部队国有资产管理问题与对策研究

近年来,随着国家和地方政府对部队经费投入的不断增长,部队国有资产在数量、质量以及结构上都有了很大的改善。如何建立健全部队国有资产的管理制度,保证部队国有资产的安全完整和有效使用,防止国有资产流失,是当前部队资产管理和使用人员必须思考的现实问题。     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

Determination of suppliers' optimal quantity discount schedules with heterogeneous buyers

Although the quantity discount problem has been extensively studied in the realm of a single supplier and a single buyer, it is not well understood when a supplier has many different buyers. This paper presents an analysis of a supplier's quantity discount decision when there are many buyers with different demand and cost structures. A common discrete all‐unit quantity discount schedule with many break points is used. After formulating the model, we first analyze buyers' responses to a general discrete quantity discount schedule. This analysis establishes a framework for a supplier to formulate his quantity discount decision. Under this framework, the supplier's optimal quantity discount schedule can be formulated and solved by a simple non‐linear programming model. The applicability of the model is discussed with an application for a large U.S. distribution network. © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 49: 46–59, 2002; DOI 10.1002/nav.1052     

Interchange fee rate,merchant discount rate,and retail price in a credit card network: A game‐theoretic analysis

We consider two game‐theoretic settings to determine the optimal values of an issuer's interchange fee rate, an acquirer's merchant discount rate, and a merchant's retail price in a credit card network. In the first setting, we investigate a two‐stage game problem in which the issuer and the acquirer first negotiate the interchange fee rate, and the acquirer and the retailer then determine their merchant discount rate and retail price, respectively. In the second setting, motivated by the recent US bill “H.R. 2695,” we develop a three‐player cooperative game in which the issuer, the acquirer, and the merchant form a grand coalition and bargain over the interchange fee rate and the merchant discount rate. Following the cooperative game, the retailer makes its retail pricing decision. We derive both the Shapley value‐ and the nucleolus‐characterized, and globally‐optimal unique rates for the grand coalition. Comparing the two game settings, we find that the participation of the merchant in the negotiation process can result in the reduction of both rates. Moreover, the stability of the grand coalition in the cooperative game setting may require that the merchant should delegate the credit card business only to the issuer and the acquirer with sufficiently low operation costs. We also show that the grand coalition is more likely to be stable and the U.S. bill “H.R. 2695” is thus more effective, if the degree of division of labor in the credit card network is higher as the merchant, acquirer, and issuer are more specialized in the retailing, acquiring, and issuing operations, respectively. © 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

常系数投资消费模型中资产折算函数常用

在有交易费的常系数投资消费模型下,讨论了资产折算的一个重要的基本性质,即给出了资产折算函数是变分不等式的粘性上解这一基本结果。     

一种改进的证据权重确定方法

针对Dempster方法在合成高冲突证据时存在的问题,分析了现有改进方法的缺点,提出了一种新的改进方法。该方法首先利用证据之间的相似系数求出各证据的初级权重;然后引入权重折扣因子,将冲突证据的权重按折扣因子折算后并入到其他证据的权重中,得到各证据的综合权重;最后对证据加权平均后再利用D-S组合规则进行组合,通过算例比较表明改进后的方法合成结果更加有效。     

带交易未定权益有偏好无套利定价

针对引入的有交易费正常化资产模型和有偏好套期保值投资策略,利用辅助鞅和资产折算函 数方法,讨论了未定权益的有偏好无套利机会定价问题,还给出了相应的有偏好无套利机会的定价区间。     

部队资产管理与预算管理相结合长效机制建设的思考

按照武警总部资产管理与预算管理相结合的办法要求,公安现役部队实行了资产管理与预算管理相结合改革,取得明显成效,促进了保障效益的提高。如何确保资产管理与预算管理相结合走上规范化、经常化的轨道？如何确保这些工作有章可循、顺畅运转,具有长久的生命力？笔者通过分析目前部队资产使用和管理现状,提出了加强资产管理与预算管理相结合长效机制建设。     

Collaborative procurement among competing buyers

Collaborative procurement emerged as one of the many initiatives for achieving improved inter‐firm coordination and collaboration. In this article, we adopt a game‐theoretical approach to study the interaction between two firms who procure jointly, but produce independently and remain competitors in a product market characterized by price‐sensitive demand. We study the underlying economics behind collaborative procurement, examine the effects of collaboration on buyer and supplier profitability, and derive conditions under which collaboration is beneficial to each participant. We find that a necessary and sufficient condition for a buyer to collaborate is to increase its sales. We identify the conditions that lead equal size buyers (i.e., consortia consisting of only large buyers or only small buyers) versus different size buyers to collaborate. We also determine the conditions that make collaboration profitable for the supplier, and show that rather than selling a large quantity to a single buyer, the supplier prefers to sell to multiple buyers in smaller quantities. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Contributors

ABSTRACT

Over the past two decades, the United States has increasingly turned to targeted sanctions and export restrictions, such as those imposed against Iran and North Korea, in order to curb the spread of weapons of mass destruction. One vexing problem, however, is how to contend with jurisdictional hurdles when the violations occur overseas, in countries that are unable or unwilling to assist US enforcement efforts. To solve this problem, US prosecutors are turning to strategies with significant extraterritorial implications— that is, exercising legal authority beyond national borders. One such tool is to use civil legal procedures to seize assets linked to sanctions or export-control violations in jurisdictions that lack cooperative arrangements with US enforcement agencies. While this may be an attractive strategy to bolster enforcement efforts against overseas illicit procurement, using such tools is not without consequence. This article explores the political, legal, and technical implications of enforcing extraterritorial controls against overseas non-state actors by exploring the recent uses of civil-asset forfeiture against Iranian and North Korean procurement networks.