Oligopolistic contracting: Channel coordination under competition

We study contracts between a single retailer and multiple suppliers of two substitutable products, where suppliers have fixed capacities and present the retailer cost contracts for their supplies. After observing the contracts, the retailer decides how much capacity to purchase from each supplier, to maximize profits from the purchased capacity from the suppliers plus his possessed inventory (endowment). This is modeled as a noncooperative, nonzero‐sum game, where suppliers, or principals, move simultaneously as leaders and the retailer, the common agent, is the sole follower. We are interested in the form of the contracts in equilibrium, their effect on the total supply chain profit, and how the profit is split between the suppliers and the retailer. Under mild assumptions, we characterize the set of all equilibrium contracts and discuss all‐unit and marginal‐unit quantity discounts as special cases. We also show that the supply chain is coordinated in equilibrium with a unique profit split between the retailer and the suppliers. Each supplier's profit is equal to the marginal contribution of her capacity to supply chain profits in equilibrium. The retailer's profit is equal to the total revenue collected from the market minus the payments to the suppliers and the associated sales costs.     

Strategic dynamic sourcing from competing suppliers with transferable capacity investment

We study the supplier relationship choice for a buyer that invests in transferable capacity operated by a supplier. With a long‐term relationship, the buyer commits to source from a supplier over a long period of time. With a short‐term relationship, the buyer leaves open the option of switching to a new supplier in the future. The buyer has incomplete information about a supplies efficiency, and thus uses auctions to select suppliers and determine the contracts. In addition, the buyer faces uncertain demand for the product. A long‐term relationship may be beneficial for the buyer because it motivates more aggressive bidding at the beginning, resulting a lower initial price. A short‐term relationship may be advantageous because it allows switching, with capacity transfer at some cost, to a more efficient supplier in the future. We find that there exists a critical level of the switching cost above which a long‐term relationship is better for the buyer than a short‐term relationship. In addition, this critical switching cost decreases with demand uncertainty, implying a long‐term relationship is more favorable for a buyer facing volatile demand. Finally, we find that in a long‐term relationship, capacity can be either higher or lower than in a short‐term relationship. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

Dual sourcing: Responsive hedging against correlated supply and demand uncertainty

This article analyzes dual sourcing decisions under stochastically dependent supply and demand uncertainty. A manufacturer faces the trade‐off between investing in unreliable but high‐margin offshore supply and in reliable but low‐margin local supply, where the latter allows for production that is responsively contingent on the actual demand and offshore supply conditions. Cost thresholds for both types of supply determine the optimal resource allocation: single offshore sourcing, single responsive sourcing, or dual sourcing. Relying on the concept of concordance orders, we study the effects of correlation between supply and demand uncertainty. Adding offshore supply to the sourcing portfolio becomes more favorable under positive correlation, since offshore supply is likely to satisfy demand when needed. Selecting responsive capacity under correlated supply and demand uncertainty is not as straightforward, yet we establish the managerially relevant conditions under which responsive capacity either gains or loses in importance. Our key results are extended to the broad class of endogenous supply uncertainty developed by Dada et al. [Manufact Serv Operat Mange 9 (2007), 9–32].© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

地方物流供应商“偷懒”行为监管机制研究

军民融合现代军事物流体系中,地方物流供应商往往会"偷懒",这必将损害军民融合现代军事物流体系的整体绩效。首先描述了"偷懒"行为及其危害性,从机制入手,基于博弈论建立地方物流供应商"偷懒"行为监管机制;分析并证明了监管机制的有效性。这一机制的构建对于监管地方物流供应商具有重要作用。     

On the polyhedral structure of two‐level lot‐sizing problems with supplier selection

In this article, we study a two‐level lot‐sizing problem with supplier selection (LSS), which is an NP‐hard problem arising in different production planning and supply chain management applications. After presenting various formulations for LSS, and computationally comparing their strengths, we explore the polyhedral structure of one of these formulations. For this formulation, we derive several families of strong valid inequalities, and provide conditions under which they are facet‐defining. We show numerically that incorporating these valid inequalities within a branch‐and‐cut framework leads to significant improvements in computation. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 647–666, 2017     

地方物流供应商“藏捏”信息行为的监管机制

针对军民融合现代军事物流体系内物流实体存有"藏捏"信息行为,难以实现信息真正共享,妨害军队物资采购的问题,从地方物流供应商"藏捏"信息动机分析入手,考虑到安全保密原则,基于交纳保密保证金的做法对格罗夫斯机制进行修改,建立地方物流供应商"藏捏"信息行为的监管机制,并运用算例证明了该机制的科学有效性。     

军事物流服务商准入标准设置和甄选研究综述

军事物流服务商甄选研究是新军事变革下供应商管理发展的重要方向,是有效完成后勤保障任务、顺利实施作战行动的重要保证。基于此,本文从供应商关系理论和发展、物流服务商指标体系选择以及结合其他方法对物流服务商甄选三个方面对国内外研究现状进行总结概述,对整个军事物流服务商的选择过程加以研究,将其科学客观地运用于军事物流服务商选择的实际操作中,对于加强军事物流服务商需求管理、提高选择质效以及优化工作流程具有重大意义。同时,分析现有研究成果的不足,并对其未来发展前景提出展望,针对性地提出了军事物流服务商初步准入标准以及后续复选的方法,为军事物流服务商选择体系的完善提供参考。