The single and multi‐item transshipment problem with fixed transshipment costs

This article deals with supply chain systems in which lateral transshipments are allowed. For a system with two retailers facing stochastic demand, we relax the assumption of negligible fixed transshipment costs, thus, extending existing results for the single‐item case and introducing a new model with multiple items. The goal is to determine optimal transshipment and replenishment policies, such that the total centralized expected profit of both retailers is maximized. For the single‐item problem with fixed transshipment costs, we develop optimality conditions, analyze the expected profit function, and identify the optimal solution. We extend our analysis to multiple items with joint fixed transshipment costs, a problem that has not been investigated previously in the literature, and show how the optimality conditions may be extended for any number of items. Due to the complexity involved in solving these conditions, we suggest a simple heuristic based on the single‐item results. Finally, we conduct a numerical study that provides managerial insights on the solutions obtained in various settings and demonstrates that the suggested heuristic performs very well. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 61: 637–664, 2014     

Optimal division of inventory between depot and bases

We consider a problem of optimal division of stock between a logistic depot and several geographically dispersed bases, in a two‐echelon supply chain. The objective is to minimize the total cost of inventory shipment, taking into account direct shipments between the depot and the bases, and lateral transshipments between bases. We prove the convexity of the objective function and suggest a procedure for identifying the optimal solution. Small‐dimensional cases, as well as a limit case in which the number of bases tends to infinity, are solved analytically for arbitrary distributions of demand. For a general case, an approximation is suggested. We show that, in many practical cases, partial pooling is the best strategy, and large proportions of the inventory should be kept at the bases rather than at the depot. The analytical and numerical examples show that complete pooling is obtained only as a limit case in which the transshipment cost tends to infinity. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 64: 3–18, 2017     

The transshipment fund mechanism: Coordinating the decentralized multilocation transshipment problem

The multilocation replenishment and transshipment problem is concerned with several retailers facing random demand for the same item at distinct markets, that may use transshipments to eliminate excess inventory/shortages after demand realization. When the system is decentralized so that each retailer operates to maximize their own profit, there are incentive problems that prevent coordination. These problems arise even with two retailers who may pay each other for transshipped units. We propose a new mechanism based on a transshipment fund, which is the first to coordinate the system, in a fully noncooperative setting, for all instances of two retailers as well as all instances of any number of retailers. Moreover, our mechanism strongly coordinates the system, i.e., achieves coordination as the unique equilibrium. The computation and information requirements of this mechanism are realistic and relatively modest. We also present necessary and sufficient conditions for coordination and prove they are always satisfied with our mechanism. Numerical examples illustrate some of the properties underlying this mechanism for two retailers. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Allocation with demand competition: Uniform,proportional, and lexicographic mechanisms

We examine capacity allocation mechanisms in a supply chain comprising a monopolistic supplier and two competing retailers with asymmetric market powers. The supplier allocates limited capacity to retailers according to uniform, proportional, or lexicographic mechanism. We study the impact of these allocation mechanisms on supplier pricing decisions and retailer ordering behavior. With individual order size no greater than supplier capacity, we show that all three mechanisms guarantee equilibrium ordering. We provide precise structures of retailer ordering decisions in Nash and dominant equilibria. Further, we compare the mechanisms from the perspective of the supplier, the retailers, and the supply chain. We show that regardless of whether retailer market powers are symmetric, lexicographic allocation with any priority sequence of retailers is better than the other two mechanisms for the supplier. Further, under lexicographic allocation, the supplier gains more profit by granting higher priority to the retailer with greater market power. We also extend our study to the case with multiple retailers. © 2017 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 64: 85–107, 2017     

Fixed‐interval joint‐replenishment policies for distribution systems with multiple retailers and stochastic demand

We consider a distribution system consisting of a central warehouse and a group of retailers facing independent stochastic demand. The retailers replenish from the warehouse, and the warehouse from an outside supplier with ample supply. Time is continuous. Most previous studies on inventory control policies for this system have considered stock‐based batch‐ordering policies. We develop a time‐based joint‐replenishment policy in this study. Let the warehouse set up a basic replenishment interval. The retailers are replenished through the warehouse in intervals that are integer multiples of the basic replenishment interval. No inventory is carried at the warehouse. We provide an exact evaluation of the long‐term average system costs under the assumption that stock can be balanced among the retailers. The structural properties of the inventory system are characterized. We show that, although it is well known that stock‐based inventory control policies dominate time‐based inventory control policies at a single facility, this dominance does not hold for distribution systems with multiple retailers and stochastic demand. This is because the latter can provide a more efficient mechanism to streamline inventory flow and pool retailer demand, even though the former may be able to use more updated stock information to optimize system performance. The findings of the study provide insights about the key factors that drive the performance of a multiechelon inventory control system. © 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 60: 637–651, 2013     

Inventory sharing under decentralized preventive transshipments

We consider preventive transshipments between two stores in a decentralized system with two demand subperiods. Replenishment orders are made before the first subperiod, and the stores may make transshipments to one another between the subperiods. We prove that the transshipment decision has a dominant strategy, called a control‐band conserving transfer policy, under which each store chooses a quantity to transship in or out that will keep its second‐subperiod starting inventory level within a range called a control band. We prove that the optimal replenishment policy is a threshold policy in which the threshold depends on the capacity level at the other store. Finally, we prove that there does not exist a transfer price that coordinates the decentralized supply chain. Our research also explains many of the differences between preventive and emergency transshipments, including differences in the optimal transfer policies and the existence or nonexistence of transfer prices that coordinate the system. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Should firms conceal information when dealing with common suppliers?

A firm making quantity decision under uncertainty loses profit if its private information is leaked to competitors. Outsourcing increases this risk as a third party supplier may leak information for its own benefit. The firm may choose to conceal information from the competitors by entering in a confidentiality agreement with the supplier. This, however, diminishes the firm's ability to dampen competition by signaling a higher quantity commitment. We examine this trade‐off in a stylized supply chain in which two firms, endowed with private demand information, order sequentially from a common supplier, and engage in differentiated quantity competition. In our model, the supplier can set different wholesale prices for firms, and the second‐mover firm could be better informed. Contrary to what is expected, information concealment is not always beneficial to the first mover. We characterize conditions under which the first mover firm will not prefer concealing information. We show that this depends on the relative informativeness of the second mover and is moderated by competition intensity. We examine the supplier's incentive in participating in information concealment, and develop a contract that enables it for wider set of parameter values. We extend our analysis to examine firms' incentive to improve information. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. 62:1–15, 2015     

Dynamic inventory and pricing models for competing retailers

We address infinite‐horizon models for oligopolies with competing retailers under demand uncertainty. We characterize the equilibrium behavior which arises under simple wholesale pricing schemes. More specifically, we consider a periodic review, infinite‐horizon model for a two‐echelon system with a single supplier servicing a network of competing retailers. In every period, each retailer faces a random demand volume, the distribution of which depends on his own retail price as well as those charged by possibly all competing retailers. We also derive various comparative statics results regarding the impact several exogenous system parameters (e.g., cost or distributional parameters) have on the equilibrium decisions of the retailers as well as their expected profits. We show that certain monotonicity properties, engrained in folklore as well as in known inventory models for centralized systems, may break down in decentralized chains under retailer competition. Our results can be used to optimize the aggregate profits in the supply chain (i.e., those of the supplier and all retailers) by implementing a specific wholesale pricing scheme. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

The value of losing control: Competition in markets for complements

When selling complementary products, manufacturers can often benefit from considering the resulting cross‐market interdependencies. Although using independent retailers makes it difficult to internalize these positive externalities, the ensuing double marginalization can mitigate within‐market competition. We use standard game theoretic analysis to determine optimal distribution channel strategies (through independent retailers or integrated) for competing manufacturers who participate in markets for complements. Our results suggest that a firm's optimal channel choice is highly dependent on its competitive positioning. A firm with a competitive advantage in terms of product characteristics (customer preferences) or production capabilities (cost) might benefit from selling through company‐controlled stores, allowing coordinated pricing across the two markets, whereas a less competitive firm might be better off using independent channel intermediaries to mitigate price competition. We consider two scenarios depending on whether the two firms make their distribution channel decisions sequentially or simultaneously. Although firms are unlikely to make such decisions at exactly the same instant, the simultaneous model also serves as a proxy for the scenario where firms decide sequentially, but where they cannot observe each other's strategic channel choices. For the sequential case, we find that the sequence of entry can have tremendous impact on the two firms'profits; whereas in some cases, the first mover can achieve substantially higher profits, we find that when the two markets are of sufficiently different size and only loosely related, a firm with a competitive advantage might be better off as a follower. Interestingly, our results suggest that, when the markets are of rather similar size, both firms are better off if they enter the industry sequentially. In those cases, the first entrant has incentive to reveal its planned channel strategies, and the follower has incentive to seek out and consider this information. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Emergency transshipment in decentralized dealer networks: When to send and accept transshipment requests

While there has been significant previous literature on inventory transshipment, most research has focused on the dealers' demand filling decision (when to fill transshipment requests from other dealers), ignoring the requesting decision (when to send transshipment requests to other dealers). In this paper we develop optimal inventory transshipment policies that incorporate both types of decisions. We consider a decentralized system in which the dealers are independent of the manufacturer and of each other. We first study a network consisting of a very large number of dealers. We prove that the optimal inventory and transshipment decisions for an individual dealer are controlled by threshold rationing and requesting levels. Then, in order to study the impact of transshipment among independent dealers in a smaller dealer network, we consider a decentralized two‐dealer network and use a game theoretic approach to characterize the equilibrium inventory strategies of the individual dealers. An extensive numerical study highlights the impact of the requesting decision on the dealers' equilibrium behavior in a decentralized setting. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2006     

The one‐warehouse multiretailer problem with an order‐up‐to level inventory policy

We consider a two‐level system in which a warehouse manages the inventories of multiple retailers. Each retailer employs an order‐up‐to level inventory policy over T periods and faces an external demand which is dynamic and known. A retailer's inventory should be raised to its maximum limit when replenished. The problem is to jointly decide on replenishment times and quantities of warehouse and retailers so as to minimize the total costs in the system. Unlike the case in the single level lot‐sizing problem, we cannot assume that the initial inventory will be zero without loss of generality. We propose a strong mixed integer program formulation for the problem with zero and nonzero initial inventories at the warehouse. The strong formulation for the zero initial inventory case has only T binary variables and represents the convex hull of the feasible region of the problem when there is only one retailer. Computational results with a state‐of‐the art solver reveal that our formulations are very effective in solving large‐size instances to optimality. © 2010 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Inventory management with advance capacity information

An important aspect of supply chain management is dealing with demand and supply uncertainty. The uncertainty of future supply can be reduced if a company is able to obtain advance capacity information (ACI) about future supply/production capacity availability from its supplier. We address a periodic‐review inventory system under stochastic demand and stochastic limited supply, for which ACI is available. We show that the optimal ordering policy is a state‐dependent base‐stock policy characterized by a base‐stock level that is a function of ACI. We establish a link with inventory models that use advance demand information (ADI) by developing a capacitated inventory system with ADI, and we show that equivalence can only be set under a very specific and restrictive assumption, implying that ADI insights will not necessarily hold in the ACI environment. Our numerical results reveal several managerial insights. In particular, we show that ACI is most beneficial when there is sufficient flexibility to react to anticipated demand and supply capacity mismatches. Further, most of the benefits can be achieved with only limited future visibility. We also show that the system parameters affecting the value of ACI interact in a complex way and therefore need to be considered in an integrated manner. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

A location‐inventory model with lateral transshipments

We study an infinite horizon periodic stochastic inventory system consisting of retail outlets and customers located on a homogenous line segment. In each period, the total demand, generated by the customers on the line, is normally distributed. To better match supply and demand, we incorporate lateral transshipments. We propose a compact model in which the strategic decisions—the number and locations of retail outlets—are determined simultaneously with the operational decisions—the inventory replenishment and transshipment quantities. We find the optimal balance between the risk‐pooling considerations, which drive down the optimal number of retail outlets, and lateral transshipments, which drive up the optimal number of retail outlets. We also explore the sensitivity of the optimal number of retail outlets to various problem parameters. This article presents a novel way of integrating lateral transshipments in the context of an inventory‐location model. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Locational tying of complementary retail items

We study a selling practice that we refer to as locational tying (LT), which seems to be gaining wide popularity among retailers. Under this strategy, a retailer “locationally ties” two complementary items that we denote by “primary” and “secondary.” The retailer sells the primary item in an appropriate “department” of his or her store. To stimulate demand, the secondary item is offered in the primary item's department, where it is displayed in very close proximity to the primary item. We consider two variations of LT: In the multilocation tying strategy (LT‐M), the secondary item is offered in its appropriate department in addition to the primary item's department, whereas in the single‐location tying strategy (LT‐S), it is offered only in the primary item's location. We compare these LT strategies to the traditional independent components (IC) strategy, in which the two items are sold independently (each in its own department), but the pricing/inventory decisions can be centralized (IC‐C) or decentralized (IC‐D). Assuming ample inventory, we compare and provide a ranking of the optimal prices of the four strategies. The main insight from this comparison is that relative to IC‐D, LT decreases the price of the primary item and adjusts the price of the secondary item up or down depending on its popularity in the primary item's department. We also perform a comparative statics analysis on the effect of demand and cost parameters on the optimal prices of various strategies, and identify the conditions that favor one strategy over others in terms of profitability. Then we study inventory decisions in LT under exogenous pricing by developing a model that accounts for the effect of the primary item's stock‐outs on the secondary item's demand. We find that, relative to IC‐D, LT increases the inventory level of the primary item. We also link the profitability of different strategies to the trade‐off between the increase in demand volume of the secondary item as a result of LT and the potential increase in inventory costs due to decentralizing the inventory of the secondary item. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 2009     

The effect of a temporary product distribution channel on supply chain performance

We analyze a supply chain of a manufacturer and two retailers, a permanent retailer who always stocks the manufacturer's product and an intermittent deal‐of‐the day retailer who sells the manufacturer's product online for a short time. We find that without a deal‐of‐the‐day (DOTD) retailer, it is suboptimal for the manufacturer to offer a quantity discount while it is optimal for the retailer to offer periodic price discounts to consumers. With the addition of a DOTD retailer, it is likely to be optimal for the manufacturer to offer a quantity discount. We show that even without market expansion, i.e., no exclusive DOTD retailer consumers, opening the intermittent channel can leave the permanent retailer no worse‐off while increasing the manufacturer's profit. We identify the regular and discounted wholesale prices and the threshold quantity at which the manufacturer should give the discount. We also identify the optimal retail prices. We find that opening the intermittent channel increases the profit of the manufacturer, is likely to decrease the average retail price and to increase sales, and may increase the permanent retailer's profit. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 505–528, 2016     

Optimal operating policies in a commodity trading market with the manufacturer's presence

With the help of the Internet and express delivery at relatively low costs, trading markets have become increasingly popular as a venue to sell excess inventory and a source to obtain products at lower prices. In this article, we study the operational decisions in the presence of a trading market in a periodic‐review, finite‐horizon setting. Prices in the trading market change periodically and are determined endogenously by the demand and supply in the market. We characterize the retailers'optimal ordering and trading policies when the original manufacturer and the trading market co‐exist and retailers face fees to participate in the trading market. Comparing with the case with no trading fees, we obtain insights into the impact of trading fees and the fee structure on the retailers and the manufacturer. Further, we find that by continually staying in the market, the manufacturer may use her pricing strategies to counter‐balance the negative impact of the trading market on her profit. Finally, we extend the model to the case when retailers dynamically update their demand distribution based on demand observations in previous periods. A numerical study provides additional insights into the impact of demand updating in a trading market with the manufacturer's competition. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Inventory financing under Risk-Adjusted-Return-On-Capital criterion

Risk-Adjusted-Return-On-Capital (RAROC) is a loan-pricing criterion under which a bank sets the loan term such that a certain rate of return is achieved on the regulatory capital required by the Basel regulation. Some banks calculate the amount of regulatory capital for each loan under the standardized approach (“standardized banks,” the regulatory capital is proportional to the loan amount), and others under the internal rating-based (IRB) approach (“IRB banks,” the regulatory capital is related to the Value-at-Risk of the loan). This article examines the impact of the RAROC criterion on the bank's loan-pricing decision and the retailer's inventory decision. We find that among the loan terms that satisfy the bank's RAROC criterion, the one that benefits the retailer the most requires the bank to specify an inventory advance rate in addition to the interest rate. Under this loan term, the retailer's inventory level is more sensitive to his asset level when facing an IRB bank compared to a standardized bank. An IRB (standardized) loan leads to higher profit and inventory level for retailers with high (low) asset. For retailers with medium asset, an IRB loan results in a higher retailer profit but a lower consumer welfare. Calibrated numerical study reveals that the benefit of choosing standardized banks (relative to IRB banks) can be as high as 30% for industries with severe capital constraints, volatile demands, and low profit margins, highlighting the importance for retailers to carefully choose the type of banks to borrow from. When the interest rate is capped by regulation, retailers borrowing from a standardized bank are more likely to be influenced by the interest rate cap than those borrowing from an IRB bank. Under strong empire-building incentives (the bank will offer loan terms to maximize the size of the loan), retailers with medium initial asset level shift their preference from IRB banks to standardized banks.     

A duality‐based relaxation and decomposition approach for inventory distribution systems

We propose a new method for making the inventory replenishment decisions in distribution systems. In particular, we consider distribution systems consisting of multiple retailers that face random demand and a warehouse that supplies the retailers. The method that we propose is based on formulating the distribution problem as a dynamic program, and relaxing the constraints that ensure the nonnegativity of the shipments to the retailers, by associating Lagrange multipliers with them. We show that our method provides lower bounds on the value functions, and a good set of values for the Lagrange multipliers can be obtained by maximizing a concave function in a relatively straightforward manner. Computational experiments indicate that our method can provide significant improvements over the traditional approaches for making the inventory replenishment decisions, in terms of both the tightness of the lower bounds on the value functions and the performance of the policies. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

An integrated electric power supply chain and fuel market network framework: Theoretical modeling with empirical analysis for New England

In this article, we develop a novel electric power supply chain network model with fuel supply markets that captures both the economic network transactions in energy supply markets and the physical network transmission constraints in the electric power network. The theoretical derivation and analysis are done using the theory of variational inequalities. We then apply the model to a specific case, the New England electric power supply chain, consisting of six states, five fuel types, 82 power generators, with a total of 573 generating units, and 10 demand market regions. The empirical case study demonstrates that the regional electric power prices simulated by our model match the actual electricity prices in New England very well. We also compute the electric power prices and the spark spread, an important measure of the power plant profitability, under natural gas and oil price variations. The empirical examples illustrate that in New England, the market/grid‐level fuel competition has become the major factor that affects the influence of the oil price on the natural gas price. Finally, we utilize the model to quantitatively investigate how changes in the demand for electricity influence the electric power and the fuel markets from a regional perspective. The theoretical model can be applied to other regions and multiple electricity markets under deregulation to quantify the interactions in electric power/energy supply chains and their effects on flows and prices. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

A probabilistic analysis of a fixed partition policy for the inventory‐routing problem

We consider the Inventory‐Routing Problem (IRP) where n geographically dispersed retailers must be supplied by a central facility. The retailers experience demand for the product at a deterministic rate, and incur holding costs for keeping inventory. Distribution is performed by a fleet of capacitated vehicles. The objective is to minimize the average transportation and inventory costs per unit time over the infinite horizon. We focus on the set of Fixed Partition Policies (FPP). In an FPP, the retailers are partitioned into disjoint and collectively exhaustive sets. Each set of retailers is served independently of the others and at its optimal replenishment rate. Previous research has measured the effectiveness of an FPP solution relative to a lower bound over all policies. We propose an additional measure that is relative to the optimal FPP. In this paper we construct a polynomial‐time partitioning scheme that is shown to yield an FPP whose cost is asymptotically within 1.5% + ? of the cost of an optimal FPP, for arbitrary ? > 0. In addition, in some cases, our polynomial‐time scheme yields an FPP whose cost is asymptotically within 1.5% + ? of the minimal policy's cost (over all feasible policies). © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004