装备采购线性合同优化研究

高额装备费支出使对招投标合同优化问题备受国防经济学界关注,对装备采办过程中招投标线性合同的优化进行了研究。采用招投标模型与委托-代理模型分析相结合的方法,先从道德风险与风险分担2个方面分析装备采购合同的优化问题,然后引入竞争效应,分析风险分担的问题。即使在双方为风险中性不需要风险分担时,DoD仍然需要在最初的投标竞争与中标后承包商降低成本行为之间进行权衡。一般的投标中,应使最终支付基于实际成本和投标值2个因素,并考虑最终支付基于道德风险损失。研究的基本结论是:固定价格合同应尽可能少地使用;若存在2个以上的投标人,成本加价合同也应禁止使用;在使用激励合同时,应慎重选择合同系数,提出了计算优化线性激励合同系数的方法。

Study on optimization of a linear contract of weapon procurement

Opimization of a linear contract of weapon procurement attracts much attention in the field of defense economics for the higher expenditure of weapon procurement.The method combining a bidding model with a principal-agent model is proposed.First,the problems of moral hazard and risk sharing are analyzed.Second,the bidding-competition effect serves to reinforce the risk-sharing effect in determining the optimal contract.Even if the bidders are risk neutral,so that there is no need for risk sharing,the DoD is still need a tradeoff between stimulating competition in the wining firm incentives to limit its costs.Generally,the payment can be made contingent upon both the bids and the true valuation.making payment depend upon valuation introduces moral-hazard problems.Thus,the gains from making payment depend upon valuation must be weighted against the losses from moral hazard.The results show that fixed-price contracts should be used as less as it can be,and the cost-plus contracts are forbidden if there is more than one bidder.Finally the selecting parameters in the linear contract function is given.