别斯兰事件后俄罗斯反恐机制的重建

随着苏联的解体,本来著称于世的强效反恐机制一夜之间分崩离析,反恐部门权责不清,协调不畅,反恐不力,恐怖势力乘虚而入,俄罗斯频频处于恐怖事件威胁之下。别斯兰事件给俄罗斯敲响了警钟。通过实施一系列有效措施,俄罗斯重建反恐机制,并取得明显效果。     

Coercive diplomacy and the Donbas: Explaining Russian strategy in Eastern Ukraine

What were Russia’s objectives in Eastern Ukraine, and why was it seemingly unable to achieve a successful or decisive outcome? In contrast to Russia’s seizure of Crimea, the uprising in Eastern Ukraine was marked by disorganization and chaos. Using proxy and surrogate actors, along with military exercises and the injection of Russian troops, Russia sought to institutionalize a political entity inside Ukraine to influence its domestic politics. In this article, I analyze the mechanisms by which Russia attempted to implement, and later salvage, its strategy. The article contributes to clearer theoretical and practical understanding of limited force in coercive diplomacy, signaling, and a more rigorous treatment of the role and uses of proxy actors.     

金融危机视野中的西方马克思热及其启示

在金融危机的汹汹来势中,马克思批判资本主义的巨著《资本论》再次进入欧洲人的视野。既然欧洲政要和民众都在读《资本论》,我们也有必要重温这部巨著,在重新解读中真正认识资本主义的历史性,正确看待资本的两重性等问题,结合实际推动马克思主义中国化的历史进程。     

关于联合国维和警察公共关系工作的几点思考

阐述了开展联合国维和警察公共关系工作的必要性与紧迫性,分析了开展联合国维和警察公共关系工作的原则与步骤,从加强联合国维和警察与各种传播媒体之间的公共关系工作;加强联合国维和警察与任务区民众之间的公共关系工作;加强联合国维和警察机构与联合国其他机构、各国驻维和任务区外交代表机构以及当地政府之间的公共关系工作;加强联合国维和警察内部派遣国警队之间的公共关系工作;重视发挥维和警察个体的公关作用;及时处理突发事件引起的公关危机等6个方面提出了开展维和警察公共关系工作的具体措施。     

关于城市公共危机管理的思考

介绍了危机管理的基本概念和基本思想,阐述了危机管理在城市防灾体系中的重要意义。在理论分析的基础上通过实例,说明在目前公共安全资源普遍短缺的现实背景下,在构建城市防灾体系的过程中,如何将危机管理的理念引入并加以科学应用,对于提高我国城市防灾减灾体系效能有着决定性的作用。     

Europe,Russia and the Ukraine crisis: the dynamics of coercion

This article analyses European strategy towards Russia during the Ukraine crisis between February 2014 and December 2015, conceptualising it as a coercive diplomatic strategy and analysing the relationship between its ends, ways and means. European strategy sought to reverse Russian intervention. However, this overarching aim was flanked by two ‘constraining’ aims of avoiding an escalation of the conflict and a breakdown of relations with Russia. The strategy shifted between these aims, which proved to be irreconcilable: while the EU partly succeeded in containing the conflict, it failed to reverse Russian intervention and relations between the EU and Russia deteriorated sharply.     

Putin – the masked nemesis of the strategy of ambiguity

Recent events demonstrate the complex and adaptive approach employed by Russia to reassert influence in Europe. The changing face of Russia’s strategy commenced in 2007 when it launched a crippling cyber-attack against Estonia. This was followed by a large Russian conventional attack against Georgia in 2008, occupying two large areas of the nation. 2014 witnessed the Russian annexation of Crimea where in just a week, Russia seized control of Crimea “without firing a shot.” The annexation of Crimea was rapidly followed by a Russian inspired and led subversive war in eastern Ukraine. The common thread among these diverse Russian operations is its use of ambiguity to confound and confuse decision makers in the West.     

The Power of the NPT: International Norms and Ukraine's Nuclear Disarmament

ABSTRACT

There is a lingering disagreement among scholars on how the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) affects nonproliferation and disarmament outcomes. Drawing on constructivist scholarship on international norms, this article examines the extent of the NPT's effect in the case of Ukraine's nuclear disarmament. In the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, Ukraine found itself host to the world's third largest nuclear arsenal. Despite Ukraine's initial commitment to become a non-nuclear state, it proceeded along a difficult path toward NPT accession. Most controversial and directly at odds with the NPT was Ukraine's claim to ownership of its nuclear inheritance as a successor state of the Soviet Union. This article argues that, while much domestic discourse about the fate of these nuclear weapons was embedded in the negotiation of Ukraine's new identity as a sovereign state vis-à-vis Russia and the West, the NPT played an important, structural role by outlining a separate normative space for nuclear weapons and providing the grammar of denuclearization with which Ukraine's decision makers had to grapple.     

A Rejoinder to Peter M. Sales

This analytical article asks the question: to what degree did the media contribute to the Rwandan genocide and what might have been done about it? In examining the historical development of mass media in Rwanda, this paper argues that while hate media clearly contributed to the dynamics that led to genocide, its role should not be overstated. While it is commonly believed that hate media was a major cause of the genocide, instead it was a part of a larger social process. The use of violent discourse was at least as important as, for example, the availability of weapons in carrying out the genocide. Put another way, violent discourse was necessary but not sufficient by itself to cause the genocide of 1994. In arguing this thesis, Rwandan history is examined to demonstrate the processes of communication in the formation of destructive attitudes and behaviour. Next, analysis of the methods and content of propaganda campaigns is discussed. Finally, an overview of the requirements and organizations for third parties to conduct international communication interventions is presented in the last section.     

Myth and the small war tradition: Reassessing the discourse of British counter-insurgency

In recent years a number of commentators have posited that the British reputation for conducting small wars has suffered in the wake of setbacks in Iraq and Afghanistan. The argument here contests whether such a tradition can be truly said to have ever existed. A close examination of this supposed tradition reveals it to be a myth. In fact, rarely have the British armed forces claimed a facility for counter-insurgency or small war. Invariably, commentators outside the Army have ascribed the tradition to them. Most notably, commentators in the United States keen to discern practices of minimum force or rapid institutional learning generated the narrative of British COIN expertise. Ultimately, what this myth reveals is that, when deconstructed, it is political will, not an ingrained understanding of fighting insurgencies, that has determined Britain's success, or otherwise, in so-called small wars.