Threshold incentives over multiple periods and the sales hockey stick phenomenon

In this article, we study threshold‐based sales‐force incentives and their impact on a dealer's optimal effort. A phenomenon, observed in practice, is that the dealer exerts a large effort toward the end of the incentive period to boost sales and reach the threshold to make additional profits. In the literature, the resulting last‐period sales spike is sometimes called the hockey stick phenomenon (HSP). In this article, we show that the manufacturer's choice of the incentive parameters and the underlying demand uncertainty affect the dealer's optimal effort choice. This results in the sales HSP over multiple time periods even when there is a cost associated with waiting. We then show that, by linking the threshold to a correlated market signal, the HSP can be regulated. We also characterize the variance of the total sales across all the periods and demonstrate conditions under the sales variance can be reduced. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

一种基于零控脱靶量的滑模末制导律设计

基于零控脱靶量的思想,提出一种能够有效针对大气层再入目标的滑模末制导律.首先,建立纵向平面内的弹目相对运动方程;然后利用扩张状态观测器对目标机动加速度信息进行估计,并对零控脱靶量算法进行分析,提出了制导律的设计思路;接着利用滑模变结构控制理论进行制导律的推导;最后进行仿真分析,仿真结果证明,所设计的制导律能够很好地对目标弹进行拦截,并且指令的跟踪效果也很好,从而验证了算法的有效性.     

Why nations fail: defense spending,fighting commitment and,inter-nations-prosperity-poverty-gap

Both the increasing defense spending and the widening divergence between rich and poor countries are of great concerns. This paper attempts to explain the two concepts in a unify theory framework. In the view of conflict economics, a nation’s defense spending can be seen as the fighting commitment of distributive effort in the global economy while other is the productive effort. The development of global economy needs the productive efforts from almost every nation, and the distribution of the aggregate output is determined in large degree by the fighting commitment of each nation. The numerical simulation of the model gives a reasonable explanation of the patterns of the divergence/convergence of prosperity-poverty gap between nations, the fact which is evidenced by many empirical analyses. (1) Given the initial wealth ratio between nations fixed, there is a critical value of fighting decisiveness, when the actual value is larger than the critical value, it is more likely to result in Matthew effect; otherwise the gap would gradually be shortened. (2) Given the fighting decisiveness fixed, there is a critical value of initial wealth ratio, when the actual value is larger than the critical value, it is more likely to result in Matthew effect; otherwise, the gap would gradually be shortened. The study gives a new perspective to explain and handle the increasingly defense spending and the prosperity-poverty gap between nations.     

Resale price maintenance contracts with retailer sales effort: Effect of flexibility and competition

In Resale Price Maintenance (RPM) contracts, the manufacturer specifies the resale price that retailers must charge to consumers. We study the role of using a RPM contract in a market where demand is influenced by retailer sales effort. First, it is well known that RPM alone does not provide incentive for the retailer to use adequate sales effort and some form of quantity fixing may be needed to achieve channel coordination. However, when the market potential of the product is uncertain, RPM with quantity fixing is a rigid contract form. We propose and study a variety of RPM contracts with quantity fixing that offer different forms of flexibility including pricing flexibility and quantity flexibility. Second, we address a long‐time debate in both academia and practice on whether RPM is anti‐competitive in a market when two retailers compete on both price and sales effort. We show that depending on the relative intensity of price competition and sales effort competition, RPM may lead to higher or lower retail prices compared to a two‐part tariff contract, which specifies a wholesale price and a fixed fee. Further, the impact of RPM on price competition and sales effort competition is always opposite to each other. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

Quality risk in outsourcing: Noncontractible product quality and private quality cost information

This article addresses the concept of quality risk in outsourcing. Recent trends in outsourcing extend a contract manufacturer's (CM's) responsibility to several functional areas, such as research and development and design in addition to manufacturing. This trend enables an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) to focus on sales and pricing of its product. However, increasing CM responsibilities also suggest that the OEM's product quality is mainly determined by its CM. We identify two factors that cause quality risk in this outsourcing relationship. First, the CM and the OEM may not be able to contract on quality; second, the OEM may not know the cost of quality to the CM. We characterize the effects of these two quality risk factors on the firms' profits and on the resulting product quality. We determine how the OEM's pricing strategy affects quality risk. We show, for example, that the effect of noncontractible quality is higher than the effect of private quality cost information when the OEM sets the sales price after observing the product's quality. We also show that committing to a sales price mitigates the adverse effect of quality risk. To obtain these results, we develop and analyze a three‐stage decision model. This model is also used to understand the impact of recent information technologies on profits and product quality. For example, we provide a decision tree that an OEM can use in deciding whether to invest in an enterprise‐wide quality management system that enables accounting of quality‐related activities across the supply chain. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

空间拦截零控脱靶量与末段制导能量需求的近似计算

基于理想二体假设下的弹道方程解析式,忽略重力在拦截末段对拦截器和目标运动状态的影响.推导了空间拦截初始制导偏差与终端零控脱靶量之间的线性近似计算式,并以速度增量的大小来近似描述拦截末端主动寻的制导段的能量需求,给出了拦截末段制导最小能量需求与零控脱靶量、探测距离之间的近似关系.通过数字仿真测试了近似计算的准确性.     

How to deal with consumers who group to request a discount?

We investigate operations impacts of consumer‐initiated group buying (CGB), whereby consumers voluntarily form buying groups to negotiate bulk deals with retailers. This differs from regular purchasing whereby consumers visit retailers individually and pay posted prices. Upon the visit by group consumers, a retailer decides to forgo or satisfy their demand in its entirety. Turned down by a retailer, group consumers continue to visit other retailers. In the case where their group effort fails to conclude a deal, some group consumers switch to individual purchasing provided they receive a non‐negative utility by doing so. Even after a successful group event, the group consumers who forgo the event out of utility concern may switch to individual purchasing as well. Retailer competition, group size, and the chance that group consumers switch to individual purchasing upon unsatisfaction are crucial to how retailers adjust operations to deal with CGB. With retailer competition, the rise of CGB results in every consumer paying the same reduced price when group size is small but makes group consumers pay more than by purchasing individually when group size is large. This has mixed consequences on the profits for retailers in both absolute and relative terms.     

Supply contracts in manufacturer‐retailer interactions with manufacturer‐quality and retailer effort‐induced demand

We consider a decentralized distribution channel where demand depends on the manufacturer‐chosen quality of the product and the selling effort chosen by the retailer. The cost of selling effort is private information for the retailer. We consider three different types of supply contracts in this article: price‐only contract where the manufacturer sets a wholesale price; fixed‐fee contract where manufacturer sells at marginal cost but charges a fixed (transfer) fee; and, general franchise contract where manufacturer sets a wholesale price and charges a fixed fee as well. The fixed‐fee and general franchise contracts are referred to as two‐part tariff contracts. For each contract type, we study different contract forms including individual, menu, and pooling contracts. In the analysis of the different types and forms of contracts, we show that the price only contract is dominated by the general franchise menu contract. However, the manufacturer may prefer to offer the fixed‐fee individual contract as compared to the general franchise contract when the retailer's reservation utility and degree of information asymmetry in costs are high. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

数字电路故障模拟方法复杂性分析

通过分析故障模拟算法的发展及其现状,在理论和对ISCAS实验的基础上,给出各种算法的复杂性分析结果,并比较了各种故障模拟方法的优劣。