灰色矩阵对策

本文结合灰色系统与对策论的知识,给出了以区间型灰数为元素的灰矩阵对策的定义,讨论了灰矩阵对策在纯策略与混合策略意义下的最优策略及灰解的存在性。     

自动武器可靠性寿命分布规律研究

本文对两种具有代表性的自动武器收集其生产验收寿命试验的故障记录,经处理得出寿命子样,再用皮尔逊检验进行分布函数检验,从中发现自动武器寿命分布服从指数分布,为研究自动武器可靠性指标及其验收方法提供了理论依据。     

玻璃瓶动态图像检测运动模拟平台

动态图像检测中,如何在指定位置快速而准确地捕捉到运动物体的图像是最基本的环节。试验验证图像检测装置的成像特性,成为动态图像检测研究的重要内容之一。以变频器控制电动机为核心,通过变频器内部参数编程和外部简单的辅助控制电路,构建了运动平稳、速度可调、具有自动保护功能的模拟平台。该平台适于动态图像检测中普通运动物体的快速模拟,已成功地用于玻璃瓶动态图像装置中,达到了预期目的。     

Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

Defensive weapons and star wars: a supergame with optimal punishments

We model the perspective faced by nuclear powers involved in a supergame where nuclear deterrence is used to stabilise peace. This setting allows us to investigate the bearings of defensive weapons on the effectiveness of deterrence and peace stability, relying on one-shot optimal punishments. We find that the sustainability of peace is unaffected by defensive shields if the latter are symmetric across countries, while asymmetric endowments of such weapons have clear-cut destabilising consequences.     

考虑运行故障的工程安全设施使用检查可用度模型

使用检查是发现工程安全设施系统隐蔽功能故障的有效措施。在考虑检查期间可能发生运行故障的前提下,建立了基于使用检查策略的系统可用度模型。应用该模型对应急柴油发电机的使用检查过程进行可用度分析,确定了其最优检查问隔期和给定可用度条件下的检查间隔期区间;探讨了检查时间和维修时间对可用度的影响。研究表明,该模型对于工程安全设施系统的可用度分析是有效可行的,其结果能够为维修决策提供依据。     

Production to order and off‐line inspection when the production process is partially observable

This study combines inspection and lot‐sizing decisions. The issue is whether to INSPECT another unit or PRODUCE a new lot. A unit produced is either conforming or defective. Demand need to be satisfied in full, by conforming units only. The production process may switch from a “good” state to a “bad” state, at constant rate. The proportion of conforming units in the good state is higher than in the bad state. The true state is unobservable and can only be inferred from the quality of units inspected. We thus update, after each inspection, the probability that the unit, next candidate for inspection, was produced while the production process was in the good state. That “good‐state‐probability” is the basis for our decision to INSPECT or PRODUCE. We prove that the optimal policy has a simple form: INSPECT only if the good‐state‐probability exceeds a control limit. We provide a methodology to calculate the optimal lot size and the expected costs associated with INSPECT and PRODUCE. Surprisingly, we find that the control limit, as a function of the demand (and other problem parameters) is not necessarily monotone. Also, counter to intuition, it is possible that the optimal action is PRODUCE, after revealing a conforming unit. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

Cost allocation rules for elastic single‐attribute situations

Many cooperative games, especially ones stemming from resource pooling in queueing or inventory systems, are based on situations in which each player is associated with a single attribute (a real number representing, say, a demand) and in which the cost to optimally serve any sum of attributes is described by an elastic function (which means that the per‐demand cost is non‐increasing in the total demand served). For this class of situations, we introduce and analyze several cost allocation rules: the proportional rule, the serial cost sharing rule, the benefit‐proportional rule, and various Shapley‐esque rules. We study their appeal with regard to fairness criteria such as coalitional rationality, benefit ordering, and relaxations thereof. After showing the impossibility of combining coalitional rationality and benefit ordering, we show for each of the cost allocation rules which fairness criteria it satisfies. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 271–286, 2017     

Probabilistic resource pooling games

We study a setting with a single type of resource and with several players, each associated with a single resource (of this type). Unavailability of these resources comes unexpectedly and with player‐specific costs. Players can cooperate by reallocating the available resources to the ones that need the resources most and let those who suffer the least absorb all the costs. We address the cost savings allocation problem with concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we formulate a probabilistic resource pooling game and study them on various properties. We show that these games are not necessarily convex, do have non‐empty cores, and are totally balanced. The latter two are shown via an interesting relationship with Böhm‐Bawerk horse market games. Next, we present an intuitive class of allocation rules for which the resulting allocations are core members and study an allocation rule within this class of allocation rules with an appealing fairness property. Finally, we show that our results can be applied to a spare parts pooling situation.