Why did Sudan Lose a small war in Southern Sudan?

ABSTRACT

When on the wrong end of an asymmetry in the projection of hard power, weaker sides countenance the grim arithmetic of avoiding direct and massed confrontations. Invariably, insurgents have over the ages tended to employ indirect tactical methods to render their stronger opponents ineffective. Ultimately – interest asymmetry, regime type, asymmetries of strategy, and external intervention – combine in a complex interplay and pattern, to militate against a strong side. In Sudan, these factors interacted throughout the civil wars to produce regional autonomy and finally an independent South Sudan in 2011. Similar strategic logic had confronted many large African states battling insurgencies in Ethiopia, Angola, Nigeria, Zaire, and apartheid-era South Africa. Oftentimes, weakening public resolve has caused these governments to accommodate, capitulate or withdraw even if they try not to blink. Notwithstanding the regime type, it can be concluded that the majority of strong actors are prone to fail in a protracted, asymmetric conflict. Hence, the notion of linking victory in counterinsurgency to the degree of openness (democratic polyarchies); or closeness (totalitarianism) – is still valid but highly contestable in the case of Africa’s large dysfunctional states.     

The ties that bind

Analysis of the failures of African security forces generally focuses on structural issues such as corruption of senior leadership, insufficient equipment and training, and coup d’état fears driving mistrust of armies that are too strong or effective. However, less examined is the role that sub-state identity plays; using Libya, South Sudan, and Mali as case studies, this paper examines how ethnicity inhibits the development of national armies, divides them, and exposes a critical flaw that adversaries are able to exploit. Given the increasingly ethnic nature of conflict throughout the world, and the rising threat that ethnic conflicts in Africa pose to regional and Western partners, it may be prudent for researchers, policymakers and other stakeholders to examine the critical role that sub-state identity plays in undermining African security forces.     

Turning the tides of war: The impact of private military and security companies on Nigeria’s counterinsurgency against Boko Haram

Since the 2003 war in Iraq, private military and security companies (PMSCs) have become increasingly legitimate actors in modern conflicts. Despite this normative shift, rumours in March 2015 regarding the use of South African mercenaries in Nigeria to combat Boko Haram insurgents caused an international outrage, while the Nigerian government remained nonchalantly silent on the matter. This article investigates the impact of mercenaries on the conflict in the last six months of the Jonathan government. Using primary and secondary qualitative research, it assesses the role that PMSCs played in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency strategy, along with the ensuing reaction of international and local media to the outsourcing of violence to foreign companies. The article concludes that – notwithstanding the improved image of PMSCs in the world, and the actual impact of the contractors on the Nigerian counterinsurgency effort – the stigma of mercenaries continues to plague the industry, particularly on the African continent.     

From combat to non-combat action

This paper examines the rationale and centrality of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in humanitarian assistance operations in Sudan, asking why PMSCs are involved in humanitarian assistance operations in Sudan and what the principles underlying their activities are. To answer this question, the paper draws attention to the link between humanitarian crises and PMSC interventions. Where there is no meaningful alternative intervention, undergirded by humanitarian concerns that are also profit driven, PMSCs come in to provide the needed services. The protracted and complicated internal armed conflicts in Sudan, which have lasted for over two decades, have produced as many as 4,8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) – the single largest number in the world. The kind of humanitarian assistance operations provided by PMSCs in Sudan have become critical to the provision of much-needed services which were inadequately provided by governmental authorities at both unilateral and multilateral levels. This paper argues that the humanitarian crises in Sudan created a regime that permits humanitarian assistance operations by both state and non-state actors.     

‘Fighting for peace’

In Africa, most of the present conflicts are civil, intra-state wars where belligerent groups use guerrilla tactics to achieve various political, economic or ideological objectives. The atrocities and the effect of these on-going wars on innocent civilians, human suffering, poverty and development are beyond comprehension. Not surprisingly, the majority of current peace operations are in Africa, with more than 70 countries contributing forces to these conflict zones. On the continent, South Africa has come to assume a leading role in peace operations and is now a major troop-contributing country to UN and AU missions. In the past 11 years, the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) has taken part in no fewer than 14 peace missions. This article provides a brief background of the conflicts in Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan, the different United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) mandates under which peacekeepers had to operate as well as their objectives, and the extent of South Africa's involvement in the various missions. In the last section, the major challenges, that these operations have posed are highlighted.     

After the Split: Partition,Successor States,and the Dynamics of War in the Horn of Africa

Why do partitioned successor states engage one another in armed conflict? We explore the drivers of war between successor states by comparing two border crises that followed the partitions of Ethiopia (1993) and Sudan (2011). We argue that the politico-military struggles that give way to partition create important historical memories that shape what successor states think about the utility of military force. While the partition of Ethiopia yielded successor states led by regimes that were victors of the preceding war of partition, the war of partition in Sudan produced successor states that emerged out of military stalemate. This distinction explains why Ethiopia and Eritrea waged a costly border war that Sudan and South Sudan were able to avoid.     

Beyond the state: reconceptualising African security in the 21st century

Confronted with myriad security challenges, African states and the much-vaunted peace and security architecture of the African Union (AU) has proven not to be up to the challenge. Indeed, this is implicitly acknowledged by the AU itself if one considers the creation of such security structures as the African Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), which exists outside its peace and security architecture. This paper argues for a radical rethink of security structures on the African continent – one in which state structures of security coexist with newer forms of security actors, including private military companies (PMCs), community movements and the business sector. Whilst this shift in security actors is already happening on the ground, policymakers need to embrace this new reality.     

Explaining the (il)legality of Uganda's intervention in the current South Sudan conflict

During the night of 15 December 2013, fighting broke out between factions of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) in Juba, the capital of the Republic of South Sudan. The fighting pitted forces loyal to President Salva Kiir against those loyal to former Vice President Riek Machar. Five days later, Uganda sent troops into South Sudan, advancing a number of reasons for intervention, including that it had been invited by the legitimate government of South Sudan to ensure order; it needed to evacuate Ugandan citizens caught up in the fighting; it had been asked by the United Nations Secretary-General to intervene; and that the regional organisation, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development had sanctioned the intervention. As the conflict escalated, Ugandan troops started fighting on the side of forces loyal to Kiir. The underlying reasons for the intervention were clearly economic, but those advanced were legal. This article discusses both sets of reasons and concludes that the economic reasons are more persuasive. Nevertheless, while some of the legal arguments (such as being invited by the legitimate government of South Sudan) can be asserted, others are clearly dubious. In addition, the participation of Ugandan troops in the fighting on the side of the Kiir government renders the intervention illegal.     

A ‘transparent gold’ rush?

Abstract

The signing of a new treaty on the equitable sharing of the Nile waters – signed last May in Kampala by Rwanda, Ethiopia, Uganda and Tanzania – has the potential of derailing relations with Sudan and Egypt. According to the latter countries, this new agreement replaces the 1959 Nile agreement – that awarded them with 90 per cent control over the Nile water – giving other Nile Basin countries the possibility to implement water-related projects in agriculture and energy. This new development, according to Egypt and Sudan, places their water level security in jeopardy. Furthermore, the use of land grabs and water consumption for food security by wealthy foreign countries contributes to the sensitive situation the nine Nile Basin countries are now facing. Water is a red line when it comes to Egypt and Sudan and the future of the whole region depends on whether this line will be crossed.     

Interreligious violence in the Central African Republic

The outbreak of violence following the insurgency by a coalition of armed groups called Séléka represents one of the darkest pages in the contemporary history of the Central African Republic (CAR). Although the country has experienced chronic instability since independence from France in 1960, it has never before descended into the current near-genocidal situation, which has pitted Muslims against Christians. The CAR has been embroiled in conflict since March 2013, with unprecedented security and humanitarian consequences. In December 2013, the United Nations representative for the first time described the situation as an alarming security threat and evoked the likelihood of genocide and humanitarian disaster if nothing is done.     

Low-intensity conflict in Eastern Sudan: A comparative approach to the development of rebel groups

This article discusses the development of a low-intensity conflict in Sudan's eastern region between 1994 and 2006. Drawing on data collected in the region in 2009, recruitment processes within three different insurgent groups are analysed and compared, paying attention to the impact of these processes on insurgents' organisational development and military capacity. The peace process in Eastern Sudan is further discussed, focusing specifically on the disarmament, demobilisation, and reintegration (DDR) programmes for former insurgents. The article finally discusses current developments and draws conclusions regarding the risk of renewed rebellion in Eastern Sudan.     

The next step in Somalia: exploiting victory,post-Mogadishu

From 2006 to 2011, al-Qaeda's East African proxy, al-Shabaab, served as the de facto ruling party of Somalia despite the efforts of the internationally recognised Transitional Federal Government (TFG). During these five years, a violent struggle between al-Shabaab and the peacekeeping force of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) resulted in thousands of dead civilians, hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons and a strategic environment inhospitable to reconciliation, recovery or development. By 2012, AMISOM was able to break the deadlock and force al-Shabaab from Mogadishu and Kismayo. In order to continue the momentum, the African Union and other partner nations must support the TFG in neutralising al-Shabaab throughout Somalia and providing good governance to its constituents. Al-Shabaab's revenue streams must be shut down and its offensive capability must be degraded while the strategic environment is shaped to ensure that conditions conducive to a revival do not exist. Failure to do so will likely see Somalia continuing to produce Islamist extremists and pirates to menace international maritime traffic in the western Indian Ocean, destabilise East Africa and adversely impact millions.     

Democracy index for Africa, 2010

ABSTRACT

Natural resource-based conflicts continue to occur in different parts of Nigeria with negative implications. This study investigated the phenomena of natural resource conflicts vis-à-vis their propensities to impact political economy and national security negatively. Data for the study were sourced from theoretical and empirical evidence. Empirical data were sourced from existing studies selected on the basis on their relevance to the study and analysed based on their content. The limitation to this approach is the obsolete and subjective nature of some the literature. This limitation was, however, addressed among others through the author’s knowledge of the issues under study. The study found that Nigeria is enmeshed in conflict over ownership, distribution, access to or competition over natural resources such as petroleum resources and agricultural land and these conflicts have undermined democracy, human rights, the economy and the nation’s security. The paper identified poor resource governance, environmental factors and poor political leadership as the causes and drivers of these conflicts. It recommends natural resource governance among others, as a way out of the problem.     

Ethnic crises and national security in Nigeria

The article focuses on the interface between ethnicity and national security in Nigeria. It critically explores the negative mobilization of ethnicity in Nigeria's fourth republic, and how this has been shaping (and reshaping) the democratization process, particularly in the management of cooperation and conflict over contestations for power and other resources. The re-democratization of Nigeria in 1999 has been preceded with high expectations of meaningful reductions in the high level of insecurity witnessed under the long years of military suzerainty. However, this has not been the case. Rather, what is obtained is an increase in national insecurity on a much larger scale. This article argues that one of the banes of national security in the Nigerian state is ethnic politics, which continues to witness changes in context and character with grave consequences for the future of democracy. The central argument is that ethnicity has always been a major driver of politics and conflicts in Nigeria and the trend is not likely to change anytime soon.     

浅析达尔富尔和平进程及其面临的挑战

达尔富尔危机始于2003年2月。这场危机主要是由北方的游牧民与南方的定居农民之间对生存资源的争夺而引发的国内冲突。在国际社会的斡旋下，苏丹政府已与几个反政府武装签署了和平协议，并同意部署联合国-非盟混合维和行动，达尔富尔地区的和平进程已步入正轨。由于苏丹国内的复杂形势和困难，达尔富尔地区的和平进程仍面临诸多挑战，和平与和解之路仍然漫长。     

Rentier peacekeeping in neo-patrimonial systems: The examples of Burundi and Kenya

International peacekeeping in Africa has developed dynamically in the last decade. The majority of global missions are deployed to the continent, the largest regional contingent of troops comes from Africa, and the African Peace and Security Architecture has made significant progress. Peacekeeping is Africanized today more than at any time before. However, mainstream research has insufficiently paid attention to African agency in this context. This article sheds light on the often neglected influence of African politics on international peacekeeping missions. The focus is set on the consequences of neo-patrimonial political systems, which can use international peacekeeping missions as an opportunity to generate rents. It will be shown that such a rent-seeking approach is highly problematic for the troop-contributing as well as mission-hosting countries. Instead of curbing conflict, rentier peacekeeping is prolonging and exporting it. The empirical examples used are the Burundian and Kenyan involvement in peacekeeping in Somalia.     

RETHINKING CONFLICT TRAJECTORIES

South Africa and Kenya experienced various forms of conflict and gross human rights abuse between 1948–1994 and 1963–2002 respectively. In both situations, the conflicts were motivated by various factors; these included unequal distribution of socio-economic resources and skewed political relationships. The centrality of human rights abuse and political violence to both situations places similar issues on the agenda for analysis. In both cases opposition to regimes was justified on the basis that the political systems were constructed in such a way that limited alternative conceptions and prevented democratic freedom (until 19921 in Kenya and 1994 in South Africa). After undergoing transition to democratic rule in 1994, South Africa engaged the idea of a truth and reconciliation commission as an instrument for dealing with its past conflicts. The South African case animated widespread international interest and after an electoral victory in 2002, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government in Kenya mooted the same idea. By the end of 2004 however the NARC government seems to have lost interest in the truth commission concept; this paper probes the question why? Broadly there is room for alternative interpretations both within and between the two cases on how conflicts were perpetuated and the potency of a truth and reconciliation commission as a viable alternative for dealing with past conflicts. This paper broadly aims to offer a clearer account of conflicts and mechanisms for dealing with them from the conceptual lenses of conflict management theory.     

Trading coups for civil war

This paper investigates civil conflict as a product of the survival strategies of African leaders. Specifically, the paper offers a theory of risk substitution that predicts coup-fearing leaders will undermine the military effectiveness of the state when making an effort to extend their own tenure. While ‘coup-proofing’ practices have often been noted as contributors to political survival, considerably less attention has been paid to the influence of these strategies on other forms of conflict. Utilising data from a number of cross-national datasets, the analyses show that having a higher number of ‘coup-proofing’ counterweights significantly worsens a state's civil conflict prospects. A brief consideration of multiple episodes of conflict further suggests that in addition to coup-proofing undermining the counterinsurgency capacity of the state, some leaders are simply indifferent to – or can even potentially benefit from – the existence of an insurgency.     

Leadership and national security: an interrogation of the Boko Haram violence in Nigeria

This study contends that an analysis of the nexus between leadership and security offers useful insights into explaining conflict by stating that the conceptualisation of these argots, especially through the definition of leadership as a process, helps to explain and address Nigeria’s security challenges. By arguing that leaders’ ability to establish mutuality with their followers in any situation and set collectively-generated means for attaining these set goals for societal security, the study shows how such a relationship creates a secured state. This is not the case in Nigeria, where leaders’ security decisions are influenced by external actors rather than by their followers. By showing that the Nigerian ruling elite’s security agendas intersect with dominant global notions of security while neglecting genuine security interests of ordinary Nigerians, the study contextualises the complex global and local security interests in Nigeria. The lack of an intersection at home, however, has contributed to the emergence of extremists such as the Boko Haram sect, as well as the escalation of the acts of violence they perpetrate. As national insecurities become complex and intractable, ‘elegant’ or unilinear solutions – such as a military approach – lack the capacity to address these problems.     

HUMAN STABILITY AND CONFLICT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA: PART ONE

Human stability is rare in the Horn of Africa. The history of the countries of the Horn since the end of colonialism in the region has largely been one of violent repression and insurgency. Succession by peaceful election has been the exception. This paper looks at the internal conflicts in the Horn of Africa in terms of the balance of power between civil society and the state in the countries comprising the Horn. A relevant feature is the formation and disintegration of centralised states. Centralising states, affected by the lack of human stability which can lead to their fragmentation and demise, also contribute to the escalation of the crisis. The Horn of Africa, consisting of Djibouti, Sudan, Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia, is a region of Considerable Strategic importance, even to nations far beyond its borders because of its strategic location, its diverse religious and ethnic groupings and its significant agricultural potential.