On the brink: The resurgence of militant Islam in Central Asia

Since Operation Enduring Freedom, Central Asian militants, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, have fled to Pakistan from their previous strongholds in Afghanistan. However, many militants have begun returning to Central Asia. Thus questions are raised as to what extent militancy has the potential to thrive with the pending North Atlantic Treaty Organization withdrawal from Afghanistan set for 2014? Is militancy a legitimate security threat to Central Asia? What strategies might militants implement? Thus, this article examines the current state of militancy, analyzes militant trends, introduces Afghanistan and Pakistan into the Central Asian equation, and determines the militants' capability and overall strategy. The article concludes that militant Islam, regardless of its current numbers, remains a viable threat to regional security, Afghanistan will be an essential factor for the future of Central Asian militancy, and the form this re-emergence will take becomes apparent.     

Countering the effects of IED systems in Afghanistan: an integral approach

The current approach to countering the threat of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in Afghanistan has met with limited success. The relative lack of success may be in part because the current approach is not holistic and discounts the social systems that foster the IEDs. Insurgents are using IEDs as a tool to further their strategic aims, but the coalition and to a lesser extent the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) are attacking the IEDs as if they are an end in and of themselves. Combining network disruption with information change maximizes the opportunities for mitigating the IED threat. More specifically, to mitigate the IED threat requires disrupting the social and economic systems associated with IEDs, and at the same time providing alternative economic opportunities and improving rule of law and governance at the local level. In other words, counter-IED (C-IED) must be Counter-Insurgency (COIN) centric to be successful. This paper reviews the current state of C-IED efforts, identifies five main problems with the current approach, and suggests changes to reduce or mitigate the IED threat in Afghanistan.     

ISIS-K: deadly nuisance or strategic threat?

ABSTRACT

In 2014, an affiliate of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria emerged in Afghanistan. Wilayat Khorasan, or ISIS-K, intends to secure Afghanistan to legitimize the Islamic State’s caliphate across the ‘Khorasan Province’ including portions of Central Asia, China, Iran, the Indian Subcontinent, and Southeast Asia. While the group’s intent is clear, its capability confounds analysts. The authors argue that Wilayat Khorasan is likely the Islamic State’s most viable and lethal regional affiliate based on an expansionist military strategy. This is designed to enable the group’s encirclement of Jalalabad City in Nangarhar Province and is foundational to its expanded operational reach, regionalization, and lethality. Since 2016, the US-led Coalition’s counter-terrorism strategy has disrupted ISIS-K’s critical requirements and prevented external attacks. Yet, raids and strikes alone will not defeat ISIS-K. They must be calibrated against an institution-building approach that legitimizes Afghanistan’s government and redresses grievances that ISIS-K exploits to resolve.     

The impact of Islamic State’s ideological correction initiative on al Qaeda’s bid for relevance

ABSTRACT

Al Qaeda following 9-11 experienced a period of stagnation which it sought to remedy through a project of re-branding. Critical of this approach, Islamic State claimed that al Qaeda was an elitist organization that had facilitated the stagnation of the Salafi Jihadist project. In an attempted to claim dominance over the jihad, Islamic State’s endeavored to discredit al Qaeda through a process it presented as ideological correction, linked to Islamic eschatology, sectarian agitation, permissive violence, and the caliphate. Following Islamic State’s acquisition of vast territory in Iraq and Syria, arguments proliferated that Islamic State had surpassed al Qaeda. As the caliphate has collapsed what effects will this have on al Qaeda’s fortunes and strategy? It is argued that Islamic State has provided al Qaeda’s strategic approach with renewed vigour to help ensure its survival and pursue resurgence. Al Qaeda acting in concert with the meta-strategy for survival concept, has altered an existential threat into an advantage through disavowing Islamic State’s methods, continuing to engage with localism, and pursuing rebranding by positioning itself as a moderate alternative. The cases of al Qaeda affiliates in Yemen, Syria, West Africa, and South Asia are instructive in assessing the effectiveness of al Qaeda’s resurgence.     

Managing Withdrawal: Afghanistan as the Forgotten Example in Attempting Conflict Resolution and State Reconstruction

Perhaps surprisingly, given the availability of new Russian memoir material, some excellent individual monographs, and a large variety of declassified documents, a full operational–political account of the Soviet Union's withdrawal strategy from Afghanistan has yet to be written. This article, utilising openly published yet neglected sources, attempts to fill that gap. The final fate of the Najibullah regime, and the contradictory effect of the National Reconciliation Policy in Afghanistan itself, suggests four key lessons for international forces today as disengagement from both Iraq and Afghanistan again becomes a pressing issue, and as questions around re-creating stability within a failed state scenario again occupy the international community.     

Are PRTs Supposed to Compete with Terrorists?

This chapter discusses the impact Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have on the security situation in Afghanistan, specifically in countering the terrorist threat and in counter-narcotics.

The Afghan people define the lack of security as their country's greatest problem. The terrorist activities of groups opposed to the central government and the political process compounded by violence related to the opium trade are seen as the main sources of insecurity. The authors argue that, currently, PRTs should not assume active counterterrorism as an additional main area of operation. The complexity of Afghanistan's security environment and the pressure to have PRTs involved in the counter-narcotics effort underscore the necessity of local knowledge and experience in the PRTs. Participation of indigenous actors, such as NGOs, in the PRT-organisational structure could provide this required expertise.     

Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: US Performance and the Institutional Dimension of Strategy in Afghanistan

It is not too soon to draw cautionary lessons from the inconclusive results of US performance during more than 11 years of Operation ‘Enduring Freedom’ in Afghanistan. As in Vietnam, fundamental difficulties persist in adapting enduring institutions to the requirements of strategy. At the heart of the matter is tension between the assumptions that underlie counterinsurgency as practiced in Afghanistan and organization of the US Armed Forces, State Department, and Agency for International Development. Knowledge of basic principles and necessary changes is available to answer the question, could the US have done better?     

Cognitivism,prospect theory,and foreign policy change: a comparative analysis of the politics of counterinsurgency in Malaya and Afghanistan

This article investigates the cognitive limitations on policy change in counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts by examining why American decision-makers failed to revise their government strategy substantially while fighting the insurgency in Afghanistan in 2003–2014 and why their British counterparts were more successful in adjusting their policies in the Malayan insurgency in 1948–1954. Unlike most of the COIN literature that concentrates on military strategy and tactics, the analysis of government policy-making in Malaya holds some important political lessons for American leaders today despite differences between the insurgencies in Afghanistan and British Malaya. As a response to the criticism of COIN studies in general that they lack theoretical guidance, this article utilizes an integrated cognitivist-prospect theory framework. It is argued that some of the COIN literature mistakenly suggests that a more difficult strategic situation was primarily responsible for American failure in Afghanistan. Instead, American decision-makers faced a more difficult task cognitively than their British counterparts, as policy change in Afghanistan would have required greater ideational change. American principals were much more attached to their beliefs emotionally, had no alternative problem representation, and had to shift between frames in order to engineer a response that was more in line with events on the ground in Afghanistan. Regarding prospect theory, findings indicate that gains frames appear to be unhelpful in monitoring progress until catastrophic failure endangers the reference point, and that decision-makers often have more than one reference point to attune their policies to, which often results in suboptimal choices with regard to at least one reference point.     

NATO's Transformation Gaps: Transatlantic Differences and the War in Afghanistan

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has since the turn of the new century experienced a double transformation gap: between global and regionally oriented allies and between allies emulating new military practices defined by the United States and allies resisting radical change. This article takes stock of these gaps in light of a decade's worth of collective and national adjustments and in light of counter-insurgency lessons provided by Afghanistan. It argues first of all that the latter transatlantic gap is receding in importance because the United States has adjusted its transformation approach and because some European allies have significantly invested in technological, doctrinal, and organizational reform. The other transformation gap is deepening, however, pitching battle-hardened and expeditionary allies against allies focused on regional tasks of stabilization and deterrence. There is a definite potential for broad transformation, our survey of officers' opinion shows, but NATO's official approach to transformation, being broad and vague, provides neither political nor military guidance. If NATO is to move forward and bridge the gap, it must clarify the lessons of Afghanistan and embed them in its new Strategic Concept.     

Using strategic culture to understand participation in expeditionary operations: Australia,Poland, and the coalition against the Islamic State

This article investigates how strategic culture influenced the decision-making of Australia and Poland regarding the global coalition against the Islamic State. In the coalition, Australia has followed its tradition of active participation in United States-led operations, while Poland has embarked on a more cautious line, thereby breaking with its previous policy of active participation. The article examines how Australian and Polish responses to the coalition were shaped by five cultural elements: dominant threat perception, core task of the armed forces, strategic partners, experiences of participating in coalitions of the willing, and approach to the international legality of expeditionary operations. It finds that Australia and Poland differed on all five elements but that the major differences are found in dominant threat perception and core task of the armed forces.     

Resistance through Islamic clerics against Boko Haram in northern Nigeria

Islamic clerics and scholars constitute one of the community actors affected by the Boko Haram crisis in northern Nigeria. This group is also one that is most familiar with the essential doctrinal elements required to deconstruct the narrative pushed by Boko Haram in a crisis where ideology represents a vital aspect. While not undermining the bearing which socio-economic and political issues have on the crisis, this paper frames the focus to emphasise the long-term battle where Islamic clerics are involved in winning hearts and minds. Drawing upon fieldwork conducted in Sokoto State and Borno State, this paper highlights the influential role of clerics in communal mobilisation and resistance against Boko Haram. It is suggested that a deeper integration of this community actor into the broader counter-insurgency struggle in northern Nigeria would be beneficial.     

The Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (1996–2001): ‘War-Making and State-Making’ as an Insurgency Strategy

This paper examines the institutional and functional aspects of the Taliban’s Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA). The Taliban’s coercive approach and its entire reliance on “war-making” to “state-making” shows the difficulty of the transformation of an insurgent group into a state structure. The Taliban was primarily capable of establishing a two-track system of governance. However, the assessment of the IEA’s institutional and functional capabilities shows that the military–political organization formed by the Taliban lacked statehood in all three areas of legitimacy, authority and capacity.     

Moving Beyond Population-Centric vs. Enemy-Centric Counterinsurgency

Historically, insurgency is one of the most prevalent forms of armed conflict and it is likely to remain common in the foreseeable future. Recent experiences with counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan offer many lessons for future counterinsurgents, but the discourse on the subject continues to be mired in a traditional dichotomy pitting population-centric approaches to counterinsurgency against enemy-centric approaches. Historical analysis suggests that this traditional dichotomy is not a sufficiently nuanced way to understand or plan for such operations. Instead, discussions of counterinsurgency should focus on two dimensions: actions (use of physical force vs. political or moral actions) and targets (active insurgents vs. insurgent support). This perspective divides the space of possible counterinsurgency efforts into four quadrants, suggesting that effective counterinsurgency campaigns find a balance of effort across the four quadrants that is well matched to the specific context.     

Enmeshed in insurgency: Britain's protracted retreats from Iraq and Afghanistan

Ten years of counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan have produced little in Britain's national interest. This article examines the political objectives set in these wars and the reasons why they have proved elusive. The core foreign policy aim was to sustain Britain's position as a great power by assuming responsibility for global order. Alliances with the United States and NATO would be the diplomatic tool for pursuing this aim. These alliances brought obligations, in the shape of agreed common threats. Rogue regimes with weapons of mass destruction and international terrorists harboured in failed states were deemed the primary threats to British security. Military means were therefore used in Iraq and Afghanistan to attack them. Whether Tony Blair's vision of global order ever made sense is debatable, and it attracted scepticism from the outset. The article argues experience in Iraq and Afghanistan showed that a strategy to eliminate terrorism (the WMD threat turned out never to have existed) by expeditionary counterinsurgency could only fail. Therefore the attention lavished on operational-level performance by most studies is misplaced, because no amount of warfighting excellence could make up for strategic incoherence. Finally, the article proposes the more important question arising from the last ten years is why the UK pursued a futile strategy for so long. The difficulties associated with interpreting events, a malfunctioning strategic apparatus, weak political oversight, and bureaucratic self-interest are posited as the most significant explanations.     

After ISAF: partners and proxies in Afghanistan after 2014

The conclusion of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan at the end of 2014 has generated substantial uncertainty about the duration and level of international commitment to Afghanistan. The fate of local allies of international forces is therefore deeply in doubt. This article is of necessity speculative rather than empirical, but it attempts to draw on the history of previous intervention in Afghanistan as well as more general patterns of local and external alliance to sketch plausible scenarios for the fate of local allies. It proceeds in four parts. First, it draws distinctions between different types of local allies in Afghanistan based on position and relationship to the Afghan state and an external actor. Second, it examines the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan for relevant lessons for the fate of local allies. Third, it presents a scenario based on the foregoing that assumes there will be an ongoing small but significant international military presence and accompanying resources. Fourth, it presents a scenario that assumes there will be no or minimal international military presence and accompanying resources.     

Al Qaida on the US invasion of Afghanistan in their own words

This article consists of selected translations from captured interviews and dairies of Al Qaida members. The time period covered is from mid-2001 to early 2002 and concerns their operations in Afghanistan. The material clearly conveys a range of emotion, from confident to despondent, as well as efforts to contest the US actions. The first several pages give the reader context and some possible “lessons learned,” but the story(ies) are best told by the Al Qaida members themselves. All names are pseudonyms.     

Countering the Quetta Shura: a viable strategy to US policy in Afghanistan

The US strategy in Afghanistan has fallen short of neutralizing the insurgency that threatens the future stability. The primary insurgency's leadership council, the Quetta Shura, has effectively managed influence through a shadow government and superior tactics in recruiting marginalized tribal leaders, leading to a questionable outcome once Coalition forces withdraw in 2014. This article summarizes the threat posed by the Quetta Shura, coinciding with the deficiencies in the current US policy, and recommends a more viable strategy conducive to the current circumstances, based on historical and cultural precedence. Coalition forces have put a great amount of time, money, and effort into establishing a more stable Afghanistan. The USA needs a more aggressive strategy to counter the aspirations of the insurgency, thereby giving the Afghans the opportunity to further progress in the future. Under the current circumstances and policies, a peaceful transition after the Coalition withdrawal is becoming more unlikely.     

Deviant globalization: the application of strategic landpower*

In both Afghanistan and Iraq, US landpower was able to gain control rapidly over terrain. However, that control ebbed as US presence weakened. Non-state actors, such as the Taliban, the Haqqani network, the Islamic State, and Al Qaeda, gained control of segments of the population. Transnational Criminal Organizations capitalized on this permissive environment to strengthen their networks, often eroding the legitimacy of the host nation government, fueling regional instability, and, ultimately, undermining US policy objectives. The proliferation of deviant globalization, or the connectedness of subversive elements, is a key indicator of future conflict. Strategic landpower is uniquely positioned to influence the physical, psychological, economic, and social interactions of various non-state actors and their association with deviant globalization. It is no longer enough to seize and hold terrain. Landpower must also have the capability to influence the actions and attitudes of populations on that terrain wherever and whenever these interactions occur.     

The fateful phoenix: the revival of Al-Qa’ida in Iraq

Although the Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) is seen as a novel manifestation of Islamic extremism, it is in fact the latest, albeit perhaps the most effective, of a long line of revivalist movements in the Islamic and the Arab worlds. Its motivations – hisba and jihad – differ little from its predecessors and its ambitions – to create a state organised in accordance with the precepts of the Islamic caliphate – reflect a long-standing Islamic ambition. It differs, of course, in terms of the sophistication of its political and military strategies, which mirror the contemporary complexities of the world in which it operates, but its objectives recall long-standing Islamic ideals, even if articulated in radically brutal and extremist ways. More importantly, perhaps, ISIS or Da’ish, to give it its Arabic sobriquet, reflects the enormous degree of resentment inside the Middle East at the ways in which Western powers have intervened in regional affairs over recent years, particularly their support for regimes and economic systems there that have betrayed, in the popular imaginary, the essential principles of social justice that lie at the root of Islamic vision of ideal social order. Indeed, in many respects, its analysis of the world in which it operates and of the objectives it seeks differ little in essence from those any other resistance and rejectionist movement, whether religious or sectarian. More specifically, it has been the sectarian conflict that resulted from the reversal of political order in Iraq as a result of the 2003 American-led invasion that has driven the success of the movement in capturing widespread Sunni support. Whether it can manage the complexities of the administration of a state remains open to question.