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装备采办中的讨价还价博弈模型
引用本文:李晓谦,张志峰. 装备采办中的讨价还价博弈模型[J]. 装甲兵工程学院学报, 2009, 23(5): 16-20
作者姓名:李晓谦  张志峰
作者单位:1. 空军工程大学,导弹学院,陕西,三原,713800;68222部队,甘肃,陇四,748000
2. 空军工程大学,导弹学院,陕西,三原,713800
摘    要:竞争性谈判是一种重要的武器装备采办方式,军方与承包商之间的谈判是一个重复博弈过程,双方谈判的本质是讨价还价。分析了轮流出价的讨价还价模型,对轮流出价博弈的子博弈精炼均衡进行了论述;在轮流出价模型的基础上建立了同时出价的讨价还价模型,并对2种模型的特点进行了分析;通过案例对2个模型的均衡结果进行了对比。分析结果显示:同时出价的讨价还价模型更能有效解决实际问题,更具有现实意义。

关 键 词:装备采办  讨价还价  重复博弈  轮流出价  同时出价  模型

Game Model for Bargaining in Equipment Acquisition
LI Xiao-qian,ZHANG Zhi-feng. Game Model for Bargaining in Equipment Acquisition[J]. Journal of Armored Force Engineering Institute, 2009, 23(5): 16-20
Authors:LI Xiao-qian  ZHANG Zhi-feng
Affiliation:1. Missile College, Air Force Engineering University, Sanyuan 713800, China; 2. Troop No. 68222 of PLA, Longxi 748000, China)
Abstract:Competitive negotiation is one of the most important equipment acquisition methods and the negotiation between army and contractors is a process of repeated game, where the essence of negotiation is bargaining. Firstly, the bargaining model for alternating offers is analyzed, and the sub-game perfect equilibrium of alternating offers is discussed. Based on the alternating offers model, the bargaining model for simultaneous offers is established. Then, the characteristics of both models are analyzed. Finally, the equilibrium solutions for both models are compared with examples. The results show that the simultaneous offers model can better solve practical game problem, thus may have more realistic meaning.
Keywords:equipment acquisition  bargaining  repeated game  alternating offers  simultaneous offers  model
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