Economic sanctions and official ethnic discrimination in target countries, 1950–2003

Conventional studies on the consequences of sanctions tend to focus on the target society as a whole without specifying how foreign economic pressures might affect the well-being of vulnerable groups within target countries – the same groups who often disproportionately bear the burden of sanctions. This study explores the extent to which sanctions increase the likelihood of discriminatory government practices against one of the globally most vulnerable groups, ethnic groups. It is argued that sanctions contribute to the rise of official ethnic-based economic and political discrimination through contracting the economy and creating incentives for the target government to employ ethnic-based discriminatory policies. Using data on over 900 ethnic groups from 1950 to 2003, the results lend support for the theoretical claim that sanctions prompt the government to pursue ethnic-based discriminatory economic and political practices in multiethnic countries. The findings also indicate that multilateral sanctions are likely to be more harmful to the well-being of ethnic groups than sanctions levied by individual countries. Further, the negative effect of comprehensive sanctions appears to be greater than that of sanctions with moderate and limited impact on the target economy. The regime type of the target state, on the other hand, appears to have a significant role only in conditioning the hypothesized effect of sanctions on economic discrimination. Overall, this study’s focus on a vulnerable segment of the target society – ethnic groups – offers a greater understanding of the consequences of sanctions. It also provides additional insight as to how, in multiethnic countries, political elites might domestically respond to external pressures to retain power.     

Autocracies and Economic Sanctions: The Divergent Impact of Authoritarian Regime Type on Sanctions Success

There is some consensus in the literature that economic sanctions targeting authoritarian regimes are less effective than those against democratic regimes. This line of research, however, assumes that autocratic regimes are monolithic and that they have similar capacities to resist foreign pressure. This study argues that the success rate of sanctions against dictatorships is contingent on institutional differences across different types of autocracies. I develop a theoretical model indicating that single-party and military regimes are less likely to concede to foreign pressure compared to democracies. This is because they effectively use various repressive tactics and positive inducements to endure the costs of the coercion. Sanctions against personalist regimes, on the other hand, are likely to be as effective as sanctions directed at democracies. Personalist regimes might be inclined to acquiesce to foreign pressure due to their lack of strong institutional capacity to weather the costs of the sanctions. Results from the selection-corrected models show that sanctions against military or single-party regimes are less likely to induce concessions relative to democratic target regimes. The findings also indicate that there is no significant difference in the success rate of sanctions against personalist regimes and democratic governments.     

中国传统战争哲学理念的近代嬗变

近代以来,在西方列强坚船利炮的重创之下,中华民族在军事上接连失败。在严酷的现实面前,中华民族流传两千多年的传统战争哲学理念,受到了前所未有的挑战。在近代战争的冲击下,中国传统战争哲学理念开始了缓慢的嬗变历程。主要表现为三点：“避战求和”理念的破产与激变;“义战必胜”理念的质疑与超越;“道器合一”理念的背离与回归。     

简析汉匈争夺西域之战与两汉时期中央政府西进策略

两汉与匈奴的和战维持了四百多年,持续如此之久的战争和复杂多变的关系在中国历代民族关系史中是绝无仅有的,本文从战争的角度分析战争的原因、特点及双方得失,着重探讨两汉中央政府西进策略的得失。     

面向任务的导弹测试性需求分析与指标确定

针对当前缺乏科学合理的理论和方法确定导弹系统级测试性指标的现状,提出一种面向任务需求的测试性指标确定方法.将导弹任务剖面划分为贮存、出库、部署和发射四个阶段,并提出各个阶段相应的测试需求;分别建立基于贮存可用度、战斗准备任务成功率、部署战备完好率和发射任务成功率为性能要求的测试性需求子模型,给出各个性能指标与测试性参数...     

When Do Imposed Economic Sanctions Work? A Critical Review of the Sanctions Effectiveness Literature

ABSTRACT

There is growing policy consensus in Washington and other Western capitals that economic sanctions are powerful tools to cope with major foreign policy crises. Are sanctions, particularly targeted sanctions, really the potent instruments optimists suggest? Under what circumstances do punitive economic measures induce policy change in sanctioned countries? To probe these queries, in this article I outline the conditions that have been identified as more likely to lead to successful sanctions outcomes in the literature. I also discuss four major shortcomings of existing scholarship. First, the sender-biased interpretation of sanctions effectiveness renders the treatment of the ‘ineffective’ cases with negative outcomes the same as those cases that induce no discernable change in target behavior. Second, the prevalent use of static data from existing sanctions databases reduces the ability of researchers to study various time-specific factors affecting the probability of sanctions success. Third, the dominant state-centric bargaining model in the literature offers limited insight into contemporary coercive measures directed at non-state actors. Fourth, the study of sanctions in isolation of other instruments that frequently accompany them, such as incentives and diplomatic pressure, leads to a partial understanding of the specific role sanctions play in shaping the outcome of key foreign policy initiatives.     

The long and winding road … to success? Unit peace operation effectiveness and its effect on mission success

Why does peacekeeping sometimes fail? How can effective peacekeepers increase the likelihood of success of a mission? The two main flaws in the current evaluations of peace operations are that they mainly rely on already concluded missions and that they make use of indicators that do not reveal micro-level dynamics. This article introduces an analytical framework relating the effectiveness of soldiers to their actual impact in their area of operation in a peace operation. The framework is called “unit peace operation effectiveness” (UPOE). Focusing on soldiers in peace operations, this article shows that: different units behave differently; emphasize different aspects of the mandate; and are effective in different ways. Ultimately, this has an actual impact on the end-state of the mission. It relies on and adapts classic security studies works to theoretically enrich the peacekeeping literature. The model is tested in an illustrative case study based on ethnographic work on French and Italian units in Afghanistan between 2008 and 2010.     

舰船总体任务成功性的建模与应用

针对典型舰船的系统组成,进行了全舰任务成功性指标的示例计算,给出了总体指标的层次化表达方式。以舰船任务过程和典型任务剖面为依据,分析了任务可靠性和任务成功性之间的区别与联系,建立了舰船总体任务成功性指标的多阶段整体模型,并对航渡、待机、交战、撤离、返航阶段分别进行了仿真和解析建模。在建模与计算的基础上,通过敏感性分析计算了任务阶段持续时间的单位降低率等指标,为舰船任务成功性问题及其相关研究,提供了一个系统性的分析框架和方法。     

BANKING ON NONPROLIFERATION

In the past decade, governments have increasingly relied on financial sanctions to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. By targeting not only individuals and entities involved in illicit activities, but also banks that allow transactions to occur, financial sanctions were expected to stanch the flow of funds that support proliferation and compel compliance with international law—notably by Iran. Ten years later, Iran's nuclear program has advanced, calling into question the effectiveness of financial sanctions. Previous research evaluating the effectiveness of financial sanctions has focused on the impact of sanctions on the targeted country or on the enforcement of sanctions by the international community. Little attention has been devoted to their implementation by banks and government agencies. Based on interviews with US and European bank and government representatives, this article argues that the inefficiency of financial sanctions is due to shortcomings in training and information support from governments to financial institutions; governments on both sides of the Atlantic have provided little or no assistance to enable banks to identify patterns of proliferation financing and implement the sanctions regime. To transform financial sanctions into effective nonproliferation tools, governments need to play a greater role in their implementation.     

COOPERATION,SIGNALS, AND SANCTIONS

This paper uses game theory and modeling to address the role of incentive structures and information dynamics in nuclear inspections. The traditional argument is that compliant states should be willing to allow inspections to prove their innocence, while proliferating states are likely to impede inspections. This argument does not take into account the historical variation in inspection, signaling, and sanctioning behaviors. Using a game theoretic analysis and model, it is shown that the separation of proliferators from nonproliferators only occurs when the likelihood of proliferation is high and punishment costs are moderate. The model assumes that states can choose how much to cooperate with inspectors and must pay opportunity or secrecy costs when inspections are effective. The results are tested against a set of real-life cases, providing support for the claims of historical variation and the model's deductive propositions.