Coping with traps of vulnerability: a review of the impact of post-colonial issues on the independence of South Sudan

In a world virtually free of slavery and colonialism and one mainly driven by the sovereign state rationale, allusion to manifestations or the existence of some form of these phenomena within a state is often received with dumbfounding indifference or denial. However, a form of rule that had continued in South Sudan long after the departure of the British in 1956 was colonial both in its quintessence and flair in that it disenfranchised its citizens and denied them the most basic freedoms, services and development. Under this establishment, resistance against the coercive vision of the state was brutally suppressed for many decades. This state of affairs finally ended in July 2011. Nonetheless, there is a miscellany of unresolved post-colonial issues between the two countries that warrant attention. These include security and the demarcation of borders, the issue of ludicrous transit fees for South Sudan's oil exportation through Sudan, citizenship, external debt repayment, etc. These issues are part of traps inherited from the anti-colonial struggle, which have now supplanted the old ensemble of North–South conflict paroxysm. As a matter of urgency, the two countries will have to wrap up the incomplete process of negotiation on these substantive issues. The talks should be approached with a new mindset based on the new reality of two sovereign states. To the extent that it is widely established that South Sudan and Sudan must coexist peacefully in order to develop into viable entities, such mutual dependency must be based on equality and respect.     

Winning hearts and minds to lose control: exploring various consequences of popular support in counterinsurgency missions

The strategy of ‘winning hearts and minds’ is considered key to successful counterinsurgency, but it often works at the expense of political control over the course of war. This happens when the strategy requires the counterinsurgent to work with a local nationalist group that takes advantage of its lack of access to civilians. This exposes the counterinsurgent to a dilemma inherent in the strategy; because working with the group is a crucial part of the strategy, victory would be impossible without it. Yet when the strategy is implemented through the group, it compromises the policy it serves. I show how this dilemma undermined British political control during the Malayan Emergency.