The politics of multinational military operations

Today, few countries fight alone; most fight as allies or partners in multilateral campaigns. The end of the Cold War opened a window of opportunity for multinational military operations (MMOs). These have seen varying degrees of participation, enthusiasm, and success. This special forum is devoted to the politics of multilateral warfare including their formation, maintenance, and durability. The introduction sketches past research and derives some key questions of continuing relevance. The contributions shed light on the domestic and international politics of MMOs, focusing on the implementation of national restrictions and their repercussions for MMOs, party politics of military intervention, the conditions under which states decide to defect from military operations, and the role of junior partners in MMOs. In sum, this forum offers a fresh look at the politics of MMOs, including conceptual contributions to the study of national restrictions, domestic constraints, and coalition warfare.     

Less than Meets the Eye

Observers of United States (US) interventions have almost universally characterized the 1994 Haiti intervention as multilateral, a model for how international cooperation can achieve common security goals. A closer analysis of the intervention reveals that the planning and execution of the intervention were almost entirely unilateral and therefore cost the US few if any of the theoretical costs of coalition warfare, including interoperability and policy compromise. Mapped onto the unilateral strategy and operation of the intervention, however, was a multilateral diplomatic effort that secured United Nations Security Council authorization and provided a cover for an intervention that the US had already planned and intended to execute with or without that authorization. That the US sought a multilateral cover for an intervention that it could easily accomplish unilaterally shows the importance of two factors: A domestic audience that opposed unilateral peacekeeping but would accept using US resources as part of a broader multilateral operation, and a local population that would be more responsive to a multilateral coalition than a use of force that was perceived to be unilateral. The Haiti intervention shows that the determinants of success in operations other than war are as much political as military. When the US already has overwhelming military superiority vis-à-vis its adversary, building military coalitions becomes as much about enlisting political support as aggregating material capability.     

Varieties of defection strategies from multinational military coalitions: Insights from operation Iraqi freedom

How do states defect from multinational military coalitions? The question deserves considerable academic scrutiny, as states increasingly rely on coalitions to prosecute military missions. Yet to the extent that coalition defection has been explored, the extant literature tends to see defection as a binary undertaking – states are either in or out. In practice, however, defection is an act of risk minimization in a manner that forces other coalition partners to fill resulting operational gaps. A coalition can therefore appear stable due to a constant number of flags associated with the mission, but in practice be much less coherent and capable. After defining defection as a non-routine abrogation of operational responsibility at other coalition partners’ expense, significantly prior to mission conclusion, this article explores several states’ participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom and the various manners by which they defected from that coalition. It concludes with implications for future scholarship.