首页 | 本学科首页   官方微博 | 高级检索  
   检索      


Arms trade,arms control,and security: Collective action issues
Authors:Todd Sandler
Institution:School of International Relations , University of Southern California , Los Angeles, CA, 90089–0043, USA
Abstract:This article puts forth collection action as a unifying theme for the conference essays on arms trade, control, and production. For each of these topics, collective action failures are related to group size and group composition considerations. Other issues are also examined including the manner in which individual contributions determine the overall level of the associated collective good ‐ the so‐called aggregation technology of public supply. Based on alternative aggregation technologies, the game‐theoretic underpinnings of these arms issues are explored.
Keywords:Arms trade  Arms control  Arms production  Collective action  Game theory  Exploitation hypothesis  Arms races  Offsets
设为首页 | 免责声明 | 关于勤云 | 加入收藏

Copyright©北京勤云科技发展有限公司  京ICP备09084417号