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We consider the single server Markovian queue subject to Poisson generated catastrophes. Whenever a catastrophe occurs, all customers are forced to abandon the system, the server is rendered inoperative and an exponential repair time is set on. During the repair time new arrivals are allowed to join the system. We assume that the arriving customers decide whether to join the system or balk, based on a natural linear reward‐cost structure with two types of rewards: A (usual) service reward for those customers that receive service and a (compensation) failure reward for those customers that are forced to abandon the system due to a catastrophe. We study the strategic behavior of the customers regarding balking and derive the corresponding (Nash) equilibrium strategies for the observable and unobservable cases. We show that both types of strategic behavior may be optimal: to avoid the crowd or to follow it. The crucial factor that determines the type of customer behavior is the relative value of the service reward to the failure compensation. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2013 相似文献
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分别利用胶子半经典饱和与量子饱和机制,研究了相对论重离子碰撞中净余质子产生截面的大横动量现象。通过贝塞尔函数多项式近似与辛普森求积法的结合应用,解决了对贝塞尔函数的二重高振荡积分问题。计算发现:量子饱和机制的计算结果能很好地解释布鲁克海文国家实验室的最新实验现象,从而证实了高能重离子碰撞中胶子量子饱和机制的存在。 相似文献
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