Countering global insurgency

This article suggests that the War on Terrorism is actually a campaign against a globalized Islamist 1 1 In this article, the term ‘Islamist’ describes the extremist, radical form of political Islam practiced by some militant groups, as distinct from ‘Islamic’, which describes the religion of Islam, or ‘Muslim’, which describes those who follow the Islamic religion. In this article the term is used to refer primarily to Al Qaeda, its allies and affiliates. View all notes insurgency. Therefore, counterinsurgency approaches are more relevant to the present conflict than traditional terrorism theory. Indeed, a counterinsurgency approach would generate subtly, but substantially different, policy choices in prosecuting the war against Al Qaeda. Based on this analysis, the article proposes a strategy of ‘disaggregation’ that seeks to dismantle, or break, the links in the global jihad.2 2 This article uses the short form of the Islamic term jihad to mean ‘lesser jihad’ (armed struggle against unbelievers), rather than ‘greater jihad’ (jihad fi sabilillah), i.e. moral struggle for the righteousness of God. View all notes Like containment in the Cold War, disaggregation would provide a unifying strategic conception for the war – a conception that has been somewhat lacking to date.     

Warlords as alternative forms of Governance

Warlord is a label that currently besets us on all fronts. The 2001–2002 military action in Afghanistan is illustrative of the West's ambivalent view of armed factions in the developing world in general. The demonisation of the Taliban and the elevation of the former ‘warlords’ of the opposition to the rather more grandiose sounding ‘Northern Alliance’, at once formalising the hitherto informal nature of the warlord system, implies that the term ‘warlord’ is synonymous with anarchy, violence and a breakdown in civilised values. ‘Warlord’ has become an ugly, detrimental expression, evoking brutality, racketeering and terrorism. Analysts referring to violence across developing countries routinely refer to ‘new wars’ and ‘post-modern’ conflict, and yet the language used to describe these phenomena is usually pre-modern (medievalism, baronial rule, new feudalism). This article outlines some examples of historical warlords and draws out the common issues. In particular it emphasises the fact that warlords have been present for centuries and have periodically emerged whenever centralised political-military control has broken down. All that has changed through history is the technology available to each generation and the relative economic base. The article concludes with a series of implications for policy-makers currently considering intervention in warlord-based economies.     

CHILDREN IN THE SPOTLIGHT

September 11 2001 has put the spotlight on terrorism, and it has been at the apex of the international security agenda ever since. Politicians, lawmakers, scholars and others have been debating the meaning and definition of terrorism for many years. Numerous myths and misconceptions persist on this highly debated issue. With the aid of historical case studies, this article aims to demonstrate how broad a concept terrorism has become. It focuses on its subjective and value-laden interpretation and hence the difficulty of arriving at a universally acceptable definition. The author introduces the concept of ‘colonial terror’, which depicts a distinct form of state terrorism perpetrated during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Like many before her, the author concludes that the definition and meaning of terrorism lie in the eye of the beholder.

There are two ways to approach the study of terrorism. One may adopt a literal approach, taking the topic seriously, or a propagandistic approach, construing the concept of terrorism as a weapon to be exploited in the service of some system of power. In each case it is clear how to proceed. Pursuing the literal approach, we begin by determining what constitutes terrorism. We then seek instances of the phenomenon—concentrating on major examples, if we are serious—and try to determine causes and remedies. The propagandistic approach dictates a different course. We begin with the thesis that terrorism is the responsibility of some officially designated enemy. We then designate terrorist acts as ‘terrorist’ just in the cases where they can be attributed (whether plausibly or not) to the required source; otherwise they are to be ignored, suppressed or termed ‘retaliation’ or ‘self-defence’. (Noam Chomsky)     

The rationality of terrorism and other forms of political violence: lessons from the Jewish campaign in Palestine, 1939–1947

Does terrorism work? Its targets and victims steadfastly maintain that it does not; its practitioners and apologists that it does. Scholars and analysts are divided. But, if terrorism is as ineffective as many claim, why has it persisted for at least the past two millennia and indeed become an increasingly popular means of violent political expression in the twenty-first century? Using the Jewish terrorist campaign against the British in Palestine during the 1940s, this article attempts to shed light on this question. It concludes that notwithstanding the repeated denials of governments, terrorism can, in the right conditions and with the appropriate strategy and tactics, indeed ‘work’. At minimum, even if terrorism's power to dramatically change the course of history (along the lines of the 11 September 2001 attacks) has been mercifully infrequent; terrorism's ability to act as a catalyst or fulminate for either wider conflagration or systemic political change appears historically undeniable.     

Kinetic responses to global terrorism: Lessons from Africa

This essay recalls the immediate and longer-term responses of the US and its allies to the events of 9/11. It contends that the die for contemporary developments in transnational terrorism was cast in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 – in particular the launching of sustained ‘anti-terrorist’ military combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and more covert ‘kinetic’ operations elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa. The essay seeks specifically to expose the counter-productivity of using military operations as the primary antidote to transnational terrorism. Focusing on the African ‘laboratory’ and the spread of transnational terrorism and Islamic militancy, particularly in West and East Africa, the essay concludes that radical Islamists have mastered the ‘battle of the narrative’ and that the Western penchant for dispensing a kinetic brand of medication is feeding rather than fighting the virus of global terrorism.     

TERRORISM AND DETERRENCE POLICY WITH TRANSNATIONAL SUPPORT 1

This study provides an explanation of terrorism by examining interactions between the terrorist group with a minority as a potential pool of recruits and the government supported by a majority. A hawkish deterrence policy makes it more risky for terrorists to launch attacks, but heightens the anti‐government feeling of the terrorist group. In addition, the payoff for the government depends not only on the payoff loss associated with the level of terrorism, but also on the political payoff from the action itself of adopting a hawk policy due to its politicians’ vested interests. We first show that whether the deterrence policy should be ‘hawk to ‘dove is closely dependent on the relationships among the risk associated with terrorism, the anti‐government feeling of the terrorist group, and the political payoff for the government. This study then introduces transnational support enhancing the capability of a terrorist group to intensify its activity and shows that the emergence of transnational support may cause the government to reform its deterrence policy from ‘dove’ toward ‘hawk,’ with terrorism intensified in the society.     

SECURITY BRIEF

September 11 2001 precipitated the introduction of anti-terrorism legislation in most states and enhanced cooperation between states around the world. Africa may not have witnessed many incidents of international terrorism on its soil, yet the continent has, in the post 9/11 era, often been referred to as the ‘breeding ground of terrorism’ or the conduit for international terrorists. The assumption that countries with weak governments and failing economies (as in most of the continent) seems to be one of the factors that earned Africa this negative image. While the validity of the assumption is debatable, it is clear that prosecuting cases of terrorism is fraught with legal intricacies. This article deals with the difficulties involved.     

Intelligence reform and the transformation of the state: the end of a French exception

ABSTRACT

This article argues that the intelligence sector is a privileged vantage point to observe and analyse a transformation of the State in France, as this transformation deeply affects the heart of the executive power and the French intelligence and security apparatus. Traditionally, intelligence was not conceived in France as a functional tool in the hands of the decision-maker but was rather defined as a ‘regalian power’. Intelligence activities were derived from a very specific conception of the State, and especially the particular notion of ‘reason of State’ (raison d’État). The current intelligence reform prompts speculation as to whether it represents more than a ‘simple’ functional reorganisation or in fact could signify that intelligence is now recognised as a tool in the hands of a ‘État de droit’ (‘liberal state’). The idea of a French ‘exceptionalism’ is addressed through a theoretical approach of the way France redefines intelligence and surveillance in relation with a major evolution of the notion of ‘reason of State’ itself. Then the article illustrates the assumption of a ‘lost tradition’ of reason of State through an analysis of the current reform of the intelligence sector in France. This reform is based on processes of rationalisation, centralization, modernisation and normalisation of both intelligence activities and intelligence services in France. As a conclusion, the article addresses the reactions to the January and November 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, and asks whether resilience towards terrorism requires to accelerate the pace of the transformation of the French intelligence sector.     

Clausewitz’s Concept of Strategy – Balancing Purpose,Aims and Means

The task of coming to a proper appreciation of Clausewitz’s thoughts on war is to combine a hierarchical structure with that of a floating balance. This article examines the relation of purpose, aims and means in Clausewitz’s theory and highlights that this relation is methodologically comparable to the floating balance of Clausewitz’s trinity. Modern strategic thinking is characterised by the ‘ends, ways, means relationship’ and the concept of the ‘way’ as shortest possible direct connection between ends and means. If strategy is nothing else than the direct way of linking the political purpose with the means, understood as combat, this understandings results in ‘battle-centric’ warfare. My thesis is that the aim (goal, way) in warfare is not a direct link between purpose and means, but rather an indirect, intermediary dimension, a mediation (in Hegelian terms) between purpose and aims with its own grammar. This article distinguishes (sometimes going beyond Clausewitz) between the rationality of the whole process of war, the rationality of the separate aspects of purpose, aims and means in warfare and finally their conflicting tendencies. This article highlights Clausewitz’s different concepts of purpose and aims and tries to shed at least some light of the strategic implications of this difference. This interpretation of Clausewitz leads to the definition of strategy as maintaining a floating balance of purpose, aims and means in warfare.     

The ‘War on Terrorism’: What Does it Mean to Win?

Abstract

The war on al-Qaeda and its affiliates appears to be endless but every war must end. Winding down the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq has been difficult, but both were embedded in what was then called the ‘war on terrorism.’ What does ‘success’ in that war mean? With the death of bin Laden and the increase in drone operations, how far is the US from achieving it? Can this war end? The article analyzes the ongoing US response to the 9/11 attacks in historical context, revealing four patterns common to all prolonged wars: means become ends, tactics become strategy, boundaries are blurred, and the search for a perfect peace replaces reality. It concludes by laying out an effective strategy for ending the war.     

The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad factor in the Mali crisis

Mali has been a battleground for more than a year now. While the armed conflict came in the aftermath of the Libyan crisis that left the regional security environment depleted, it also served as a catalyst for the collapse of state authority in Mali. This created conditions conducive for the proliferation of, and attacks by, radical religious armed groups in the northern regions of the country, including the Tuareg armed movement: the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA). But, far from being a new phenomenon, the Tuareg-led armed insurrection in the northern regions is as old as the post-colonial Malian state, and continues to pose tremendous challenges in West Africa and the Sahel region for both regional and extra-regional actors. The recent crisis in the Sahel region is seen as one of the most serious since the end of the Cold War, with anticipated dire long-term impacts on the security of the region and beyond. While attention is predominantly focused on defeating the jihadist groups that have threatened the survival of the Malian state, one must not lose sight of the fact that the ‘Tuareg Factor’, as represented by the rebellion launched by MNLA, remains critical both in terms of appreciating the deterioration of the situation and attempting to frame long-lasting solutions. The paper argues that the Tuareg's persistent recourse to rebellion against Bamako needs to be understood within a historical trajectory that takes into consideration three key parameters: firstly, the post-colonial state in Mali and its African leadership's relations with the descendants of the Tuareg communities; secondly, the amalgamation created by the so-called war on terror; and, finally, the contradictions of the democratisation process of the 1990s.¹1 This article is based on field research carried out between 2008 and 2013 on the ‘Resurgence of Tuareg-led Rebellions’.     

Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorism

Many scholars and analysts have studied intelligence failure and surprise and developed theories to explain disasters such as the attack on Pearl Harbor. Others, especially since the 9/11 attacks, have examined the rising threat of terrorism and see it as posing a particularly difficult challenge for the intelligence community. But little work has been done to integrate the earlier literature on intelligence failure with the newer threat of terrorist attack. This article attempts such an integration, by examining the bombing of the US Marine Barracks in Beirut in 1983; it concludes that most studies of the Beirut bombing are mistaken in their assessment of the role played by intelligence in that disaster, and suggests that our understanding of intelligence failure against surprise attacks needs to be revised in the age of terrorism.     

Rebel movements in the DRC

Despite a generally valiant effort on the part of the United Nations (UN) since 1999 to bring peace and stability to the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the country continues to be destabilised by rebel forces. These armed movements pose a constant threat to the fragile transition in the DRC, and security in the country is continuously undermined. This article examines rebel forces in the DRC from two perspectives. Firstly, it examines such movements as a manifestation of sub-national terrorism. Secondly, it examines armed movements from the perspective of so-called ‘ungoverned spaces’. The view taken in this article supports the scholarly insight and argument that in countries such as the DRC, armed movements and militias are filling power vacuums that are the result of the inability and lack of military capacity of weak states to fight these movements effectively. Specifically, the eastern and north-eastern parts of the DRC have been major conflict zones where sub-national terrorists employ terror as a strategy. In this context, the DRC is severely affected by terrorism – a phenomenon in the DRC that is intimately linked to the failure to effect sustained development and to consolidate accountable and effective governance.     

Spies,advisors, and grunts: Film portrayals of counterinsurgency in Vietnam

Vietnam was a complex conflict, which historians and political scientists have struggled to understand. Some of the bitterest disputes in the historiography revolve around the US approach to counterinsurgency in Vietnam. Many different facets of the war have received the attention of filmmakers, and an examination of their work suggests new ways of thinking about the conflict. This article considers film portrayals of three phases of the Vietnam War – firstly, the early period of ‘political action’, then the advisory period, and finally the Americanization of the war after 1965. It suggests that by examining the experiences of participants in each of these phases, Vietnam War cinema helps to illustrate the problems that faced various American approaches to counterinsurgency in the conflict. Combined with the importance of films in determining popular perceptions of both historical conflicts and counterinsurgency in general, it suggests that they are worthy subjects of study and critique.     

Worth many sins: Al-Shabaab’s shifting relationship with Kenyan women

ABSTRACT

What happens when the world’s ‘oldest profession’ interacts with history’s oldest form of war? In the Horn of Africa, a symbiotic relationship between prostitutes and terrorists has emerged, illuminating critical information about the group’s ideology and strategy. In this article, we argue that al-Shabaab’s differential treatment of Somali and other East African women reveals the group’s strategic focus on Somalia, despite its claims to be a globally focused Islamic extremist organization. Through original ethnographic fieldwork in Kenya, the authors explore al-Shabaab’s deliberate relationships with different groups of women and explain how this helps scholars better understand the group. This article suggests the next phase of scholarship on gender and terrorism, encouraging scholars not only to pay attention to the relationship between women and terrorist groups, but to also examine the nuanced relationships between different categories of women and terrorist groups.     

Making Jihad or Making Money? Understanding the Transformation of Dagestan’s Jamaats into Organised Crime Groups

While terrorist and insurgent groups have often combined anti-state subversion with ‘purely‘ criminal activities in order to obtain the financial means to wage their ideological struggle, little is known about the transformation of such groups into non-ideological organised crime groups (OCG) with close links to authorities. This holds particularly for jihadist groups that have on ideological grounds ruled out collaboration with their archenemies – ‘infidels’ and ‘apostates’. Using unique ethnographic data from Russia’s Dagestan, this article explores the causes and contexts of the gradual transformation of some of Dagestan’s jihadist units – jamaats – into organised crime groups collaborating with local authorities.     

Rising Tide,Dispersing Waves: Opportunities and Challenges for Chinese Seapower Development

Abstract

This article surveys China’s current naval forces and considers key dynamics and possible Chinese naval futures to 2020, the projected end of Beijing’s ‘strategic window of opportunity’, the idea that a peaceful external environment for economic development, globalization, and integration of China into the global economy allows China to benefit from diversion of US attention to countering terrorism. It considers broad possibilities through 2030, the general limit of public US government projections, and by which time multiple factors will likely slow China’s growth and compete for leadership focus and resources.     

Terrorism research: should we focus on the opponent or on our own people?

In terrorism research, three different sources of information and data exist: the terrorists and their environment; the incidents; and the population. This article discusses the strengths and weaknesses of research that is concerned with, or relies on, any of the mentioned sources. An in-depth understanding of the methodological issues that come with these sources is important to correctly interpret results from scientific studies. It is highlighted how the different scientific approaches add to a holistic view of terrorism as a phenomenon. Furthermore, the double-edged sword of information in the field of terrorism is discussed. From these deliberations, guidance concerning the future work of both scholars and decision-makers can be deducted.     

TRENDS AND MARKERS

Africa is severely affected by sub-state terrorism—a phenomenon that is deeply rooted in the crisis facing a number of African states. While the importance of root causes in so-called sub-state terrorism is generally accepted, this issue is hotly contested internationally in debates on terrorism. In fact, both sub-state and transnational terrorism have essentially local causes and linkages, and therefore much of what is categorised as terrorism should be treated more appropriately as insurgencies. Recent events in Somalia are of particular concern, as Western responses to the war on terror may further complicate the domestic situation, with self-fulfilling results. Great care should be exercised by African states in adopting either the language of or the prescribed solutions for transnational terrorism as part of the ‘global war on terror’.     

The Botswana Defence Force and the War against Poachers in Southern Africa

‘Semper aliquid novi Africa affert’ (out of Africa this is always something new) wrote the Roman scholar Pliny the Elder, and that has been all too true of catastrophe and misery in modern times. Yet despite Africa's problems, the continent also offers many examples of humankind's most commendable achievements. This is one such story. It is the account of the successful struggle by a small but well disciplined and well led African army to protect a vital national resource, a role performed with dedication and consistent success since 1987. The fight against poaching in Botswana is a peculiar form of low-intensity conflict that poses significant political, operational and technical challenges. This article identifies some of those challenges and notes how the Botswana Defence Force overcame them, providing an example that may profitably be emulated elsewhere. The article also calls attention to evolution of military roles and missions in reaction to the novel threats of post the Cold War world.