公安现役部队非战争军事行动训练面临的挑战与对策

当前,边境安全形势复杂、训练理念陈旧、部队勤训矛盾突出、训练内容与安排不合理、训练保障能力有限等主客观因素,制约着公安现役部队非战争军事行动训练的开展,对公安现役部队形成非战争军事行动战斗力构成了挑战。树立科学的非战争军事行动训练指导思想与理念,创新训练方法和手段,优化训练内容,加强教员队伍建设和训练基地建设,是改进非战争军事行动训练的有效对策。     

运用人民战争思想营造良好警卫环境

人民战争思想是战争年代我军战胜日本帝国主义和国民党反动派的强大思想武器，和平建设时期的警卫工作同样需要运用人民战争思想营造良好的警卫环境，为完成繁重的警卫任务创造条件。因此，在全社会构建大警卫格局具有极其重要的意义。     

外军野营供水装备的特点及对我军的启示

分析总结了外军野营净水装备的系列化、高技术化、野战化等特点,提出了我军应从水源、供水规模和使用气候条件等方面成系列研制净水装备,并用高新技术对供水安全、降低能耗等关键技术进行攻关研究,以适应现代战争需要。     

基于复杂网络的机群作战建模与仿真

机群作战已成为战争中的主要作战形式之一。而传统的作战模型,已经不适应其多任务驱动、多机种协作的机群作战特性。为此,以复杂网络为基础,提出了一种构造不同类型的节点连接的动态生成算法,构建了反映真实作战场景的网络描述模型,较好地呈现出了机群作战中的涌现性、模糊性等诸多性质。并提出了描述机群作战网络的统计特征量,通过破击仿真实验,得出了与战争事实相符合的结论,为未来研究机群作战体系效能评估打下了基础。     

The essence of war: French armies and small war in the Low Countries (1672–1697)

In the late seventeenth century during the Dutch War (1672–1678) and the Nine Years War (1688–1697), French armies relied on small war for the accomplishment of essential tasks and as part of an overall strategy of exhausting their opponents in the Low Countries. The purposes of small war included the imposition of contributions on enemy populations, the destruction of the enemy base of operations, blockades of fortresses, and the general support of campaign armies. The expression ‘small war’ in the French language appeared with growing frequency in the 1690s. Small war can be viewed as both a cause and consequence of the characteristics of these wars. The limited policy goals of Louis XIV the king of France required a strategy that minimised risk and accomplished the goal of reducing if not eliminating the Spanish presence in the Low Countries that bordered the north of France. As French armies increased in size during this period, the demand for specialists at small increased in order to provide security and ensure supply. Small war in the late seventeenth century was thus not ideologically motivated insurgency, but in the minds of French commanders an essential component of strategy and the nature of war.     

Recasting Afghan strategy

The following article aims to examine current counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy in Afghanistan to posit an untried theoretical concept of operations for the war being waged there. By doing so it shall argue that Coalition and NATO forces operating there may be required to fundamentally recast Afghan war-policy if a resurgent Taliban and Al-Qa'eda are to be countered in both the military and political spheres of present day Afghanistan. By way of strategy this article shall posit that a more optimal strategy in Afghanistan, in light of the campaign's apparent difficulties, might be to seed local security apparatuses, designated herein as ‘Rural Paramilitary Forces’.     

The continuing resonance of the war as risk management perspective for understanding military interventions

In the late 1990s and 2000s, a slew of books and journal articles proposed that a nexus between risk management and warfare was emerging. This article argues that risk management ideas continue to shape recent campaigns against Libya, Islamic State, Syria, and the war on terror from Niger, Yemen to Somalia. It uses existing literature on risk and warfare to examine four key aspects of contemporary interventions. First, the article evaluates the overall strategic context as security concerns shift from terrorism toward renewed great power competition. Second, it re-assesses the risk calculus for military action through the language and grammar of risk invoked by politicians. Third and fourth, it addresses the continuing reliance on air power and the managerial ethos of military operations as important features of war as risk management.     

Military intelligence and the problem of legitimacy: Opening the model

This brief essay looks at some of the emerging dilemmas facing the Intelligence Community (IC), and suggests a model for action that is based on the growing importance of legitimization now evident in all phases of US military activity abroad. The challenge for the IC is to satisfy the needs of a demanding and highly varied set of consumers while maintaining a clear priority on missions of military concern. When the legitimization priorities of broadly varied mission tasks are disaggregated and linked with the intelligence cycle, we see that total war, limited war, and operations other than war (OOTW) have distinct and incompatible priorities. Rather than try to adapt the existing system to fish‐out‐of‐water applications, and in the process degrade the capabilities of the IC to conduct total warfare support operations effectively, it may be time to envision a new, parallel intelligence agency for the support of limited war and OOTW.     

Introduction: Exploring the jungle of terminology

When twentieth-century authors wrote about ‘partisan warfare’, they usually meant an insurgency or asymmetric military operations conducted against a superior force by small bands of ideologically driven irregular fighters. By contrast, originally (i.e. before the French Revolution) ‘partisan’ in French, English, and German referred only to the leader of a detachment of special forces (party, partie, Parthey, détachement) which the major European powers used to conduct special operations alongside their regular forces. Such special operations were the classic definition of ‘small war’ (petite guerre) in the late seventeenth and in the eighteenth centuries. The Spanish word ‘la guerrilla’, meaning nothing other than ‘small war’, only acquired an association with rebellion with the Spanish War of Independence against Napoleon. Even after this, however, armies throughout the world have continued to employ special forces. In the late nineteenth century, their operations have still been referred to as prosecuting ‘la guerrilla’ or ‘small war’, which existed side by side with, and was often mixed with, ‘people's war’ or popular uprisings against hated regimes.     

When Peacekeepers Fail Thousands are Going to Die. The ETO in Rwanda: a Story of Deception

This study develops the concepts of fourth generation operations and the associated principles. First, the concept of fourth generation operations is introduced and defined. Fourth generation operations are the evolution and extension of third and fourth generation warfare based on a change of tactics, technology, and combatants. These operations are currently ongoing in Afghanistan and Iraq, and with the global war on terrorism. Based on the framework of US joint doctrine, the supporting principles of fourth generation operations are developed. This requires the introduction of the principle of Population Perception.     

Productive War: A Re-Conceptualisation of War

Conventional wisdom on the phenomenon of war is criticised for providing little relevant guidance to deal with the security challenges of our era. One reason is that this attitude uncritically assumes power as synonymous with force. In response, ‘productive war’ is here proposed as a re-conceptualisation of war based on Michel Foucault's alternative understanding of power. Productive war appreciates the role of violence but subordinates it to non-kinetic dynamics influencing the dimension of meaning in international security. This theoretical perspective provides a conceptual framework to deal with the dynamics of political mobilisation essential to create public support for nation-building abroad and for visions of world order.     

Conceptualizing the War in Afghanistan: Perceptions from the Front, 2001–2006

Analytical focus on military operations in Iraq continue to overshadow analysis of the war in Afghanistan as it enters its sixth year. It is now possible to discern several clearly-delineated periods of coalition counterinsurgency and stabilization operations. What is the nature of the war and how has it evolved? Has there been success so far in Afghanistan?     

I Fear,Therefore I Am: Victimhood and the Struggle for Ontological Security in the Liberia Truth Commission

Civil wars cause extreme insecurities, both physical and ontological. Ontological security is the state of identity stability and predictability, generated by social and cultural routines and the continuity of collective identities and the meanings they produce. What is the impact of civil war on dynamics of ontological security and insecurity? And is it possible to prevent the reconstruction of ontological security around exclusionary identities? The paper develops a theoretical framework for the analysis of ontological insecurity during and after civil wars, and examines it in the case of the Liberian civil war (1989–2003). The war saw the mobilisation and victimisation of large parts of the population in various ways, introducing unprecedented instability and unpredictability, and causing widespread ontological insecurity. Ontological insecurity in the wake of the war resulted in extreme mistrust and a lingering sense of victimisation. The Liberia TRC, among other attempts to address the injustices of the past, did not resolve these complexes, but rather led to the reconstruction of ontological security around the ‘victim’ identity in the country, with dire implications for transitional justice in the country.     

Budget allocation under uncertainty and the costs of war and insecurity

This study presents a framework and models for the analysis of government budget allocation into defense and civilian expenditures in situations of uncertainty about the incidence of war. The models display the intricate relationships between security levels, subjective probabilities of the occurrence of war, and potential war damages. We show that poor countries tend to perceive greater probabilities of war than their richer rivals, and that the psychological burden of insecurity is larger when the country’s wealth is larger and when its preference for security is higher. We apply our models to the Israeli–Syrian arms race and show that the higher rate of growth of Israel’s gross domestic product relative to that of Syria is expected to lead to an increase in Syria’s perception of the likelihood of war and to a decrease in Israel’s perception of such a likelihood. We also show that if Syria’s regime becomes ideologically more extreme, the monetary cost of maintaining Israel’s security at the level that it enjoyed prior to the change will be very high, whereas the monetary cost of maintaining Israel’s welfare will be moderate.     

空天防御效能指标及其标准值的确定方法

空天领域的对抗决定了未来军事行动的进程和战争的胜败,空天威胁也已经成为各国国家军事安全的主要威胁。军事强国的全球打击系统、快速打击系统和弹道导弹的迅猛发展使得未来空天防御作战环境越来越复杂,也对空天防御作战提出了更高要求。空天防御是信息化空天时代的主要作战样式之一,是维护国家安全的重要屏障。本文提出了空天防御的充分性准则以及保证空天防御充分性的主要途径,分析了拟制空天防御力量行动方案的一般流程。文中所提出的空天防御效能指标以及确定和保证标准值指标的方法,能够从经济学视角较为合理、充分地构建和实施空天防御,对空天防御作战规划理论建议有一定参考价值,也能为发展空天防御作战规划系统提供研究思路和技术支撑。     

THE POST-9/11 SECURITY AGENDA AND PEACEKEEPING IN AFRICA

There are two mainstream schools of thought about the impact of the war against terror on international efforts to resolve African conflicts. One sees in the war against terrorism a renewed focus on eradicating the root causes of civil war in Africa and elsewhere, simply because it is believed that it is these conditions that foster the kind of political alienation that propels people into committing acts of terror. The other sees the continued marginalisation of Africa by powerful nations that, despite rhetoric to the contrary, have clearly become so preoccupied with their own security agenda that the bulk of resources will be directed towards combating the symptoms, rather than the root causes, of terrorism. This article asserts that the US, UN and African responses to 11 September open the door for a manipulation and redefinition of terrorism to justify crackdowns on legitimate dissent, and that peacekeeping and peace-building in Africa must inevitably take a back seat to the war on terror. It calls for a more sober and balanced perspective on what is needed to cope with the ever-increasing challenges to human security in Africa.     

微分对策界栅理论在舰艇作战能力评估中的应用

作战能力是表征战斗舰艇战术技术性能的一项重要指标,如何正确评价舰艇的作战能力一直是军事运筹研究的热点.利用定性微分对策的界栅理论研究了一类作战问题,通过构造捕获区面积和咽喉区域面积,并以此作为动态评估舰艇作战能力的衡量指标.研究结果可为综合评价舰艇作战能力提供一条新途径.     

网络舆论战效能评估探析

网络舆论战作为联合作战的重要组成部分,地位作用越来越突出,如何科学评估网络舆论战效能,是当前迫切需要解决的重点难点问题。文章探讨将多智能体建模仿真技术应用于网络舆论战效果评估,建立网络舆论战效能评估指标体系,构建网络舆论战效能评估模型,开发网络舆论战效能评估仿真系统软件,为信息化条件下的网络舆论战教育训练和作战提供辅助决策支持。     

The Needs of Political Policy versus the Reality of Military Operations: Royal Navy Opposition to the Arctic Convoys, 1942

It has become commonplace, especially in the post-Vietnam strategic environment, to quote Clausewitz's dictum that war is the continuation of policy by other means. We are told that military operations are dictated by, and must serve, clear political ends. Such thinking has been invoked to support everything from punitive strikes, to peacekeeping missions, to the ‘Powell’ doctrine and its political ‘exit strategies’, but at times political policy and military operations do not mix. In 1942 the Royal Navy bowed to political pressure and, against its collective better judgement, continued the Arctic convoys to the Soviet Union. These military operations culminated in the destruction of convoy PQ 17 in early July. This conflict between political policy and military strategy provides an object lesson of why in war issues of means and priorities must outweigh the importance of any given political policy.     

A Matter of Choice: Strategy and Discretion in the Shadow of World War II

American policy-makers are predisposed towards the idea of a necessary war of survival, fought with little room for choice. This reflects a dominant memory of World War II that teaches Americans that they live in a dangerously small world that imposes conflict. Critics argue that the ‘choice versus necessity’ schema is ahistorical and mischievous. This article offers supporting fire to those critiques. America's war against the Axis (1941–45) is a crucial case through which to test the ‘small world’ view. Arguments for war in 1941 pose overblown scenarios of the rise of a Eurasian super-threat. In 1941 conflict was discretionary and not strictly necessary in the interests of national security. The argument for intervention is a closer call that often assumed. This has implications for America's choices today.