2005～2009年《武警学院学报》文献计量分析

通过对2005～2009年《武警学院学报》5年间的载文、作者及引文情况进行统计分析,研究其载文量、栏目设置以及著者、发文地区和著者系统分布,并统计出合作度、合作类型、引文量、篇均引文数、引文语种及引文类型等,以期描述学报在改为月刊后的出版状况,从中发现一些带有规律性的问题,并客观评价其办刊特色,为刊物的进一步发展及相关学科动向提供理论依据。     

《武警工程学院学报》2006—2009年载文、作者与引文的统计分析

应用文献计量学的方法,对2006—2009年间《学报》所刊载的685篇论文进行统计分析,从载文量、基金论文比、发表时滞、稿件分布、作者基本情况和合著情况、引文情况等方面,综合反映了《学报》近几年发展的现状。力求在客观揭示该刊学术质量的同时,能为该刊的不断发展有所裨益。     

ABC分析法在不平衡报价评审中的应用

针对不平衡报价在施工招标中呈愈演愈烈之势,严重损害招标人利益,在分析不平衡报价含义与表现形式的基础上,利用ABC分析法基本原理与思想,以某建设工程为例,探析ABC分析法在不平衡报价评审中的应用和实施,并运用ABC分析法对工程实践数据进行了筛选分析,筛选结果与工程实践相符.研究结果为解决工程建设评标中定量评审不平衡报价方...     

Scheduling and due‐date quotation in a make‐to‐order supply chain

We consider a manufacturer, served by a single supplier, who has to quote due dates to arriving customers in a make‐to‐order production environment. The manufacturer is penalized for long lead times and for missing due dates. To meet due dates, the manufacturer has to obtain components from a supplier. We model this manufacturer and supplier as a two‐machine flow shop, consider several variations of this problem, and design effective due‐date quotation and scheduling algorithms for centralized and decentralized versions of the model. We perform extensive computational testing to assess the effectiveness of our algorithms and to compare the centralized and decentralized models to quantify the value of centralized control in a make‐to‐order supply chain. Since complete information exchange and centralized control is not always practical or cost‐effective, we explore the value of partial information exchange for this system. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Delivery‐date and capacity management in a decentralized internal market

We study competitive due‐date and capacity management between the marketing and engineering divisions within an engineer‐to‐order (ETO) firm. Marketing interacts directly with the customers and quotes due‐dates for their orders. Engineering is primarily concerned with the efficient utilization of resources and is willing to increase capacity if the cost is compensated. The two divisions share the responsibility for timely delivery of the jobs. We model the interaction between marketing and engineering as a Nash game and investigate the effect of internal competition on the equilibrium decisions. We observe that the internal competition not only degrades the firm's overall profitability but also the serviceability. Finally, we extend our analysis to multiple‐job settings that consider both flexible and inflexible capacity. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008