军校的改革在于开放

分析了我军院校发展中存在的问题,提出了培养合格军事人才军校必须采取的措施,阐明了军校教育必须从封闭走向开放,才能在世界军事斗争中处于不败之地。     

A search game taking account of attributes of searching resources

This article deals with a two‐person zero‐sum game called a search allocation game (SAG), in which a searcher and a target participate as players. The searcher distributes his searching resources in a search space to detect the target. The effect of resources lasts a certain period of time and extends to some areas at a distance from the resources' dropped points. On the other hand, the target moves around in the search space to evade the searcher. In the history of search games, there has been little research covering the durability and reachability of searching resources. This article proposes two linear programming formulations to solve the SAG with durable and reachable resources, and at the same time provide an optimal strategy of distributing searching resources for the searcher and an optimal moving strategy for the target. Using examples, we will analyze the influences of two attributes of resources on optimal strategies. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2008     

A search game on a cyclic graph

There is a finite cyclic graph. The hider chooses one of all nodes except the specified one, and he hides an (immobile) object there. At the beginning the seeker is at the specified node. After the seeker chooses an ordering of the nodes except the specified one, he examines each nodes in that order until he finds the object, traveling along edges. It costs an amount when he moves from a node to an adjacent one and also when he checks a node. While the hider wishes to maximize the sum of the traveling costs and the examination costs which are required to find the object, the seeker wishes to minimize it. The problem is modeled as a two‐person zero‐sum game. We solve the game when unit costs (traveling cost + examination cost) have geometrical relations depending on nodes. Then we give properties of optimal strategies of both players. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

基于检测的人体跟踪算法

传统的目标跟踪算法需要人为标定跟踪区域,且受到漂移问题的影响。为了解决这些困难,针对人体跟踪问题,提出了一种新的基于检测的跟踪算法。为了减少漏跟踪,使用了多个检测算子,用来定位多个身体部位,将其检测结果映射到一个相同的身体区域。为了适应快速运动的目标,使用KLT跟踪和凝聚聚类将检测窗口连接起来形成人体轨迹。实验结果表明:使用多个检测算子明显地提高了跟踪性能;KLT跟踪对于快速运动目标具有适应能力。该算法基本满足实时性。     

关于曹操“唯才是举”人才观的辨正

曹操“唯才是举”人才观一直被后世争论,但是,诸多争论都没有触及对这一人才观的本意。其实,曹操“唯才是举”的本意就是企图垄断人才,反对士族垄断官场,否定旧的道德观。曹操的人才观,既是当时的现实需要,又为推动封建社会选择人才制度的进步作出了贡献。     

装备完好率要求和人才成长规律的维修任务分配方法

装备完好率是军事单位战备完好性水平的重要组成部分,人才的成长需要在实践中锻炼,针对我军装备维修任务分配难题,根据不同维修级别的情况,分析维修任务分配对装备完好率水平和人才成长的影响,提出基于装备完好率要求和人才成长规律的维修任务分配方法,建立了基于装备完好率要求和装备保障人才成长规律模型,此方法对于提高装备完好率水平和装备人才成长建设具有十分重要的意义。最后,用实例对方法的正确性进行了说明和验证,实例结果表明,该方法更贴近部队实际,对于部队的维修任务分配有重要的指导作用。     

New results on a stochastic duel game with each force consisting of heterogeneous units

Two forces engage in a duel, with each force initially consisting of several heterogeneous units. Each unit can be assigned to fire at any opposing unit, but the kill rate depends on the assignment. As the duel proceeds, each force—knowing which units are still alive in real time—decides dynamically how to assign its fire, in order to maximize the probability of wiping out the opposing force before getting wiped out. It has been shown in the literature that an optimal pure strategy exists for this two‐person zero‐sum game, but computing the optimal strategy remained cumbersome because of the game's huge payoff matrix. This article gives an iterative algorithm to compute the optimal strategy without having to enumerate the entire payoff matrix, and offers some insights into the special case, where one force has only one unit. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 56–65, 2014     

建立高等教育人才评价模式的有效性探讨

在我国高校的教学改革已全方位展开的今天,人才评价模式的改革却严重滞后并制约着高校的教学改革。在高等教育大众化阶段,大学需要重新审视人才评价模式,努力实现评价观念、评价内容、评价方式等方面的根本性变革,进一步完善高校人才评价机制,建立人才评价模式的有效性,培养出与社会需求挂钩的真正人才。     

An inspection game: Taking account of fulfillment probabilities of players' aims

This paper deals with an inspection game of customs and a smuggler. The customs can take two options of assigning a patrol or not. The smuggler has two strategies of shipping its cargo of contraband or not. Two players have several opportunities to take actions during a limited number of days. When both players do, there are some possibilities that the customs captures the smuggler and, simultaneously, the smuggler possibly makes a success of the smuggling. If the smuggler is captured or there remain no days for playing the game, the game ends. In this paper, we formulate the problem into a multi‐stage two‐person zero‐sum stochastic game and investigate some characteristics of the equilibrium solution, some of which are given in a closed form in a special case. There have been some studies so far on the inspection game. However, some consider the case that the smuggler has only one opportunity of smuggling or the perfect‐capture case that the customs can certainly arrest the smuggler on patrol, and others think of a recursive game without the probabilities of fulfilling the players' purposes. In this paper, we consider the inspection game taking account of the fulfillment probabilities of the players' aims. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

论人才成长中的非智力因素

随着个性化时代的来临,一个新的概念“情商”被引入,国内外不少研究人员提出了这样一个公式即:一个人的成功=20％IQ(智力商数)+80％EQ(感情商数),故不难看出,在21世纪人才的成长过程中,非智力因素所起的作用将越来越大。