ON ETHNIC CONFLICT AND THE ORIGINS OF TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

Using the ITERATE dataset, we explore the origins of transnational terrorist activity, from 1982 through 1997, in 118 countries. We model terrorism, not as a function of a nation’s ethnic, religious or linguistic fractionalization, but as an independent measure of perceived ethnic tensions. When we control for institutional quality, evidence that political rights and civil liberties mitigate the terrorism‐producing effects of ethnic tensions exists only since 1990. Economic freedoms, on the other hand, robustly reduce the number of terrorist attacks originating in ethnically tense societies.     

Deterring the Undeterrable: Coercion,Denial, and Delegitimization in Counterterrorism

This article argues that deterrence theory can be applied to counterterrorism. Doing so requires broadening the traditional concept of deterrence by punishment, expanding deterrence by denial to include defense, mitigation, and strategic hindrance, and developing deterrence by delegitimization to influence the political, ideological, and religious rationales informing terrorist behavior. In practice, deterring terrorism requires tailoring threats against state and individual facilitators, diffusing the intended consequences of terrorism, and manipulating terrorist self–restraints. When these and other deterrent leverages are applied simultaneously against various actors and processes involved in terrorism, coercion can be achieved.     

Spatial Distribution of Minority Communities and Terrorism: Domestic Concentration versus Transnational Dispersion

Qualitative studies of terrorist movements frequently highlight the importance of diaspora communities as important factors in producing and sustaining terrorist activity in countries. The underlying theoretical argument is that bifurcation of tight-knit minority communities between countries nurtures separatist or irredentist sentiments among affected community members, thus prompting terrorist activity, while minority community members in other countries might mobilize financial and political resources to support terrorist activity among their compatriots. In this study, we empirically test whether transnational dispersion, versus domestic concentration, of minority communities in countries produces higher incidents of terrorism. Conducting a series of negative binomial estimations on a reshaped database of around 170 countries from 1981 to 2006, derived from the Minorities at Risk database and the Global Terrorism Database, we determine that both transnational dispersion of kin minority communities and domestic concentration of minorities within countries increase terrorism and that transnational dispersion is a particularly robust predictor of terrorist attacks.     

FORECASTING SERIES CONTAINING OFFSETTING BREAKS: OLD SCHOOL AND NEW SCHOOL METHODS OF FORECASTING TRANSNATIONAL TERRORISM

Transnational terrorism data are difficult to forecast because they contain an unknown number of structural breaks of unknown functional form. The rise of religious fundamentalism, the demise of the Soviet Union, and the rise of al Qaeda have changed the nature of transnational terrorism. ‘Old School’ forecasting methods simply smooth or difference the data. ‘New School’ methods use estimated break dates to control for regime shifts when forecasting. We compare the various forecasting methods using a Monte Carlo study with data containing different types of breaks. The study's results are used to forecast various types of transnational terrorist incidents.     

Transnational terrorism as a spillover of domestic disputes in other countries

This paper models transnational terrorism as a three‐way strategic interaction involving a government that faces armed opposition at home, which may spill over in the form of acts of terrorism by the state's opponents against the government's external sponsor. The external sponsor also utilises deterrence against potential terrorists, which only lowers terrorism if terrorists are not intrinsically motivated by a deep‐seated sense of humiliation. The model highlights the importance of intrinsic motivation. A rise in the external power's preference for deterrence against terrorism may backfire in these circumstances. Increases in the government's military efficiency against the rebels, who are also terrorists against the government's sponsor, raises overall levels of violence.     

The Dark Side of Extended Deterrence: Thinking through the State Sponsorship of Terrorism

States employ extended deterrence to shield third parties from aggression. The concept is traditionally applied to interstate relations, collective security arrangements, and strategic considerations. The protective relationship that exists between a state sponsor of terrorism and its non-state militant proxy is rarely considered. This article will introduce and explore the sponsor–proxy relationship in the context of extended deterrence, and relate it to Iran’s support and sponsorship of political violence, militancy, and terrorism in Europe. The article reviews the rationale states have for sponsoring terrorism, and illustrates the promises and pitfalls associated with extending deterrence to non-state militants.     

Weakest‐link attacker‐defender games with multiple attack technologies

In this article, we examine a model of terrorism that focuses on the tradeoffs facing a terrorist organization that has two qualitatively different attack modes at its disposal. The terrorist organization's objective is to successfully attack at least one target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize an efficient but discrete attack technology — e.g., suicide attacks — when a more conventional mode of attack is available, and the optimal anti‐terrorism measures.© 2012 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Naval Research Logistics, 2012     

SUICIDE TERRORISM AND THE BACKLASH EFFECT

This paper presents a game‐theoretic model of suicide terrorism containing three agents: the terrorist leader; a targeted government; and potential terrorist supporters. Supporters join the terrorist group if they gain more from their participation than from their economic opportunities. Preemptive measures by the government can result in a backlash that encourages recruitment through new grievances. Suicide attacks can also lead to recruitment. Increases in preemption costs and/or economic opportunities can reduce the overall level of terrorism, while increasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks. An increase in the effect of preemption on recruitment, or the propaganda effect of suicide bombings has the opposite effect of increasing normal and suicide attacks, but decreasing the proportion of suicide to normal attacks in the terrorist organization’s strategy profile.     

Kinetic responses to global terrorism: Lessons from Africa

This essay recalls the immediate and longer-term responses of the US and its allies to the events of 9/11. It contends that the die for contemporary developments in transnational terrorism was cast in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 – in particular the launching of sustained ‘anti-terrorist’ military combat operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, and more covert ‘kinetic’ operations elsewhere in the Middle East and Africa. The essay seeks specifically to expose the counter-productivity of using military operations as the primary antidote to transnational terrorism. Focusing on the African ‘laboratory’ and the spread of transnational terrorism and Islamic militancy, particularly in West and East Africa, the essay concludes that radical Islamists have mastered the ‘battle of the narrative’ and that the Western penchant for dispensing a kinetic brand of medication is feeding rather than fighting the virus of global terrorism.     

Clash of counterterrorism-assistance-seeking states and their super power sponsors: Implications on the war against Boko Haram

ABSTRACT

Decade-long security cooperation and counterterrorism engagements in Nigeria have failed to bring down Boko Haram or at least weaken its terrorist structures and transnational spread. I argue that disconnects between counterterrorism-assistance seeking states and their superpower sponsors are implicated in the intractability of Boko Haram's insurgency in Nigeria. Why is the U.S. counterterrorism intervention to individual MNJTF countries (i.e. troop contribution, military funding and intelligence support) ‘lopsided’, ‘fragmented’ and ‘unevenly distributed;’ and how are these implicated in the fight against Boko Haram terrorism? This has impacted negatively on MNJTF countries – lack of cooperation, divisiveness and individualism in coordinating and forging offensives against Boko Haram. These concerns interface several blind spots in the picture of external influences on military’s approach to Boko Haram. I elicit primary data from top military officers. I conclude by predicting the implications and consequences of these counterterrorism complexities, and their potency to defeat or encourage Boko Haram terror.     

End of the cycle: assessing ETA’s strategies of terrorism

ABSTRACT

In May 2018, the Basque insurgent group Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) officially disbanded after a 60-year struggle. This inquiry assesses ETA’s violent campaigns using recent conceptual and theoretical advancements from the field of terrorism studies. Three conclusions concerning the group’s strategies of terrorism are advanced. First, ETA regularly targeted civilians to achieve goals other than coercing the Government of Spain; these objectives included outbidding rival separatist groups and spoiling negotiation processes. Second, ETA’s most rapid period of organizational growth occurred as the result of an aggressive terrorist campaign, demonstrating that civilian targeting can serve as a stimulus to rebel group recruitment. Finally, while terrorism did not advance ETA’s primary political objective of creating an independent Basque state, it did enable the group to assume a leading position within the radical Basque separatist movement, helping extend ETA’s lifespan and making the group an embedded actor within the contentious political processes surrounding the question of Basque self-determination. Collectively, these conclusions support recent theoretical findings arguing that non-state terrorism often enables insurgent groups to prolong their lifespans while paradoxically making it more difficult for them to advance their long-term political objectives.     

Remittances and terrorism: A global analysis

This paper is the first global investigation of the relationship between remittances and terrorism. To discern this relationship, we draw terrorism event data from the Global Terrorism Database and International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorism Events. When a host of standard terrorism controls is employed, lagged remittances as a share of gross domestic product have a positive and significant impact on both domestic and transnational terrorist attacks. For the venue country’s viewpoint, lagged remittances have a greater marginal impact on domestic than on transnational terrorism. However, when we investigate remittances to the home country of the perpetrator, lagged remittances have the greatest marginal impact on transnational terrorism. Throughout our investigation, standard terrorism controls perform according to our priors and those of the literature, lending credence to the isolation of the impact of remittances. We also account for endogeneity concerns.     

The rationality of terrorism and other forms of political violence: lessons from the Jewish campaign in Palestine, 1939–1947

Does terrorism work? Its targets and victims steadfastly maintain that it does not; its practitioners and apologists that it does. Scholars and analysts are divided. But, if terrorism is as ineffective as many claim, why has it persisted for at least the past two millennia and indeed become an increasingly popular means of violent political expression in the twenty-first century? Using the Jewish terrorist campaign against the British in Palestine during the 1940s, this article attempts to shed light on this question. It concludes that notwithstanding the repeated denials of governments, terrorism can, in the right conditions and with the appropriate strategy and tactics, indeed ‘work’. At minimum, even if terrorism's power to dramatically change the course of history (along the lines of the 11 September 2001 attacks) has been mercifully infrequent; terrorism's ability to act as a catalyst or fulminate for either wider conflagration or systemic political change appears historically undeniable.     

Deterrence of nuclear terrorism in the context of South Asia

Stability among the great powers during the Cold War is widely theorized in terms of nuclear deterrence. Rationality of States and their preference for survival are the basis of nuclear deterrence. The rationality of non-state terrorist groups is different from that of nation-states. Even though they are also rational actors with their own hierarchy of preferences, survival may not be their ultimate goal. Deterrence of nuclear terrorism is therefore different from deterrence against states. South Asia is more vulnerable to nuclear terrorism than any other region of the world for many reasons. This article analyzes the possibility of nuclear terrorism and the ways of deterrence against it in the context of South Asia.     

Military support and transnational terrorism

Analysing the relationship between the provision of military support and the probability of becoming the target of a terrorist attack, this paper contributes to the literature on the causes of transnational terrorism. We find that deployment of military troops of country X in country Y increases the probability of a terrorist attack on citizens of country X by a terrorist group located in country Y. Exporting weapons to country Y seems to increase the probability of being attacked by the terrorists of this country Y as well. Deploying materials, however, does not seem to significantly influence the probability of attack. Including lagged values for our military support variables ensures that the causality direction is from military support to terrorist attacks. Moreover, these results indicate that while the effect of military deployment on the probability of attack lasts for more than 1 year, the effect is rather short-lived.     

Deterrence of nuclear terrorism in the context of South Asia

Stability among the great powers during the Cold War is widely theorized in terms of nuclear deterrence. Rationality of states and their preference for survival are the basis of nuclear deterrence. The rationality of non-state terrorist groups is different from that of nation-states. Even though they are also rational actors with their own hierarchy of preferences, survival may not be their ultimate goal. Deterrence of nuclear terrorism is therefore different from deterrence against states. South Asia is more vulnerable to nuclear terrorism than any other region of the world for many reasons. This article analyzes the possibility of nuclear terrorism and the ways of deterrence against it in the context of South Asia.     

Urban gangs evolving as criminal Netwar actors

The nature of conflict and crime is changing. Technology allows groups to spread their influence without regard to geographic limitations. A shift from hierarchies to network organizational forms is also occurring. As a consequence non‐state actors can extend their influence to gain social, political or economic power and challenge state institutions. This article examines the potential for gangs, transnational criminals and terrorists to embrace network forms and utilize technology to wage netwar. Factors which influence ‘third generation’ gang organization (politicization, internationalization and sophistication) are described to illustrate how a net‐based threat can mature. A move toward network organization within transnational criminal organizations and terrorist groups demonstrating the potential for these classic criminal entities to emerge as netwar actors is also reviewed. Finally, the need for state institutions such as the police and military to develop networked responses to combat networked threats is stated.     

CHILDREN IN THE SPOTLIGHT

September 11 2001 has put the spotlight on terrorism, and it has been at the apex of the international security agenda ever since. Politicians, lawmakers, scholars and others have been debating the meaning and definition of terrorism for many years. Numerous myths and misconceptions persist on this highly debated issue. With the aid of historical case studies, this article aims to demonstrate how broad a concept terrorism has become. It focuses on its subjective and value-laden interpretation and hence the difficulty of arriving at a universally acceptable definition. The author introduces the concept of ‘colonial terror’, which depicts a distinct form of state terrorism perpetrated during the colonial and post-colonial periods. Like many before her, the author concludes that the definition and meaning of terrorism lie in the eye of the beholder.

There are two ways to approach the study of terrorism. One may adopt a literal approach, taking the topic seriously, or a propagandistic approach, construing the concept of terrorism as a weapon to be exploited in the service of some system of power. In each case it is clear how to proceed. Pursuing the literal approach, we begin by determining what constitutes terrorism. We then seek instances of the phenomenon—concentrating on major examples, if we are serious—and try to determine causes and remedies. The propagandistic approach dictates a different course. We begin with the thesis that terrorism is the responsibility of some officially designated enemy. We then designate terrorist acts as ‘terrorist’ just in the cases where they can be attributed (whether plausibly or not) to the required source; otherwise they are to be ignored, suppressed or termed ‘retaliation’ or ‘self-defence’. (Noam Chomsky)     

Worth many sins: Al-Shabaab’s shifting relationship with Kenyan women

ABSTRACT

What happens when the world’s ‘oldest profession’ interacts with history’s oldest form of war? In the Horn of Africa, a symbiotic relationship between prostitutes and terrorists has emerged, illuminating critical information about the group’s ideology and strategy. In this article, we argue that al-Shabaab’s differential treatment of Somali and other East African women reveals the group’s strategic focus on Somalia, despite its claims to be a globally focused Islamic extremist organization. Through original ethnographic fieldwork in Kenya, the authors explore al-Shabaab’s deliberate relationships with different groups of women and explain how this helps scholars better understand the group. This article suggests the next phase of scholarship on gender and terrorism, encouraging scholars not only to pay attention to the relationship between women and terrorist groups, but to also examine the nuanced relationships between different categories of women and terrorist groups.     

FIGHTING TERRORISM: ARE MILITARY MEASURES EFFECTIVE? EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM TURKEY

The present article aims at investigating the causal relationship between defense spending and terrorism in Turkey using the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing procedure and Granger‐causality analysis. The findings reveal that there exists a unidirectional causality running form terrorist attacks to defense spending as expected, but not vice versa. In the light of this finding it can be inferred that military anti‐terrorism measures alone are not sufficient to prevent terrorism.