Shifting power,preventive logic,and the response of the target: Germany,Russia, and the First World War |
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Authors: | Jack S. Levy |
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Affiliation: | Department of Political Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA |
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Abstract: | If a declining state has incentives for preventive war, the rising state should have incentives to delay a confrontation until it is stronger. We develop the theoretical paradox and examine the July 1914 crisis. Why did Russia, rising relative to Germany, not adopt a buying-time strategy? We argue that although most Russian leaders hoped to avoid a confrontation, they feared that the failure to support Serbia would lead to a loss of Russian credibility and a significant setback to Russia’s position in the Balkans, one that could not easily be reversed, even with Russia’s expected increase in relative military power. |
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Keywords: | Power transition preventive war rising states buying time status July Crisis First World War |
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