The long shadow of colonial cartography: Britain and the Sino-Indian war of 1962

ABSTRACT

This article examines British responses to the Sino-Indian border war of 1962. It illustrates how, in the years leading up to the war, Britain’s colonial legacy in the Indian subcontinent saw it drawn reluctantly into a territorial dispute between Asia’s two largest and most powerful nations. It analyses disagreements in Whitehall between the Foreign Office and Commonwealth Relations Office over the relative strength of India and China’s border claims, and assesses how these debates reshaped British regional policy. It argues that the border war was instrumental in transforming Britain’s post-colonial relationship with South Asia. Continuing to filter relations with India through an imperial prism proved unsatisfactory, what followed was a more pragmatic Indo-British association.     

India’s emerging space assets and nuclear-weapons capabilities

ABSTRACT

Over the last five decades, India’s nuclear and space programs have gone through several phases, from collaboration to divorce to supportive. An interplay of two factors determined the nature of the relationship. One was the state of India’s nuclear-weapon program. The second was international conditions, especially India’s relationship with the nuclear-nonproliferation regime. In the early decades, because of the rudimentary nature of India’s nuclear and space programs, the relationship was collaborative, since the rocket technology being developed was a necessary adjunct to the nuclear-weapon program. Subsequently, as India’s rocketry capabilities and nuclear-weapon program began to mature and concerns about international sanctions under the non-proliferation regime began to grow, the two programs were separated. The Indian rocketry program was also divided, with the civilian-space and ballistic-missile programs clearly demarcated. After India declared itself a nuclear-weapon state in 1998 and the programs matured, the relationship has become more supportive. As the two programs mature further, this relationship is likely to deepen, as the nuclear-weapon program requires space assets to build a robust and survivable nuclear deterrent force.     

‘Just another border incident’: The Rann of Kutch and the 1965 India–Pakistan War

ABSTRACT

The India–Pakistan War of September 1965 has attracted little attention in the larger body of work on South Asia. Further, almost nothing has been written on the earlier skirmish, in April 1965, between Indian and Pakistani security forces in the Rann-of-Kutch, an uninhabited salt marsh. This article argues that the limited conflict in the Rann, its immediate consequences, and its impact on Pakistani military and civilian leaders were central to Pakistan’s consideration of a military solution to the ongoing dispute in Kashmir, which then led to Indian retaliation and the outbreak of war.     

‘The extraordinary successes which the Russians have achieved’ - the Conquest of Central Asia in Callwell’s Small Wars

ABSTRACT

Charles Callwell’s Small Wars (1896, 1899, 1906) is widely considered both an ur-text for modern counter-insurgency studies, and a primer for the racialized late-Victorian approach to war against ‘savages’: either way it is usually only considered within a British context. Alongside the numerous examples Callwell used from British colonial campaigns, he frequently referred to those of other European powers – notably the Russian conquest of Central Asia. This article will seek to analyse Callwell’s views of Russian colonial warfare, establish the sources on which he relied, and evaluate his accuracy and the effect which the Russian example had on his thinking.     

British operations among the people and civilian risk

ABSTRACT

Debates on military intervention and small wars often include the claim that soldiers should operate among civilians in order to avoid civilian casualties and to protect civilians against third-party violence. This article, by contrast, points at negative unintended consequences of military operations taking place in close proximity to local populations: it argues that also risk-tolerant militaries cause civilian casualties and that their presence triggers third-party violence against civilians. The British military, in particular the British Army, exported risk-tolerant practices from Northern Ireland to the Balkans, with sporadic success. But in southern Iraq and in Helmand, British ground operations harmed civilians. The findings suggest that the chances for protection are better in operations where levels of violence are relatively low than in counterinsurgency where troops face ruthless and well-endowed enemies operating among civilians.     

British counter‐insurgency in Kenya, 1952–56: Extension of internal security policy or prelude to decolonisation?

Despite considerable post‐war planning, the British counter‐insurgency campaign in Kenya did not constitute a Colonial Office strategy for decolonisation. COIN in Kenya had one purpose: to re‐impose law and order, or British control. If for no other reason, this is demonstrated by the initial reluctance of the Colonial Office to intervene. Frequent re‐assessments and postponement of the ending of the State of Emergency, and the subordination of socio‐economic and political reforms to military objectives, show clearly that decolonisation was not high on the British list of priorities in Kenya. This article questions the relationship between COIN and decolonisation, and the validity of models of British counter‐insurgency.     

The campaign of the lost footsteps: the pacification of Burma, 1885-95

ABSTRACT

What Rudyard Kipling called the ‘campaign of lost footsteps’ was the longest campaign fought by the Victorian army. The conquest of Upper Burma, an area of 140,000 sq. miles with a population of four million, took only three weeks in November 1885 and was accomplished with minimum cost. However, the removal and deportation of the Burmese King and dismantling of all traditional authority dismantled led to growing resistance to British rule leading to an increasingly difficult guerrilla war. Though the Burmese guerrillas were characterised by the British as mere bandits or dacoits, many were former soldiers along with Buddhist monks. The extremely difficult nature of campaigning in the terrain and climate of Burma was not sufficiently appreciated by the War Office, who viewed the conflict as a ‘subaltern’s war’ and ‘police’ work. Intended regime change was also not accompanied by any consideration of the likely implications. Prolonged insurgency necessitated deploying a force far larger than originally intended; though order was finally secured by 1895, the campaign proved destructive of Burmese society while British recruitment of hill tribes into the police and armed forces sowed the seeds for future divisions.     

Provocation,war and restraint under the nuclear shadow: The Kargil conflict 1999

ABSTRACT

The Kargil conflict was a limited war between India and Pakistan fought along the Kashmir Line of Control during the spring/summer of 1999. Named for the principal town in the combat zone on the Indian side, it was the first open warfare between India and Pakistan as declared nuclear weapons states and included the first combat employment of the Indian Air Force since 1971. Despite its intensity, it was also characterised by considerable restraint on both sides. The potential for conventional escalation, however, was high and the possibility of nuclear confrontation could not be excluded. It had significant long-term ramifications for both countries and constitutes an important part of the backdrop to their relations today.     

Gill — A Family of Sword Cutlers

Abstract

Amongst the armour in the collection of the British Museum is a kettle-hat (Object Number: P&;E 1856,0701·2243) that was found in London during the second quarter of the nineteenth century. In January 2010, the kettle-hat was conserved before its loan to the Royal Armouries Museum for display at the Tower of London. New findings that occurred during conservation led to the most in-depth technical examination and analysis of this relatively unknown helmet since its discovery.

This paper aims to interpret the British Museum’s kettle-hat from art historical perspectives in order to place it in a wider context. The development of the kettle-hat during the 14th and 15th centuries is described along with the subsequent derivatives of transitional or progressive forms of helmet. Through stylistic comparison and consideration of related evidence it is suggested that the British Museum kettle-hat dates to the late 14th century and is of western European, possibly English, workmanship. Furthermore, although the British Museum helmet has much in common with typical forms of kettle-hat, it also has features, such as a short tail-piece, that suggest it may be closely related to some early forms of sallet.     

The Sword of General Sir William Fenwick Williams,Baronet of Kars,in the Royal Armouries (IX.1841) and Aspects of High Victorian Sword Design

Abstract

The Sword of Honour (RA IX.1841) presented in 1856 by the Province of Nova Scotia to its native son, General Sir William Fenwick Williams, Bart. for his deeds at Kars, Turkey, is described, illustrated, discussed and placed both in its historical and its design context. Other notable British swords of the Victorian Age (1837–1901), the Age of Empire, are also examined and the various and influential aspects of their designs, ornament and iconography discussed.     

Defence Procurement Policy: The Way Ahead

Abstract

The Defence Procurement Executive is the single largest customer of British industry and controls some 127 000 contracts. As Chief of Defence Procurement, Dr McIntosh explains the effects of expanding market forces on defence contracts and the suppliers, before continuing to outline the prospects for future competitive contracts in view of the recent cuts in defence budgets.     

Regaining Strategy: Small Powers,Strategic Culture,and Escalation in Afghanistan

Abstract

In Western operations in Afghanistan, small European powers escalate in different ways. While Denmark and the Netherlands have contributed to Western escalation through integration with British and US forces, Norway and Sweden have done so by creating a division of labour allowing US and British combat forces to concentrate their efforts in the south. These variations in strategic behaviour suggest that the strategic choice of small powers is more diversified than usually assumed. We argue that strategic culture can explain the variation in strategic behaviour of the small allies in Afghanistan. In particular, Dutch and Danish internationalism have reconciled the use of force in the national and international domains, while in Sweden and Norway there is still a sharp distinction between national interest and humanitarianism.     

The Race that wasn't

ABSTRACT

Graham Farmelo's new book on the early British nuclear weapon program assembles a fascinating cast of characters in a gripping narrative. It particularly succeeds at illustrating the importance of “atomic energy” imagery in the United Kingdom well before the discovery of fission, and provides nuanced insights into Churchill's handling of issues relating to the atomic bomb and scientific expertise. However, in arguing that the British had a “lead” on the manufacture of atomic bombs that was “lost” to the United States during the early Manhattan Project, the book overstates its case, and in the process misunderstands what it took to make the bomb.     

Surprise attack: The case of Sweden

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Fighting on Their Own Terms: The Tactics of the Irish Republican Army 1919-1921

Abstract

The 1919-1921 Anglo-Irish War represents one of the earliest instances of a successful insurgent movement in the twentieth century. By combining a fluid organizational structure with effective hit-and-run tactics and accurate intelligence, the Irish Republican Army was able to defeat militarily the security forces of Great Britain. Combined with a successful propaganda campaign, these tactics allowed the IRA to drive the British to the negotiating table, where its representatives secured greater autonomy than Ireland had known in centuries. The outcome of the Anglo-Irish War demonstrates the success which a well-organized guerrilla campaign can achieve, and the tactics used by the IRA must therefore be understood by any serious student of small warfare.     

The revisionist historiography of Britain’s decolonisation conflicts and political science theses of civilian victimisation in counterinsurgency

ABSTRACT

Recent historical research exposed the myth of self-restraint as the distinctive feature of British counterinsurgency during decolonisation. This article shows that the revisionist historiography of British counterinsurgency has important, but unnoticed, implications for political scientists. Specifically, historical scholarship challenges the predictions and causal mechanisms of the main social scientific theses of civilian victimisation in counterinsurgency. Using revisionist historians’ works as a source of data, I test those theses against Britain’s decolonisation conflicts. I find that they do not pass the test convincingly. I conclude that political scientists should be more willing to explore the theoretical implications of new historical evidence on counterinsurgency campaigns.     

Royal Armouries Acquisitions 2012

Abstract

The Royal Armouries collection contains many Indian combination weapons, many of which have neither been published nor displayed. This article sets out to describe three unusual firearm related items. These are what appears to be an elaborate gunner's staff of a unique type, a pair of guns that can be combined and shot as a combination and finally a percussion gun shield.     

火箭助飞鱼雷入水姿态角海上测量方法探讨

为了解决火箭助飞鱼雷入水姿态角度海上测量这一技术难点，该文避开传统方法，另辟思路，应用高速摄影技术对火箭助飞鱼雷入水过程在两个垂直方向上进行摄像，采用事后图像处理分析方法，对所提出的火箭助飞鱼雷的入水姿态角角海上测量方法加以探讨，并以算例分析了误差影响，从结果的解算过程可看出，这种新方法切实可行。     

New Light on the Swordmakers,Goldsmiths and Jewellers,John Ray and James Montague,Active in Partnership in London 1800–1821, With a New and Extended List of Their Known Work

Abstract

Some new information is presented on the prominent London goldsmiths and jewellers, John Ray and James Montague, of 22 Denmark Street, Soho, active in partnership from 1800 to 1821. A revised and extended list has been compiled of recorded works, including presentation swords, freedom boxes, ‘Toys’, tokens and other items, made by this highly reputable Soho workshop, during a decisive period of British history.     

The ‘Indian’ staff college: Politics and practices of military institution-building in Twentieth century India

ABSTRACT

This paper focuses on the twentieth century administrative and institutional history of the ‘Indian’ Staff College. This institutional focus on the Staff College helps reveal the political, military and intellectual fault lines that have intersected with the processes of military institution-building in India. By focussing on the administrative challenges of the Staff College, I am to chart the historical development of the practices which have undergirded the delivery of professional military education on the subcontinent.