing a formal tactical-level mechanism for ‘knowledge management’. The diffusion of this battlefield lesson-learning system that originated at lower-levels of the organization is examined, as well as its implementation and effectiveness during the 2006 Lebanon War. A nuanced analysis of IDF adaptation illustrates the dynamic interplay between both ‘top-down’ and ‘bottom-up’ processes of military innovation. 相似文献
8.
Steve Wills 《Defense & Security Analysis》2020,36(1):30-41
ABSTRACTDiscussion surrounding the announcement of a new NATO Maritime Command for the North Atlantic seems to have settled on the assumption that there is again a vital “sea-line of communication” (SLOC) between North America and Europe as there was supposed to be during the Cold War. The Soviet Union had a large fleet of nuclear and conventional submarines and it seemed very clear that Soviet admirals intended to fight a third “Battle of the Atlantic” in the event of war to prevent Western resupply of NATO. However, this scenario bore no resemblance to what the Soviet Navy actually intended to do in case of war. Changes in technology, notably in submarine propulsion, antisubmarine warfare (ASW), and ballistic missile range and accuracy were the real drivers of the Cold War in the Atlantic. Cruise missile-armed submarines that can attack shore-based economic infrastructure are the real threat from the Russian submarine force. 相似文献
9.
Montgomery McFate 《Defense & Security Analysis》2020,36(1):42-64
ABSTRACTThis article argues that the US Navy’s roles (which have historically been bifurcated between warfighting and political use of force) manifest in its organisational culture as two different concepts of war: the US Navy as diplomatic actor and the US Navy as warfighting force. The conflict between these different concepts of war can be seen in the current debate about the definition and function of presence. The debate about presence is not just theoretical, but represents a deep and enduring conflict within the Navy as an organisation about its concept of war. Since the end of WWII, the Navy has been designing its fleet architecture according to a Mahanian concept of war, despite the preponderance of non-lethal missions and activities. The result is a mismatch between platforms and tasks. 相似文献
10.
任元元 《中国人民武装警察部队学院学报》2009,25(3):30-33
联合国维持和平行动的指导理念随着国际局势的发展而不断变化,其中既有自身的发展与完善,也折射时代的演进和各种政治力量的对比。联合国维和行动产生初期遵循绝对中立理念,冷战后准军事介入阶段带有明显的隐性强权理念,反恐时代则对维和理念演变产生了新的影响。 相似文献