Weakest‐link attacker‐defender games with multiple attack technologies |
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| Authors: | Daniel G. Arce Dan Kovenock Brian Roberson |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, University of Texas at Dallas, GR31, School of Economic, Political, and Policy Sciences, 800 W. Campbell Rd, Richardson, Texas 75080;2. Economic Science Institute, Argyros School of Business and Economics, Chapman University, One University Drive, Orange, California 92866;3. Department of Economics, Purdue University, Krannert School of Management, 403 W. State Street, West Lafayette, Indiana 47907 |
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| Abstract: | In this article, we examine a model of terrorism that focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has two qualitatively different attack modes at its disposal. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize an efficient but discrete attack technology — e.g., suicide attacks — when a more conventional mode of attack is available, and the optimal anti‐terrorism measures.© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012 |
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| Keywords: | conflict suicide terrorism weakest link colonel Blotto game |
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