‘Restoring normalcy’: The evolution of the Indian army's counterinsurgency doctrine

The Indian Army has a uniquely political approach to counterinsurgency that has had great success. This essay examines the development of this doctrine over the last five decades, and the political and operational factors that influenced its development. The most important of these factors was, and remains, the Army's positional‐war orientation, which puts great emphasis on the need to prepare for conventional war. Though the doctrine has undergone some evolution, such changes have been constrained by the positional‐war orientation.     

India’s emerging space assets and nuclear-weapons capabilities

ABSTRACT

Over the last five decades, India’s nuclear and space programs have gone through several phases, from collaboration to divorce to supportive. An interplay of two factors determined the nature of the relationship. One was the state of India’s nuclear-weapon program. The second was international conditions, especially India’s relationship with the nuclear-nonproliferation regime. In the early decades, because of the rudimentary nature of India’s nuclear and space programs, the relationship was collaborative, since the rocket technology being developed was a necessary adjunct to the nuclear-weapon program. Subsequently, as India’s rocketry capabilities and nuclear-weapon program began to mature and concerns about international sanctions under the non-proliferation regime began to grow, the two programs were separated. The Indian rocketry program was also divided, with the civilian-space and ballistic-missile programs clearly demarcated. After India declared itself a nuclear-weapon state in 1998 and the programs matured, the relationship has become more supportive. As the two programs mature further, this relationship is likely to deepen, as the nuclear-weapon program requires space assets to build a robust and survivable nuclear deterrent force.