Dynamic capacity reservation and due date quoting in a make‐to‐order system

We consider a make‐to‐order manufacturer facing random demand from two classes of customers. We develop an integrated model for reserving capacity in anticipation of future order arrivals from high priority customers and setting due dates for incoming orders. Our research exhibits two distinct features: (1) we explicitly model the manufacturer's uncertainty about the customers' due date preferences for future orders; and (2) we utilize a service level measure for reserving capacity rather than estimating short and long term implications of due date quoting with a penalty cost function. We identify an interesting effect (“t‐pooling”) that arises when the (partial) knowledge of customer due date preferences is utilized in making capacity reservation and order allocation decisions. We characterize the relationship between the customer due date preferences and the required reservation quantities and show that not considering the t‐pooling effect (as done in traditional capacity and inventory rationing literature) leads to excessive capacity reservations. Numerical analyses are conducted to investigate the behavior and performance of our capacity reservation and due date quoting approach in a dynamic setting with multiple planning horizons and roll‐overs. One interesting and seemingly counterintuitive finding of our analyses is that under certain conditions reserving capacity for high priority customers not only improves high priority fulfillment, but also increases the overall system fill rate. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

The effects of customer rebates and retailer incentives on a manufacturer's profits and sales

In some industries such as automotive, production costs are largely fixed and therefore maximizing revenue is the main objective. Manufacturers use promotions directed to the end customers and/or retailers in their distribution channels to increase sales and market share. We study a game theoretical model to examine the impact of “retailer incentive” and “customer rebate” promotions on the manufacturer's pricing and the retailer's ordering/sales decisions. The main tradeoff is that customer rebates are given to every customer, while the use of retailer incentives is controlled by the retailer. We consider several models with different demand characteristics and information asymmetry between the manufacturer and a price discriminating retailer, and we determine which promotion would benefit the manufacturer under which market conditions. When demand is deterministic, we find that retailer incentives increase the manufacturer's profits (and sales) while customer rebates do not unless they lead to market expansion. When the uncertainty in demand (“market potential”) is high, a customer rebate can be more profitable than the retailer incentive for the manufacturer. With numerical examples, we provide additional insights on the profit gains by the right choice of promotion.© 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

Optimal control policies for an inventory system with commitment lead time

We consider a firm which faces a Poisson customer demand and uses a base‐stock policy to replenish its inventories from an outside supplier with a fixed lead time. The firm can use a preorder strategy which allows the customers to place their orders before their actual need. The time from a customer's order until the date a product is actually needed is called commitment lead time. The firm pays a commitment cost which is strictly increasing and convex in the length of the commitment lead time. For such a system, we prove the optimality of bang‐bang and all‐or‐nothing policies for the commitment lead time and the base‐stock policy, respectively. We study the case where the commitment cost is linear in the length of the commitment lead time in detail. We show that there exists a unit commitment cost threshold which dictates the optimality of either a buy‐to‐order (BTO) or a buy‐to‐stock strategy. The unit commitment cost threshold is increasing in the unit holding and backordering costs and decreasing in the mean lead time demand. We determine the conditions on the unit commitment cost for profitability of the BTO strategy and study the case with a compound Poisson customer demand.     

Impact of reseller's and sales agent's forecasting accuracy in a multilayer supply chain

We consider a three‐layer supply chain with a manufacturer, a reseller, and a sales agent. The demand is stochastically determined by the random market condition and the sales agent's private effort level. Although the manufacturer is uninformed about the market condition, the reseller and the sales agent conduct demand forecasting and generate private demand signals. Under this framework with two levels of adverse selection intertwined with moral hazard, we study the impact of the reseller's and the sales agent's forecasting accuracy on the profitability of each member. We show that the manufacturer's profitability is convex on the reseller's forecasting accuracy. From the manufacturer's perspective, typically improving the reseller's accuracy is detrimental when the accuracy is low but is beneficial when it is high. We identify the concrete interrelation among the manufacturer‐optimal reseller's accuracy, the volatility of the market condition, and the sales agent's accuracy. Finally, the manufacturer's interest may be aligned with the reseller's when only the reseller can choose her accuracy; this alignment is never possible when both downstream players have the discretion to choose their accuracy. © 2014 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 61: 207–222, 2014     

An exact analysis of a joint production‐inventory problem in two‐echelon inventory systems

We consider a two‐echelon inventory system with a manufacturer operating from a warehouse supplying multiple distribution centers (DCs) that satisfy the demand originating from multiple sources. The manufacturer has a finite production capacity and production times are stochastic. Demand from each source follows an independent Poisson process. We assume that the transportation times between the warehouse and DCs may be positive which may require keeping inventory at both the warehouse and DCs. Inventory in both echelons is managed using the base‐stock policy. Each demand source can procure the product from one or more DCs, each incurring a different fulfilment cost. The objective is to determine the optimal base‐stock levels at the warehouse and DCs as well as the assignment of the demand sources to the DCs so that the sum of inventory holding, backlog, and transportation costs is minimized. We obtain a simple equation for finding the optimal base‐stock level at each DC and an upper bound for the optimal base‐stock level at the warehouse. We demonstrate several managerial insights including that the demand from each source is optimally fulfilled entirely from a single distribution center, and as the system's utilization approaches 1, the optimal base‐stock level increases in the transportation time at a rate equal to the demand rate arriving at the DC. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

The effect of a temporary product distribution channel on supply chain performance

We analyze a supply chain of a manufacturer and two retailers, a permanent retailer who always stocks the manufacturer's product and an intermittent deal‐of‐the day retailer who sells the manufacturer's product online for a short time. We find that without a deal‐of‐the‐day (DOTD) retailer, it is suboptimal for the manufacturer to offer a quantity discount while it is optimal for the retailer to offer periodic price discounts to consumers. With the addition of a DOTD retailer, it is likely to be optimal for the manufacturer to offer a quantity discount. We show that even without market expansion, i.e., no exclusive DOTD retailer consumers, opening the intermittent channel can leave the permanent retailer no worse‐off while increasing the manufacturer's profit. We identify the regular and discounted wholesale prices and the threshold quantity at which the manufacturer should give the discount. We also identify the optimal retail prices. We find that opening the intermittent channel increases the profit of the manufacturer, is likely to decrease the average retail price and to increase sales, and may increase the permanent retailer's profit. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 63: 505–528, 2016     

Production‐inventory systems with imperfect advance demand information and updating

We consider a supplier with finite production capacity and stochastic production times. Customers provide advance demand information (ADI) to the supplier by announcing orders ahead of their due dates. However, this information is not perfect, and customers may request an order be fulfilled prior to or later than the expected due date. Customers update the status of their orders, but the time between consecutive updates is random. We formulate the production‐control problem as a continuous‐time Markov decision process and prove there is an optimal state‐dependent base‐stock policy, where the base‐stock levels depend upon the numbers of orders at various stages of update. In addition, we derive results on the sensitivity of the state‐dependent base‐stock levels to the number of orders in each stage of update. In a numerical study, we examine the benefit of ADI, and find that it is most valuable to the supplier when the time between updates is moderate. We also consider the impact of holding and backorder costs, numbers of updates, and the fraction of customers that provide ADI. In addition, we find that while ADI is always beneficial to the supplier, this may not be the case for the customers who provide the ADI. © 2011 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2011     

Optimal dynamic rules for assigning customers to servers in a heterogeneous queuing system

We consider a queuing system in which both customers and servers may be of several types. The distribution of a customer's service time is assumed to depend on both the customer's type and the type of server to which he is assigned. For a model with two servers and two customer types, conditions are presented which ensure that the discounted number of service completions is maximized by assigning customers with longer service times to faster servers. Generalizations to more complex models are discussed.     

Optimal FCFS allocation rules for periodic‐review assemble‐to‐order systems

In Assemble‐To‐Order (ATO) systems, situations may arise in which customer demand must be backlogged due to a shortage of some components, leaving available stock of other components unused. Such unused component stock is called remnant stock. Remnant stock is a consequence of both component ordering decisions and decisions regarding allocation of components to end‐product demand. In this article, we examine periodic‐review ATO systems under linear holding and backlogging costs with a component installation stock policy and a First‐Come‐First‐Served (FCFS) allocation policy. We show that the FCFS allocation policy decouples the problem of optimal component allocation over time into deterministic period‐by‐period optimal component allocation problems. We denote the optimal allocation of components to end‐product demand as multimatching. We solve the multi‐matching problem by an iterative algorithm. In addition, an approximation scheme for the joint replenishment and allocation optimization problem with both upper and lower bounds is proposed. Numerical experiments for base‐stock component replenishment policies show that under optimal base‐stock policies and optimal allocation, remnant stock holding costs must be taken into account. Finally, joint optimization incorporating optimal FCFS component allocation is valuable because it provides a benchmark against which heuristic methods can be compared. © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics 62: 158–169, 2015     

Stochastic production capacity: A bane or a boon for quick response supply chains?

The quick response (QR) system that can cope with demand volatility by shortening lead time has been well studied in the literature. Much of the existing literature assumes implicitly or explicitly that the manufacturers under QR can always meet the demand because the production capacity is always sufficient. However, when the order comes with a short lead time under QR, availability of the manufacturer's production capacity is not guaranteed. This motivates us to explore QR in supply chains with stochastic production capacity. Specifically, we study QR in a two-echelon supply chain with Bayesian demand information updating. We consider the situation where the manufacturer's production capacity under QR is uncertain. We first explore how stochastic production capacity affects supply chain decisions and QR implementation. We then incorporate the manufacturer's ability to expand capacity into the model. We explore how the manufacturer determines the optimal capacity expansion decision, and the value of such an ability to the supply chain and its agents. Finally, we extend the model to the two-stage two-ordering case and derive the optimal ordering policy by dynamic programming. We compare the single-ordering and two-ordering cases to generate additional managerial insights about how ordering flexibility affects QR when production capacity is stochastic. We also explore the transparent supply chain and find that our main results still hold.     

The impact of manufacturer rebates on supply chain profits

Manufacturer rebates are commonly used as price discount tools for attracting end customers. In this study, we consider a two‐stage supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer, where a single seasonal product faces uncertain and price‐sensitive demand. We characterize the impact of a manufacturer rebate on the expected profits of both the manufacturer and the retailer. We show that unless all of the customers claim the rebate, the rebate always benefits the manufacturer. Our results thus imply that “mail‐in rebates,” where some customers end up not claiming the rebate, particularly when the size of the rebate is relatively small, always benefit the manufacturer. On the other hand, an “instant rebate,” such as the one offered in the automotive industry where every customer redeems the rebate on the spot when he/she purchases a car, does not necessarily benefit the manufacturer. © 2007 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007     

A sequential dynamic pricing model and its applications

Consider a sequential dynamic pricing model where a seller sells a given stock to a random number of customers. Arriving one at a time, each customer will purchase one item if the product price is lower than her personal reservation price. The seller's objective is to post a potentially different price for each customer in order to maximize the expected total revenue. We formulate the seller's problem as a stochastic dynamic programming model, and develop an algorithm to compute the optimal policy. We then apply the results from this sequential dynamic pricing model to the case where customers arrive according to a continuous‐time point process. In particular, we derive tight bounds for the optimal expected revenue, and develop an asymptotically optimal heuristic policy. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2004.     

Free riding in a multi‐channel supply chain

Free riding in a multichannel supply chain occurs when one retail channel engages in the customer service activities necessary to sell a product, while another channel benefits from those activities by making the final sale. Although free riding is, in general, considered to have a negative impact on supply chain performance, certain recent industry practices suggest an opposite view: a manufacturer may purposely induce free riding by setting up a high‐cost, customer service‐oriented direct store to allow consumers to experience the product, anticipating their purchase at a retail store. This article examines how the free riding phenomenon affects a manufacturer's supply chain structure decision when there are fixed plus incremental variable costs for operating the direct store. We consider factors such as the effort required to find and buy the product at a retail store after visiting the direct store, the existence of competing products in the market, and the extent of consumer need to obtain direct‐store service. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2009     

Revenue sharing contracts in a supply chain with uncontractible actions

We consider a supplier–customer relationship where the customer faces a typical Newsvendor problem of determining perishable capacity to meet uncertain demand. The customer outsources a critical, demand‐enhancing service to an outside supplier, who receives a fixed share of the revenue from the customer. Given such a linear sharing contract, the customer chooses capacity and the service supplier chooses service effort level before demand is realized. We consider the two cases when these decisions are made simultaneously (simultaneous game) or sequentially (sequential game). For each game, we analyze how the equilibrium solutions vary with the parameters of the problem. We show that in the equilibrium, it is possible that either the customer's capacity increases or the service supplier's effort level decreases when the supplier receives a larger share of the revenue. We also show that given the same sharing contract, the sequential game always induces a higher capacity and more effort. For the case of additive effort effect and uniform demand distribution, we consider the customer's problem of designing the optimal contract with or without a fixed payment in the contract, and obtain sensitivity results on how the optimal contract depends on the problem parameters. For the case of fixed payment, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier to induce more service effort when the profit margin is higher, the cost of effort is lower, effort is more effective in stimulating demand, the variability of demand is smaller or the supplier makes the first move in the sequential game. For the case of no fixed payment, however, it is optimal to allocate more revenue to the supplier when the variability of demand is larger or its mean is smaller. Numerical examples are analyzed to validate the sensitivity results for the case of normal demand distribution and to provide more managerial insights. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Optimal operating policies in a commodity trading market with the manufacturer's presence

With the help of the Internet and express delivery at relatively low costs, trading markets have become increasingly popular as a venue to sell excess inventory and a source to obtain products at lower prices. In this article, we study the operational decisions in the presence of a trading market in a periodic‐review, finite‐horizon setting. Prices in the trading market change periodically and are determined endogenously by the demand and supply in the market. We characterize the retailers'optimal ordering and trading policies when the original manufacturer and the trading market co‐exist and retailers face fees to participate in the trading market. Comparing with the case with no trading fees, we obtain insights into the impact of trading fees and the fee structure on the retailers and the manufacturer. Further, we find that by continually staying in the market, the manufacturer may use her pricing strategies to counter‐balance the negative impact of the trading market on her profit. Finally, we extend the model to the case when retailers dynamically update their demand distribution based on demand observations in previous periods. A numerical study provides additional insights into the impact of demand updating in a trading market with the manufacturer's competition. © 2009 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2010     

The value of information sharing in a two‐stage supply chain with production capacity constraints

We consider a simple two‐stage supply chain with a single retailer facing i.i.d. demand and a single manufacturer with finite production capacity. We analyze the value of information sharing between the retailer and the manufacturer over a finite time horizon. In our model, the manufacturer receives demand information from the retailer even during time periods in which the retailer does not order. To analyze the impact of information sharing, we consider the following three strategies: (1) the retailer does not share demand information with the manufacturer; (2) the retailer does share demand information with the manufacturer and the manufacturer uses the optimal policy to schedule production; (3) the retailer shares demand information with the manufacturer and the manufacturer uses a greedy policy to schedule production. These strategies allow us to study the impact of information sharing on the manufacturer as a function of the production capacity, and the frequency and timing in which demand information is shared. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2003     

Commitment decisions with partial information updating

In this paper, we extend the results of Ferguson M. Naval Research Logistics 8 . on an end‐product manufacturer's choice of when to commit to an order quantity from its parts supplier. During the supplier's lead‐time, information arrives about end‐product demand. This information reduces some of the forecast uncertainty. While the supplier must choose its production quantity of parts based on the original forecast, the manufacturer can wait to place its order from the supplier after observing the information update. We find that a manufacturer is sometimes better off with a contract requiring an early commitment to its order quantity, before the supplier commits resources. On the other hand, the supplier sometimes prefers a delayed commitment. The preferences depend upon the amount of demand uncertainty resolved by the information as well as which member of the supply chain sets the exchange price. We also show conditions where demand information updating is detrimental to both the manufacturer and the supplier. © 2005 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2005     

Technical note: Reexamination of all‐or‐none inspection policies in a supply chain with endogenous product quality

This note studies the optimal inspection policies in a supply chain in which a manufacturer purchases components from a supplier but has no direct control of component quality. The manufacturer uses an inspection policy and a damage cost sharing contract to encourage the supplier to improve the component quality. We find that all‐or‐none inspection policies are optimal for the manufacturer if the supplier's share of the damage cost is larger than a threshold; otherwise, the manufacturer should inspect a fraction of a batch. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2008     

Engineering costs and customer costs in designing product support

Product support encompasses activities undertaken by durable goods producers to ensure their customers the continued use of the product. Examples of product support elements include after the sale activities such as providing repair services and warranty programs, as well as all the activities undertaken at the design and production stage to improve the reliability of products before they reach the market. The implications of incorporating customer costs while designing product support packages are the concern of this study. We study how the parameters of support package impact the costs incurred by customers and provide insights about selecting appropriate levels of product support. We show that the engineering orientation of maximizing the product's availability ignores market characteristics, and results in a mismatch between the corporation's support package and the customer's needs. The research is intended to be a step in understanding the interaction between design engineering parameters and customer's costs. © 1993 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Simultaneous price,location, and capacity decisions on a line of time‐sensitive customers

Consider a monopolist who sells a single product to time‐sensitive customers located on a line segment. Customers send their orders to the nearest distribution facility, where the firm processes (customizes) these orders on a first‐come, first‐served basis before delivering them. We examine how the monopolist would locate its facilities, set their capacities, and price the product offered to maximize profits. We explicitly model customers' waiting costs due to both shipping lead times and queueing congestion delays and allow each customer to self‐select whether she orders or not, based on her reservation price. We first analyze the single‐facility problem and derive a number of interesting insights regarding the optimal solution. We show, for instance, that the optimal capacity relates to the square root of the customer volume and that the optimal price relates additively to the capacity and transportation delay costs. We also compare our solutions to a similar problem without congestion effects. We then utilize our single‐facility results to treat the multi‐facility problem. We characterize the optimal policy for serving a fixed interval of customers from multiple facilities when customers are uniformly distributed on a line. We also show how as the length of the customer interval increases, the optimal policy relates to the single‐facility problem of maximizing expected profit per unit distance. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2007