THE MORAL PERMISSIBILITY OF AUTOMATED RESPONSES DURING CYBERWARFARE

Automated responses are an inevitable aspect of cyberwarfare, but there has not been a systematic treatment of the conditions in which they are morally permissible. We argue that there are three substantial barriers to the moral permissibility of an automated response: the attribution, chain reaction, and projection bias problems. Moreover, these three challenges together provide a set of operational tests that can be used to assess the moral permissibility of a particular automated response in a specific situation. Defensive automated responses will almost always pass all three challenges, while offensive automated responses typically face a substantial positive burden in order to overcome the chain reaction and projection bias challenges. Perhaps the most interesting cases arise in the middle ground between cyber-offense and cyber-defense, such as automated cyber-exploitation responses. In those situations, much depends on the finer details of the response, the context, and the adversary. Importantly, however, the operationalizations of the three challenges provide a clear guide for decision-makers to assess the moral permissibility of automated responses that could potentially be implemented.     

Past failures and future problems: the psychology of irregular war

Personal cognitive processes inform how individuals understand their environment. Cultural variation, fundamental attribution error, causal attribution, and durability bias create obstacles to Western understanding of irregular war and have created a significant institutional bias in how the US military perceives its enemies- a perception only somewhat softened after a decade of irregular war. United Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is in a better position to overcome these problems through persistent engagement. In the event of major conflict, environmentally sensitized military planners will be better able to achieve military and policy objectives.     

WARFARE IN A NEW DOMAIN: THE ETHICS OF MILITARY CYBER-OPERATIONS

While most normative evaluations of military cyber-operations have emerged from the legal community, this article assesses the legitimacy of such operations from a philosophical-ethical perspective. After reviewing the relationship between rights forfeiture and the jus ad bellum and jus in bello criteria of the just war tradition, it applies these criteria to several aspects of cyber-operations, including responses to cyber-activities, the use of cyber-capabilities affecting combatants and civilians, and the use of these capabilities by contractors. Finally, it briefly addresses the legitimacy of limiting rights to privacy and anonymity in service of preventing cyber-harm.     

JUST WAR AND CYBERWAR

My aim in this paper is to reflect on a very narrow question: under what conditions might a cyber-attack provide a just cause for war? I begin by articulating what makes for a just cause, briefly address the problem of attribution, and then discuss three broad categories of cyber-attack: those that clearly do not satisfy the just cause requirement, those that clearly do satisfy the just cause requirement, and three ambiguous cases – the destruction of property, the emplacement of logic bombs, and the failure to prevent cyber-attacks. My conclusions are exploratory and suggestive rather than definitive, partly by virtue of the extreme paucity of literature on the moral assessment of cyberwar.     

属性约简方法在威胁因素选择中的应用

分析了影响对空威胁判断的威胁因素,确定了各属性值离散化的处理标准,构建了基于粗糙集理论的对空威胁判断决策信息表;通过基于属性重要性的约简方法和基于正区域的约简方法对威胁因素进行了约简,确定了水面舰艇对空威胁判断的威胁因素,最后用Matlab仿真技术验证结论的正确性。     

武器系统维修性设计综合评估方法研究

在武器设计阶段,定性地从维修性设计因素入手,以各因素间的交互作用为出发点,先提出维修性设计属性和促进度的概念,然后通过有向图和矩阵理论对武器系统维修性设计综合评估模型进行探讨,最后给出维修性综合评估的方法和步骤。     

归因理论对英语教学的启示

本文通过对归因理论的阐述和对学生学业状况的归因倾向分析,提出了归因理论对英语教学的启示:一要关注学生的归因反应;二要研究学生的归因倾向,引导学生正确归因;三要重视培养学生的情感智力和认知技能;四要对教师自身的教学工作进行正确的归因。     

NUCLEAR ATTRIBUTION AS DETERRENCE

Recently, post-explosion nuclear forensics, or nuclear attribution, has gained a new spotlight within the nuclear weapons scientific and policymaking community. Academics are beginning to ask whether post-explosion forensics might create a replacement for an international nonproliferation regime, or at least offer a fallback option to deter states and individuals from selling nuclear materials. This paper examines current attribution technology from unclassified literature and finds the technology to be well developed but not foolproof, such that nuclear attribution currently provides little deterrent value. If current capabilities were publicized more thoroughly and if the post-explosion process of assessing the evidence were internationalized, states and intermediate actors might be deterred more effectively. Developing a nuclear fingerprint database is also discussed. While useful, its impact on deterrence would be minimal.