Myopic Government and Strategic Rebels: Exchange and Escalation of Violence

This study presents a model in which the innate inability of a government to fully comprehend the ramifications of its actions, herein referred to as the myopia of the government, leads to underinvestment in counterinsurgency measures and examines the nature of exchange of violence between the government and rebels. While the idea that voters’ or a government’s myopia leads to myopic policies is well established in the related literature, surprisingly, it has never been incorporated into conflict studies. As far as we are aware, this is the first ever study that analyzes the effects of a government’s myopia on the exchange and eventual escalation of violence when the rebels are in their trying stages and shows situations in which the two-sided violence could be either strategic substitutes or complements. The results suggest that in case of a foresighted government, the acts of two-sided violence are strategic complements. When the government is myopic, however, the rebels’ use of violence is a strategic substitute for the government’s violence. The trade-off, according to the model, lies in exchanging higher levels of violence for lower chances of revolt.     

‘Today we shall drink blood’: internal unrest in Nigeria

Despite some tentative internal peace agreements, Nigeria continues to face violence from multiple groups. This violence feeds upon itself, with segments of the population being mobilized both for self defense and for pressing their ideological and practical goals. These multiple sources of violence, which the Nigerian government appears unable to control to any significant degree, have a long term corrosive effect on the country's internal stability. There are few reasons to be sanguine as to any rapid changes to the level of overall violence or the relative number of armed groups, although their specific identities may shift. Nigeria represents a good case study of a country in which relatively low but persistent violence by a multiplicity of groups can have major impacts on internal security.     

The centrality of checkpoints for civilians during conflict

Analyses of the violence–displacement relationship motivate a disaggregation of violence into violence in residential areas (home violence) and violence along migration routes (road violence). These two forms of violence have opposite effects upon displacement, with home violence increasing displacement and road violence decreasing displacement. Yet, conflict scholarship would benefit from additional consideration of the specific activities that constitute road violence. This consideration reveals that road violence primarily involves displacement-deterring violence at checkpoints. This motivates the question: How does checkpoint violence deter displacement? Using interviews with Syrian and Somali refugees, as well as daily data on violence and displacement in Somalia, this paper argues that state and non-state armed groups create and foster uncertainty at checkpoints. Then, they use dramatic violence that is tangible to civilians through their ability to physically see, hear, and smell evidence of it as propaganda. As propaganda, the deterrent effect of checkpoint violence is amplified beyond isolated violent events. More broadly, results from quantitative analysis of the daily data on violence and displacement in Somalia indicate that uncertainty about road violence (road uncertainty) and uncertainty about home violence (home uncertainty) amplify the effects of road violence and home violence, respectively.     

Mediation,Peacekeeping And Civil War Peace Agreements

The post-civil war agreement phase is vulnerable to credible commitment problems, a lack of government capacity to implement, and/or mutual vulnerability to retribution from violating the agreement. This study’s main contribution is to demonstrate the combined utility of mediation and UN peacekeeping. Mediation builds trust and confidence and works with the parties to design an efficacious agreement conducive to, among other features, tamping down post-agreement violence. Peacekeeping stems violence and facilitates the implementation of the agreement. Agreements that are mediated and followed by UN peacekeeping are expected to be more robust in terms of staving off violence. We report the effects of the mediation–peacekeeping interaction using a method correcting for a common misinterpretation of interaction terms. We test logit and hazard models using a sample of full and partial civil war peace agreements signed between 1975 and 2011. Controlling for agreement design, democracy, and income per capita, the results indicate mediation and its interaction with peacekeeping reduce the probability of renewed/continuing violence and have a positive impact on agreement duration. We also report brief case study evidence from the 1990s peace process in Guatemala.     

New directions for African security

African security, particularly conflict-related political violence, is a key concern in international relations. This forum seeks to advance existing research agendas by addressing four key themes: domestic politics and peacekeeping; security sector reform programs; peace enforcement; and the protection of civilians. Each of the articles in this forum makes a case for analyzing African agency when it comes to African security. As a way of introduction, this short article sets out the main debates and concludes by providing further directions for future research.     

Turning the tides of war: The impact of private military and security companies on Nigeria’s counterinsurgency against Boko Haram

Since the 2003 war in Iraq, private military and security companies (PMSCs) have become increasingly legitimate actors in modern conflicts. Despite this normative shift, rumours in March 2015 regarding the use of South African mercenaries in Nigeria to combat Boko Haram insurgents caused an international outrage, while the Nigerian government remained nonchalantly silent on the matter. This article investigates the impact of mercenaries on the conflict in the last six months of the Jonathan government. Using primary and secondary qualitative research, it assesses the role that PMSCs played in Nigeria’s counterinsurgency strategy, along with the ensuing reaction of international and local media to the outsourcing of violence to foreign companies. The article concludes that – notwithstanding the improved image of PMSCs in the world, and the actual impact of the contractors on the Nigerian counterinsurgency effort – the stigma of mercenaries continues to plague the industry, particularly on the African continent.     

Using public health information to inform,build support and implement policies for gun violence prevention: A case study from the gun ban referendum

Gun violence is one of the most serious health problems in Brazil. Information on gun deaths and injuries is collected by the Ministry of Health. This data has been used very successfully to inform and design public policies for preventing gun violence. This article analyses the use of public health information by researchers and activists, as well as government officials and the media, to reveal the severity of firearm injuries and deaths and to gain consensus on the need for reforms to national gun laws. It also assesses the resounding ‘no’ vote in a recent disarmament referendum to decide whether to prohibit the sale of guns and ammunition. The results of the Brazilian referendum are a lesson to other countries struggling to deal with high levels of gun violence, showing that it may not always be enough to have data to back up efforts to change policies—as people's decisions around gun ownership and use, as well as their choices regarding security policies, are motivated by a complex interaction of factors.     

The case for Azawad

Since Mali achieved independence from France, the marginalised Tuareg population of Mali has sought independence and the right to form their own nation, ‘Azawad’. These efforts have continuously been frustrated by the Tuaregs' neighbours, due to competing nationalist pride and interests in the mineral resources believed to lie under the northern Malian soil. Thus far, the Tuaregs of northern Mali have been largely neglected and denied both inclusive and effective governance by the various Malian governments from the southern Malian capital of Bamako. When negotiations have failed, Tuareg attempts to seize their own independence through violence have been brutally crushed by the Malian government. The Malian government will neither advance the interests of the Tuaregs nor allow them the freedom to pursue their own path in the world. The advent of the ‘Arab Spring’ in Libya provided another opportunity for the Tuaregs to pursue their dreams of an independent Azawad. Tuareg fighters returning from Libya carried with them both considerable combat experience and stockpiles of arms that they used to temporarily free their homeland. Unfortunately, the Tuaregs' whirlwind conquest of northern Mali was undone by the emergence of a new transnational threat in the Sahel. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) supplanted the previously victorious Tuaregs and attempted to turn Azawad into a Taliban-esque caliphate. French intervention defeated AQIM, but set the stage for a continuation of the cycle of violence and instability borne from the unwillingness of the international community to support the Tuaregs' legitimate right to self-determination.     

The Insurgency Environment in Northeast India

The northeast states of India have faced a series of insurgencies almost since independence. Most insurgent groups have been based on the competing demands of various ethnic groups, with conflicts not only between the insurgents and the government, but also between groups. The combination of anti-government and intercommunal violence shows little sign of ending. Although the Indian government has made progress in dealing with the largest groups, the continued existence of several dozen insurgent movements represents a significant security threat to internal stability in India.     

Signaling resolve,democratization, and the first battle of Fallujah

Perceptions and efforts to signal resolve can play an important role in counterinsurgency. The Coalition offensive against Fallujah in April 2004 demonstrates the limitations of relying on military force to signal resolve. The offensive catalyzed insurgent violence in Iraq and generated popular support for the insurgency. The Coalition prematurely halted the offensive because the Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) could not maintain support for the Coalition in the face of popular outrage. Given the importance of democratizing Iraq and establishing a sovereign government, the objections of the IGC could not be ignored. Without Iraqi political support, military force ultimately signaled weakness instead of resolve.     

On Government-industry Nexus and Indigenous Armed Resistance

This paper proposes a simple game-theoretic framework for analyzing the relationship between the government, industry and indigenous community, especially in the context of mounting violence surrounding displacement of indigenous communities by governments for the purposes of commercial use of their habitat. It specifically takes into account the possibility of alleged ‘nexus’ between the government and the industry and explores its implications on the level of allocation and utilities of the players. We find that the bias in allocation that occurs when the government and the industry enter a ‘nexus’ can be rectified when there is resistance from the indigenous groups. Moreover, rebellion is a dominant strategy of the indigenous community, irrespective of whether there is ‘nexus’ or not, and being in ‘nexus’ with the government is a best response for the industry. The unique SPNE occurs when there is ‘nexus’ between the industry and the government and resistance by the indigenous groups, corroborating the widespread allegations of ‘nexus’ and evidence of resistance worldwide. We also explore a few extensions of the basic model and present some narrative evidence in support of the theoretical model.     

The Maoist insurgency in India: between crime and revolution

Since 2004, the Indian government has described the country's Maoist insurgency as a grave threat to domestic security. A study of the sustaining dynamics behind Maoist violence suggests that the rebels are growing operationally stronger due to profits derived from organized crime. Having built up a parasitic economy that operates within the boundaries of nominal state control, they are proceeding to undermine that same control. In effect, the Maoists have assumed characteristics of a Mafia group. With India's economic growth having surged in recent years, their ability to finance aggressive operations and consolidate their subversive infrastructure has increased correspondingly.     

Are PRTs Supposed to Compete with Terrorists?

This chapter discusses the impact Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) have on the security situation in Afghanistan, specifically in countering the terrorist threat and in counter-narcotics.

The Afghan people define the lack of security as their country's greatest problem. The terrorist activities of groups opposed to the central government and the political process compounded by violence related to the opium trade are seen as the main sources of insecurity. The authors argue that, currently, PRTs should not assume active counterterrorism as an additional main area of operation. The complexity of Afghanistan's security environment and the pressure to have PRTs involved in the counter-narcotics effort underscore the necessity of local knowledge and experience in the PRTs. Participation of indigenous actors, such as NGOs, in the PRT-organisational structure could provide this required expertise.     

RETHINKING CONFLICT TRAJECTORIES

South Africa and Kenya experienced various forms of conflict and gross human rights abuse between 1948–1994 and 1963–2002 respectively. In both situations, the conflicts were motivated by various factors; these included unequal distribution of socio-economic resources and skewed political relationships. The centrality of human rights abuse and political violence to both situations places similar issues on the agenda for analysis. In both cases opposition to regimes was justified on the basis that the political systems were constructed in such a way that limited alternative conceptions and prevented democratic freedom (until 19921 in Kenya and 1994 in South Africa). After undergoing transition to democratic rule in 1994, South Africa engaged the idea of a truth and reconciliation commission as an instrument for dealing with its past conflicts. The South African case animated widespread international interest and after an electoral victory in 2002, the National Rainbow Coalition (NARC) government in Kenya mooted the same idea. By the end of 2004 however the NARC government seems to have lost interest in the truth commission concept; this paper probes the question why? Broadly there is room for alternative interpretations both within and between the two cases on how conflicts were perpetuated and the potency of a truth and reconciliation commission as a viable alternative for dealing with past conflicts. This paper broadly aims to offer a clearer account of conflicts and mechanisms for dealing with them from the conceptual lenses of conflict management theory.     

Violence and the state: Lessons from Colombia

Whether or not Colombia has improved is a controversial topic. If improvement has occurred, what, if any, lessons from the Colombian model can be learned? The first lesson is that Colombia's problems were caused more by a weak state than by drugs. The second lesson is that improving state capacity requires more than just increased security. The state must also provide the basic social services that citizens require to gain and maintain their support. Additionally, government institutions need to improve their professionalism, protect human rights, and root out impunity and corruption. The alternative is to suffer from new cycles of violence as old foes are vanquished, but new ones emerge.     

Domestic violence legislation for development,peace and security in Nigeria

Though laws have been enacted in different parts of Nigeria to address some aspects of gender-based violence, domestic violence persists with serious consequences for social and economic development. Nigeria has not enacted specific domestic law that is applicable throughout the federation, despite the United Nations mandate to all countries to adopt and enforce such laws by 2015. This article examines the causes and nature of domestic violence in Nigeria, and the legal reform needed to address the situation. In addition to library sources, the study used focus group discussions and individual interviews (involving the general population, key informants, legislators and traditional rulers) to discover that enacting specific national domestic violence legislation is necessary to address the problem in Nigeria, but enacting laws alone is not a magic bullet.     

Strategic terrorism: The framework and its fallacies

This article seeks to lay out a comprehensive framework by which those who utilize a campaign of strategic terrorism seek to attain their ends. It identifies a distinctive modus operandi: 1) disorientation: to alienate the authorities from their citizens, reducing the government to impotence in the eyes of the population; 2) target response: to induce a target to respond in a manner that is favorable to the insurgent cause; 3) gaining legitimacy: to exploit the emotional impact of the violence to insert an alternative political message. By elucidating the strategy of terrorism, the analysis also reveals its inherent limitations. Resting on the premise that a militarily more powerful adversary will in some way feel restrained from bringing the full force of its military superiority to bear, the strategy relies exclusively on the exploitation of the psychological effects of armed action, thereby rendering it vulnerable to those who are willing to view the resolution of clashes of interest principally in terms of the tangibles of military power.     

Remembering the war of liberation: legitimacy and conflict in contemporary Algeria

The aim of this article is to consider how Algeria's most prized achievement and treasured memory – the FLN's victory over the French in the war of liberation – has helped stimulate and sustain the violence that has blighted the country since independence. It argues that successive governments have propagated a legend of the war that encourages and legitimises rebellion and armed resistance. By celebrating the actions and achievements of a committed band of revolutionaries they have established a precedent whereby it is every citizen's duty to oppose and resist an unjust government. Time and again therefore, insurgent groups like the FFS, MIA, and AIS have justified their actions and won popular support by portraying themselves as the early FLN's natural heir.     

The Kashmir insurgency: As bad as it gets

In January 2000, the Kashmir militancy is gaining ground and Indian forces are on the defensive. This is despite a decline in militancy from 1996 to mid‐1999. While India has managed to secure greater international support from the West, the failure of an elected state government in Kashmir to regain the confidence of Kashmiris has cost Delhi support. The militant revival is being driven by increasing professionalism, along with strong support from backers in Pakistan. Given there is now a 12‐year period of violence to analyse, new literature brings interesting insights.¹