Transnational terrorism as a spillover of domestic disputes in other countries |
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Authors: | TONY ADDISON S. MANSOOB MURSHED |
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Affiliation: | 1. UNU‐WIDER , Katajanokanlaituri 6B, FIN‐00160 Helsinki , Finland murshed@iss.nl;3. Institute of Social Studies (ISS), PO Box 29776, 2502 LT The Hague, The Netherlands;4. The Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, Edgbaston, Birmingham B15 2TT, UK, Centre for the Study of Civil War (CSCW), PRIO , Oslo , Norway |
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Abstract: | This paper models transnational terrorism as a three‐way strategic interaction involving a government that faces armed opposition at home, which may spill over in the form of acts of terrorism by the state's opponents against the government's external sponsor. The external sponsor also utilises deterrence against potential terrorists, which only lowers terrorism if terrorists are not intrinsically motivated by a deep‐seated sense of humiliation. The model highlights the importance of intrinsic motivation. A rise in the external power's preference for deterrence against terrorism may backfire in these circumstances. Increases in the government's military efficiency against the rebels, who are also terrorists against the government's sponsor, raises overall levels of violence. |
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Keywords: | Conflict Terrorism Intrinsic motivation JEL code: C72, D81, H11, O19 |
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