Counterinsurgency as armed reform: The political history of the Malayan Emergency |
| |
Authors: | David H. Ucko |
| |
Affiliation: | College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University, Washington, DC, USA |
| |
Abstract: | Despite the emphasis in doctrine and academia that counterinsurgency is in its essence political, these operations are all too commonly discussed and approached as primarily military endeavors. Informed by the need to refocus counterinsurgency studies, this article revisits a foundational case of the canon – the Malayan Emergency – to discuss its political (i.e., not military) unfolding. The analysis distinguishes itself by emphasizing the diplomatic processes, negotiations, and deals that gave strategic meaning to the military operations underway. In so doing, the article also generates insight on the use of leverage and elite bargains in creating new political settlements and bringing insurgent conflicts to an end. |
| |
Keywords: | Malayan Emergency counterinsurgency diplomacy elite bargain |
|
|