MOZAMBIQUE

Mozambique is widely regarded as a success story. The parliamentary and presidential lections in 1994 marked the peak of the peace process in Mozambique. Despite minor irregularities, the elections were declared free and fair by international observers. Mozambique has succeeded where other countries such as Angola has failed—a stable peace process, multiparty elections and the transformation of the armed opposition into a civil political party. Its transition to liberalism and capitalism brought macro-economic growth rates that are probably envied by many countries in the region. This article argues, however, that Mozambique provides an example of a third wave democracy where the transition from in electoral democracy to a consolidated democracy has not yet been completed, with little progress towards democratic maturity. In particular, the repercussions of the elections in 1999, Mozambique's ‘black’ November in 2000 and the process of recent consultation between the and Frelimo leadership in order to resolve the paralysed state of Mozambican politics underline a tendency towards a permanent entrenchment of democratic minimalism.     

GUINEA-BISSAU

Guinea-Bissau is currently living through a decisive period in its political history. Marked by governmental instability, particularly since 1998, the country suffered another coup d'état in September 2003. Since then a transitional period has led up to the March 2004 legislative elections. It is hoped this transitional arrangement will end after the presidential elections scheduled for March 2005.

This commentary analyses recent political developments and current political and military dynamics in the context of the many political and economic challenges facing Guinea-Bissau. It also discusses the possible outcomes of the transition and outlines the main challenges facing the country's government in the near future.     

Lesotho’s 2015 elections in the context of an ongoing security vacuum

After inconclusive elections in 2012, Lesotho had a coalition government for the first time, made up of three political parties that had a narrow majority in parliament. The new government, however, faced several challenges, some of which were of its own making. The agreement among the three parties was to literally divide the government into three parts, leading to a continuous stalemate in its operation; the most serious consequence was the prorogation of parliament and the resultant attempted coup. The flight of the prime minister to South Africa and his return under a Southern African Development Community (SADC) security detail provided a short-term solution to Lesotho's security crisis. Under Cyril Ramaphosa's mediation, the prorogued parliament was conditionally opened and the election date set for 28 February 2015. However, the security dilemma – whereby the prime minister, who is also minister of defence, has no control over the military – remains. When elections are held, there does not seem to be a guarantee that they will be held in peace; moreover, there are now fears that the losers will not accept the results of the elections because of the security vacuum in Lesotho. This article argues that peace can only be salvaged by enhanced SADC security before, during and after the elections. It argues that the SADC mission should remain beyond the elections to oversee the constitutional changes that are necessary for ensuring long-term stability. On their own, Lesotho politicians are unlikely to be able to work together in order to move the country forward.     

The ‘one-plus-four’ formula and transition in the Democratic Republic of Congo

In the aftermath of the signing of the ‘Accord Global et Inclusif’ (AGI) in Pretoria on 17 December 2002, not much was expected of President Thabo Mbeki's ‘imposed political monster’. In effect, after Mbeki came up with his ‘final plan’ providing for a transitional presidency made up of a president and four vice-presidents, many blamed ‘Mbeki's ignorance of Congolese political intricacies’. Mbeki's ‘one-plus-four’ formula was not only said to be unknown to the Congolese, but was also doomed to failure, given the nature of the stakeholders and the interests at stake in the DRC crisis. However, in view of the latest political developments in the DRC (a successful constitutional referendum as well as presidential, legislative and provincial elections, among others), we contend that, given the complexity of the Congolese conflict, Mbeki's design has emerged as a commendable contribution to the political solution of the Congolese crisis. Factors that have enabled such a transition mechanism to hold ought to be critically studied and eventually applied as a model for similar conflict situations in Africa and probably beyond.     

Political transition to democracy

This paper argues that the crisis of electoral democracy in Zimbabwe and Cote d'Ivoire is a result of underlying structural and institutional deficiencies within national and regional multinational institutions. It assesses the extent to which they have been ‘enablers’ or ‘spoilers’ of electoral-based transitions to democracy. Yet it avoids generalisations of the security sector's involvement in political transitions. In terms of structure, the paper is divided into four sections. Section one will briefly discuss the theoretical perspectives of the election-democracy trajectory. It argues that although elections are a major variable for democracy, unless the ‘ecology of elections’ is conducive, elections may not be an instrument of transition to democracy. The second section analyses the militarisation of politics and the role of the security sector in aiding or stalling democratisation. Section three will assess the role of regional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community, Economic Community of West African States and the African Union in electoral-based political transitions in Africa. Lastly, the paper will discuss how the security sector and multinational African institutions can aid political transitions to democracy in troubled African countries.     

‘God willing,I will be back’: Gauging the Truth and Reconciliation Commission's capacity to deter economic crimes in Liberia

Recently, in July 2012, the high-profile and bitterly fought nine-month race for the post of Chair of the African Union (AU) Commission, between Dr Jean Ping of Gabon, and his main challenger, Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, culminated in the latter's victory. Her victory came after the deadlock at the Eighteenth AU Summit in January 2012. Borne out of the considered need for a quick fix through reliance on a vote of expediency, the election of Dr Dlamini-Zuma represented a political resolution to the crisis that arose due to the earlier ongoing electoral deadlock. Far from being a competitive election by design, the 2012 AU Commission election by default became transformed into an intensely fought campaign that put the AU in the limelight. This article briefly introduces the electoral process, explains in detail the voting behaviour of AU member states, and offers five specific reasons for the victory of Dr Dlamini-Zuma. On the surface the election looks very competitive, but the article explains why this is not the case. To create greater competition for these posts, the AU needs to overhaul the nomination process and the voting procedure. In this regard, the article proffers detailed analysis and proposes a radical revision of the existing criteria for the nomination. The article also proposes specific recommendations for the amendment of the rules of procedure of the AU Assembly to allow for a qualified majority as a deadlock breaker in the fifth round. It also assesses whether the integrity of the AU Commission election was damaged during the campaigning and voting process. In this regard, it recommends the development of a code of conduct for future elections at the AU.     

Was the Nigerian 2015 presidential election a victory for Boko Haram or for democracy?

The ousting of Dr Goodluck Jonathan marked the first time in Nigerian history that a member of the opposition unseated an incumbent in fair and peaceful elections. The smooth transition of power, uncharacteristic of Nigeria, was hailed by the international community as a victory. However, did Muhammadu Buhari win because Jonathan lost or did Jonathan lose because Buhari won? This article argues that Jonathan's growing unpopularity gave Buhari the win, and that Boko Haram played a major role in the president's sinking support. The 2015 presidential election was thus a win for both democracy and Boko Haram.     

Political dynamics in Kenya’s post-electoral violence: Justice without peace or political compromise?

The political upheavals that erupted in Kenya after the release of the 2007–8 election results resulted in the death of approximately 1 200 people, as well as the loss of livestock and other valuable property. While the Kenyan government tried to seek solutions to the crisis, the International Criminal Court (ICC) issued warrants for the arrest of top government officials. For its part, the African Union (AU) accused the ICC of racism by targeting only African leaders, and maintained that such practices undermine the rule of equality before the law set forth in Article 27 of the Rome Statute. The AU is therefore advising African countries, including Kenya, to consider withdrawing from the ICC. Will the ICC's intervention into the situation in Kenya bring justice and peace to the country, or will it add to the existing injuries affecting not just the country but the region as well? Through a critical analysis of contemporary scholarly discourse, this article unravels the dilemma of the ICC's intervention and the likely consequences of this action for the people of Kenya and Africa.     

TRENDS AND MARKERS

The twin concepts of secrecy and transparency are central to any discourse on the freeness and fairness of elections, because they are universally accep ted yardsticks of the degree to which elections can be said to be legitimate. Without challenging this truism, this paper explores these concepts as both theoretical constructs and as manifes ted in empirical situations. It will highlight their ideological function and argue that they have an alienating effect in practice. The article will also attempt to show how secrecy and transparency have helped to shape Lesotho's electoral process and the mode of its management, and will also discuss the issues and questions that it raises. Next, the most critical issues in any debate concerning Lesotho's elections and their management are raised, followed by the recommendation of an ideal way of managing elections to serve the interest of voters better. Lastly, the paper demonstrates the danger of depoliticising elections and relegating them to the legal sphere, which only the courts of law are competent to interpret.     

The effects of local elections on national military spending: A cross-country study

In this paper, we study the domestic political determinants of military spending. Our conceptual framework suggests that power distribution over local and central governments influences the government provision of national public goods, in our context, military expenditure. Drawing on a large cross-country panel, we demonstrate that having local elections will decrease a country’s military expenditure markedly, controlling for other political and economic variables. According to our preferred estimates, a country’s military expenditure is on average 20% lower if its state government officials are locally elected, which is consistent with our theoretical prediction.     

Stopping Nuclear Traffic

The exploits of the A.Q. Khan nuclear network have received significant attention in the last three years. Gordon Corera's recent book, Shopping for Bombs, is an important addition to the existing literature. In this book, the author explores how Khan became a nuclear supplier and why his network was able to flourish for so many years. In his analysis, Corera examines relevant domestic and international political circumstances that affected Khan's rise and ultimate fall. The author also gives a compelling account of the international investigation that shut down this network in 2004 and warns that Khan's network will not be the last to challenge international nonproliferation regimes. Despite a few gaps in the book's narrative and analysis, Shopping for Bombs is an important source of insight into the activities of Khan and his network.     

EASTERN SUDAN INDIGENOUS CONFLICT PREVENTION,MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION MECHANISMS

In the wake of heightened media and political pressure about the Darfur humanitarian catastrophe, the African Union (AU) hurriedly deployed its monitors in Darfur, to be augmented later by a protection force to safeguard the monitors, albeit without adequate pre-deployment and logistic assessment. Without doubt, the Darfur crisis has become the AU's major preoccupation for the past year. The deployment of the African Mission in Sudan (AMIS) since June 2004 has presented many challenges to the AU and its partners. A restrictive mandate, inadequate troops to cover Darfur, serious operational, logistical and capacity shortfalls have combined in an inextricable way to present the AU's mission to some observers as spineless and ineffective. The UN and partners have acknowledged the lead role of the AU in Darfur, and have been very supportive with assistance in these critical deficient areas. How the AU will take advantage of this favourable environment and optimise the benefits from its partners will be crucial to its success in Darfur. The article emphasises the need for the AU to strengthen its capacity and expertise at all levels of command through technical cooperation and appropriate assistance from the UN and partners. The entire world is waiting to see how Africa delivers on this critical assignment.     

MADAGASCAR

There would be few who could conclude that the African Union (AU) or its predecessor covered themselves in glory during the Madagascan crisis. Indeed, the organisations consistently went out of their way to accommodate the views of the incumbent, refusing to take a strong stand on agreements reached when these were no longer expedient to Ratsiraka. By concentrating on minutiae it diverted its gaze from the bigger picture, in which electoral fraud loomed large. If final proof was wanted of this it came in the parliamentary results a year after the flawed first round of presidential elections. Ultimately the AU found itself floundering in the wake of developments, and was irrelevant to the solution of Madagascar's political crisis. Other international actors eventually played a far more constructive role as they sought to engage and encourage the new government.     

The myth of Afghan electoral democracy: the irregularities of the 2014 presidential election

ABSTRACT

This article systematically assesses the 2014 Afghanistan Presidential Election, the first transfer of power from President Hamid Karzai to an elected successor, using provincial voting data as well as explicit data from polling centers. The analysis finds unusual voting results in the April election, where no candidate received 50%+1 votes required by the Afghan constitution, versus the voting results realized for the June ‘runoff election.’ As in other Afghan voting analyses, this article finds voting based on ethno-linguistic preferences, and interestingly found Dr. Ashraf Ghani receiving almost all the swing votes in the runoff election even though the other leading candidate from the April election all endorsed Dr. Abdullah Abdullah. More importantly, however, the research presented here clearly finds extremely strange voting patterns. For example, the polling data center analysis finds 606 polling places where Ghani received all 600 votes and Abdullah received none and another 900 polling centers that gave virtually all its votes to Ghani. These results in combination with other analyses raise the very real possibility that the election results were illegitimate. The article concludes with a discussion of the implications of the research to future Afghan elections and their processes as well as to the long-standing conflict in the country.     

Country survey XII: South Africa

This article examines the relationship between defence expenditure and economic performance in South Africa, both prior to and after that country's first fully democratic election in 1994. Prior to 1994 defence expenditure decisions were largely dominated by non‐economic factors; since then defence spending has declined in reaction to, inter alia, the need to address a number of socio‐economic inequities.

After 1975 in particular, military industrialisation in South Africa placed a disproportionately high burden on the country's industrial resources and natural economic and technical capabilities. However, although this suggests that the opportunity cost of domestic arms production has been fairly high, the country's poor economic and development performance since the mid‐1970s is a function of underlying structural deficiencies and institutional constraints rather than the consequence of inordinately high defence spending levels.     

India's counter-insurgency experience: the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy

The Indian Army, a force trained primarily for conventional warfare, has been engaged in internal counter-insurgency operations since the 1950s. Despite such a long innings on a counter-insurgency mode, little attention has been accorded within military circles to doctrinal innovation for waging sub-conventional warfare in India's democratic political context. At best, the Army continues to view counter-insurgency duty as secondary to its primary duty of defending India from external conventional threats. By conceptualizing a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’, this article aims to fill this critical doctrinal gap in India's military policy. The author argues that a counter-insurgency strategy of ‘trust and nurture’ based on democratic political culture, measured military methods, special counter-insurgency forces, local social and cultural awareness and an integrative nation-building approach will result in positive handling of India's internal security problems. The author utilizes India's counter-insurgency experiences in Assam, Mizoram, Nagaland, Punjab, and Operation ‘Sadhbhavana’ in Jammu and Kashmir as illustrative empirical indicants in order to validate the ‘trust and nurture’ strategy.     

The politics of renewed quest for a Biafra Republic in Nigeria

The quest for a Biafran Republic by the Igbo ethnic group has become a recurring demand in Nigeria since the late 1960s. The agitation has been premised on claims of marginalisation and exclusion of the Igbo people in the Nigerian body politic. In spite of the consistency of the agitation through various Administrations, there was a noticeable lull in such demands during the time of President Goodluck Jonathan, only to assume a frightening proportion since the advent of the Administration of President Muhammadu Buhari. This article locates the factors in the outcomes of the 2015 general elections: the question of inclusion and representation; the unfinished nature of the Nigerian civil war; economic challenges, miscalculation both on the part of the Igbo people and indiscretion in the initial appointments made by President Muhammadu Buhari. The article recommends political restructuring of Nigeria as one of the ways to address secessionist tendencies.     

Power and influence in post-secession South Sudan: A leadership perspective on nation-building

ABSTRACT

Following South Sudan's secession in 2011, the country faced significant political, social and economic challenges. The country emerged from a long andarduous nation-building journey, including almost 50 years of violent conflict, that would continue after declaring independence. This nation-building process would suffer a significant set-back in December 2013 when the most recent civil war broke out. This article provides a new perspective on South Sudan's nation-building trajectory that tends towards violence and complicates peace-building. It does so by utilising the leadership process approach from the Leadership Studies literature. While popular literature and commentary tends to fault the South Sudanese elite for the current crisis, there has not been a systematic effort to understand the leadership challenge and its role in conflict, peace and nation-building in South Sudan. In this article, South Sudan's nation-building process and its three primary components of (a) identity construction, (b) statehood and (c) collective will and responsibility, are analysed from a leadership perspective, focusing on issues of power and influence. The conclusion is reached that South Sudan's nation-building has been and will likely continue to trend towards a violent process due to a leadership process that lacks mutuality and is founded on insufficient sources of power.     

Hans Morgenthau and the Lasting Implications of World War I

ABSTRACT

World War I was an epochal event that permanently redefined international politics. Yet, there is no consensus about what kind of international system it erected. This article argues that since 1918 to the present day, there is a unique revolutionary/revisionist system in existence. To confirm the argument, this article will revisit the mid-twentieth century writings of political realism's founding father Hans J. Morgenthau. His political thought is premised on the co-constitutive relation between ethics and politics, which characterized international politics throughout the Westphalian era and which was irreversibly lost in the tragedy of World War I. By sketching some of Morgenthau’s main arguments on the political and ethical transformations brought about by total war and total politics, the article argues that World War I generated a revolutionary system indifferent to political and non-political spheres, where insulated ethical systems clash in a kind of “global civil war”.     

Turkey’s strategic choice: buy or make weapons?

Turkey has been investing in its national defence industrial base since the 1980s. As with other developing countries, Turkey’s motivations for investing in national defence industries can be boiled down to the pursuit of defence autarky, economic benefits and international prestige. However, after 40 years of investment, Turkey is unable to reach the primary goals of defence industrialisation. We argue that three factors are important to understanding Turkey’s persistence in these primary goals. First, Turkey believes that there is an overall improvement in its defence industrial capabilities and the goal of autarky is still reachable. Second, increased defence exports support the belief that Turkish defence industries have become sustainable and the trend will continue in the future. The third reason, perhaps most important of all, has to do with the domestic political gains of defence industrialisation: the AKP uses defence industry and indigenous weapon systems for prestige and, therefore, garners broader support.