TERRORIST THREATS AND TRANSITIONAL DYNAMICS IN AN OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS MODEL |
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| Authors: | Jhy‐Yuan Shieh Juin‐Jen Chang Ching‐Chong Lai |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics , Chinese Culture University , Taiwan;2. Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Department of Economics , Fu‐Jen Catholic University , Taiwan;3. Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Department of Economics , National Taiwan University , Taiwan |
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| Abstract: | Previous research has shown that the duration of a civil war is in part a function of how it ends: in government victory, rebel victory, or negotiated settlement. We present a model of how protagonists in a civil war choose to stop fighting. Hypotheses derived from this theory relate the duration of a civil war to its outcome as well as characteristics of the civil war and the civil war nation. Findings from a competing risk model reveal that the effects of predictors on duration vary according to whether the conflict ended in government victory, rebel victory, or negotiated settlement. |
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| Keywords: | Security spending Terrorist threats Overlapping generations model Transitional dynamics |
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